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ABSTRACT 
Access to the Internet and participation in discourse through the medium of the Internet 
have become integral parts of our democratic life.  Facilitation of this democratic potential 
critically relies on a governance structure supportive of the right to freedom of expression.  
In western democracies, governance is largely the preserve of the private sphere. This is 
because of two reasons.  First, the communication technologies that enable or disable 
participation in discourse online are privately-owned.  In order to find information, we use 
search engines.  In order to sort through the clutter, we use portals.  In order to access the 
Internet, we need to use Internet Service Providers (ISPs).  Thus we inevitably rely on these 
companies to participate in discourse online and they thereby become gatekeepers to our 
digital democratic experience.   
Second, governance of such technologies has been largely left to companies to address 
through corporate social responsibility (CSR) frameworks such as in-house codes of conduct 
found in Terms of Service, through the work of bodies such as the Internet Watch 
Foundation (IWF), and industry initiatives such as the Global Network Initiative (GNI).  The 
state has stayed out of it, rigidly retaining the focal point of free speech laws on 
government.  This has fractured the administrative structure of free speech between free 
speech as a legal concept and as an experienced concept.  It is in this fissure that CSR has 
grown and taken shape.   
This thesis argues that the CSR frameworks that currently govern the activities of these 
information gatekeepers are insufficient to provide the standards and compliance 
mechanisms needed to protect and respect freedom of expression online.  Equally, top-
down legal controls are too blunt a tool for this tricky arena.  What is needed is a framework 
that embraces the legal and extra-legal dimensions of this dilemma. To that end a new 
corporate governance model is proposed to help mend the deficiencies identified in the 
case studies and move forward with a democratic vision for the Internet.  
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‘One of the greatest ironies of this period in history is that, just as technology remakes our 
world, the need to maintain the human dimension of our work, and a company’s sense of its 
social responsibility, is growing at an equally rapid pace.  Harmonising economic growth with the 
protection of human rights is one of the greatest challenges we face today.’ Mary Robinson, 
former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights1 
 
 ‘The problem of maintaining a system of freedom of expression in a society is one of the most 
complex any society has to face. Self-restraint, self-discipline, and maturity are required.  The 
theory is essentially a highly sophisticated one.  The members of the society must be willing to 
sacrifice individual and short-term advantage for social and long-range goals.’ Thomas Emerson2 
  
                                                          
1
 Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, Business and Human Rights: A Progress Report 
(2000), www2.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/business.htm (last visited 20 July 2011), Preface. 
2
 T.I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 10. 
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PREFACE 
The methodology of this thesis is doctrinal in nature, interpreting cases, legislation and 
academic research, to determine the rules and principles as applied to Internet Information 
Gatekeepers (IIG), a term defined in chapter two, and how these impact on the exercise of 
freedom of expression online.  However, given the focus on CSR and human rights, there is 
an extra-legal, and importantly, policy focus as well.  Indeed the model proposed in the final 
chapter is both legal and extra-legal in nature.  This partly reflects the fact that the law has 
struggled to keep pace with technological change and thus an examination of Internet 
governance quickly leaves the law behind.   It is where the law ends that this thesis grounds 
its policy analysis in theories of CSR and human rights to help carve out the best path for 
governance of the gatekeepers that are the focus of this thesis. Thus the methodology used 
is necessarily a hybrid, between the law on the one hand, rooted in its social context, and 
theories of CSR and human rights on the other.  This thesis is ultimately policy oriented, 
asking what the harm is, how the law addresses this harm and - where insufficiencies are 
found - whether the law is the way to mend them.  
The thesis is organised as follows.  Chapter 1: The Internet as a Democratising Force, 
examines the Internet’s potential to be both a tool of democracy and a tool of control, 
setting up for the reader the critical role played by private gatekeepers in making discourse 
online possible and the need for human rights compliant governance structures in order to 
facilitate this democratic potential. In Chapter 2:  A Framework for Identifying Internet 
Information Gatekeepers, the IIGs studied in this thesis will be identified and rooted in their 
impact on democratic culture.   
In Chapter 3: Corporate Social Responsibility in Cyberspace, CSR theory will be examined, 
tracing its history and establishing its relationship with the law and human rights and how it 
is being used in practice.  It will show that the promise of CSR in the digital environment is in 
deploying human rights principles to non-public bodies, which operate largely outside the 
remit of traditional human rights law.  Ultimately, however, the largely voluntary nature of 
CSR instruments makes it a difficult candidate as a stand-alone governance tool for IIGs and 
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freedom of speech. The chapter will conclude by delineating the methodology of the case 
studies. 
Chapters 4 and 5 comprise case studies of two macro-IIGs to determine the compliance of 
their governance structures with the principles underlying Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the criteria in the Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework developed by John Ruggie the former Special Representative of the United 
Nations Secretary-General on business & human rights.  In Chapter 4: Direct Mechanisms of 
Information Control: ISP Filtering, I examine the role of ISPs in filtering content, in particular 
the role of the industry regulatory the IWF.  In Chapter 5: Indirect Mechanisms of 
Information Control: Search Engines, the case study examines the role of search engines in 
controlling information flows through search rankings.   
Chapter 6: A Corporate Governance Model for the Digital Age draws together the findings of 
the case studies and examines their significance to the question of whether CSR is enough 
on its own to provide the standards and compliance mechanisms needed to protect and 
respect freedom of expression online.  In this chapter an alternative corporate governance 
model will be proposed to address the deficiencies identified in the thesis and through the 
case studies. 
Some final preliminary matters should be addressed here. First, the thesis takes account of 
developments to June 2011. In addition, as has already become apparent no doubt, several 
acronyms are used throughout this thesis. Each chapter is treated as a fresh introduction to 
terms.  However, for ease of reference, a Glossary is at page 253.  Third, while the nature of 
Internet regulatory research tends toward an international focus, the focus of this thesis, in 
particular the focus of the solution proposed in chapter six, is on the UK jurisdiction in its 
European context, although considerable comparative work is done with other jurisdictions 
in particular the US. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE INTERNET AS A DEMOCRATISING 
FORCE 
The Internet has the power to be a tool of democracy, but its potential in this respect is at 
risk. This is because the same technology that can be a positive force for the discursive 
values underlying democratic culture can also be a tool of control. The same technology that 
facilitates discourse creates opportunities for censorship of information, monitoring of 
online practices, and the subtle shaping and manipulation of behaviour.  This is not to say 
that the architecture of the Internet does not somewhat determine how the Internet is 
used,1 but ultimately the Internet is neutral in the face of the human agents that control its 
use.  As Kofi Annan stated in 2003, ‘[w]hile technology shapes the future, it is people who 
shape technology, and decide to what uses it  can and should be put.’2  In this chapter I will 
explore the positive aspects of technology to set out what is at stake if we do not intervene 
to secure the requisite freedoms into the Internet’s governance structure.  This grounds the 
inquiry in this thesis into the role of private gatekeepers in facilitating or hindering this 
democratic potential through their control of the pathways of communication.   
Based on a theory developed by Jack Balkin, the Internet’s democratic potential will be 
argued to be rooted in its ability to promote democratic culture.  Threaded through this 
argument will be the centrality of communication to democracy.  In saying that the Internet 
has the potential to be a democratising force what will be asserted in this thesis is that the 
Internet can help facilitate deliberation and participation in the forms of meaning-making in 
democratic society.  The distinction between the Internet having potential to be a 
democratising force and it achieving it must be noted at the outset.  Attempts have been 
                                                          
1
 See L. Winner, ‘Do artifacts have politics?’ in the D. MacKenzie and J. Wajcman (eds.), The Social Shaping of 
Technology, 2
nd
 edn (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999), discussing whether artifacts can have built in 
politics.  With regard to the Internet, Lawrence Lessig famously argues that the Internet’s code is law: L. Lessig, 
Code and other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 
2
 K.A. Annan, ‘Break the technology barrier – the word information summit’ (9 December 2003), at 
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/articleFull.asp?TID=11&Type=Article (last visited 9 August 2011). 
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made empirically to prove that the Internet facilitates democracy but such studies are 
compromised by the numerous variables present.3  The goal of this chapter is more 
modestly to identify democratic culture as the type of democracy that the Internet can 
facilitate and to explicate the characteristics of the Internet that give it this potential.   
This chapter sets up the broader investigation of this thesis into our reliance for facilitation 
of the Internet’s democratic potential on privately-owned ‘Internet Information 
Gatekeepers’ (IIGs).  The term IIG will be defined and examined in detail in chapter two; 
briefly it means a gatekeeper which facilitates or hinders deliberation and participation in 
the forms of meaning making in democratic culture.  Every time we use the Internet we 
engage with IIGs.   In order to find information, we use search engines.  In order to sort 
through the clutter on the Internet, we use portals.  In order just to access the Internet, we 
need to use Internet service providers (ISP).  To be able to participate on message boards, 
we go through a host.4  The role of such regulators has not yet been settled and as of yet 
they do not have any democratic or public interest mandate5 that assures the Internet’s 
democratic potential is being facilitated.  If the Internet is a democratising force, we 
inevitably at present must rely on these IIGs for the realisation of this aspect of its capacity. 
It is argued in this thesis that the corporate social responsibility (CSR) frameworks that 
currently govern the activities of IIGs are insufficient to meet their human rights obligations, 
and without intervention, the continuation of their work in its current mode will hamper the 
ability of the Internet to work as a tool of democracy. 
To that end this chapter will first orient the reader with a history of the rise and fall of the 
concept of the Internet as a democratising force.  It will then examine the elastic concept of 
democracy and articulate the substance and appropriateness of democratic culture as the 
type of democracy most capable of facilitation by the Internet.  This will include an analysis 
                                                          
3
 Michael Best and Keegan Wade attempted an empirical study of the effect of the Internet on democracy 
from 1992-2002. The authors were only able to conclude that their study suggests a positive, but not absolute, 
link between Internet penetration and democratic development.  The authors also summarise other empirical 
studies of the Internet’s democratising effect showing mixed results: M.L. Best and K.W. Wade, ‘The Internet 
and Democracy: Global Catalyst or Democratic Dud’ (Research Publication No. 2005-12: Berkman Center, 
2005). 
4
 See discussion by Sandor Vegh, ‘Profit Over Principles: The Commercialization of the Democratic Potentials of 
the Internet’ in K. Sarikakis and D.K. Thussu (eds.), Ideologies of the Internet (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton 
Press, 2006). 
5
 P.M. Shane (ed.), Democracy Online: The Prospects for Political Renewal Through the Internet (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), p. 54. 
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of the narrower, and for our purposes, ill-fitting concept of deliberative democracy most 
famously discussed by Jürgen Habermas.  Lastly, this chapter will look more closely at the 
ways that the Internet is promoting democratic culture and the criticisms thereof, focusing 
on the Internet’s facilitation of information access and participation in politics and culture. 
 
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE INTERNET 
 
The Internet was celebrated in its infancy as a democratising force.  Its decentralised 
structure invited anti-establishment-type rhetoric arguing that it was uncontrollable by 
governments, and that it was a new space outside of legal institutions and territoriality.6  
‘Information wants to be free’7 was the slogan.  The courts reflected this optimism, noting 
the increasingly important role of the Internet in facilitating communication in democratic 
society. In ACLU v. Reno,8 one opinion famously described the Internet as a vast library 
which anyone can access, and a platform from which anyone can publish, continuing that 
anyone ‘can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 
soapbox.’9  
In the late 1990s, however, the reality of the Internet’s regulability began to crush cyber-
libertarian idealism.  Discussions no longer centred on the Internet as a democratising force, 
and rather were about the forces waiting to clamp down on it.  With publications by Joel 
Reidenberg10 and Lawrence Lessig,11 a new constraint was recognised.  It was not just 
governments and laws that regulated behaviour, but those entities (inevitably private) that 
controlled the technology - the code writers and engineers who as a result of their work 
                                                          
6
 D.R. Johnson and D.G. Post, ‘Law and Borders – The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’ (1996), at 
www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost/Borders.html (last visited 21 July 2011).  
7
 Popularised by John Perry Barlow in ‘Selling Wine Without Bottles: Economy of Mind on the Global Net’ 
(March 1994), at http://virtualschool.edu/mon/ElectronicFrontier/WineWithoutBottles.html (last visited 21 
July 2011), though it has been attributed originally to Stewart Brand, who stated, ‘Information wants to be free 
because it has become so cheap to distribute, copy and recombine – too cheap to meter. It wants to be 
expensive because it can be immeasurably valuable to the recipient’: The Media Lab: inventing the future at 
MIT (New York: Penguin Group, 1987), p. 202. 
8
 (1997) 521 U.S. 844, Justice Stevens delivering the opinion of the Court. 
9
 Ibid. pp. 852-3, 896-7. 
10
 J.R. Reidenberg, ‘Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology’, Tex. 
L.R., 76(3) (1998) 553. 
11
 Lessig n. 1. 
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delineated the environment of our social life.12  The message was that treating cyberspace 
as a separate place that will flourish if left alone by governments will not ensure the 
freedoms sought, because that ignores the indirect ways that governments can regulate as 
well as the ways architecture can be harnessed by private parties to constrain behaviour.   
We also witnessed the increased regulation of the Internet by states, which continues 
today.13  Through the use of filtering and blocking technologies, countries such as China and 
Syria have developed tools to prevent their population accessing undesirable content.  
China has famously erected the great firewall of China, Syria prevents access to the entire 
Israeli .il domain, and many other states routinely filter access to websites with 
pornography, and dissident or human rights-oriented content.14  Sites such as 
www.youtube.com, are routinely blocked.  For example, Turkey blocks the posting of videos 
deemed offensive to the memory of its founding father Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.15  During 
the protests across Africa and the Middle East in 2010 and 2011, filtering technologies were 
readily employed by states to block access to communication technologies that were seen 
as enabling and mobilising the protesters.16    
                                                          
12
 Ibid. pp. 85-86. 
13
 See R.J. Deibert et al, Access Controlled: the shaping of power, rights, and rule in cyberspace (MIT Press, 
2010), and the earlier R.J. Deibert et al, Access Denied: the practice and policy of global Internet filtering (MIT 
Press, 2008). 
14
 R.J. Deibert & N. Villeneuve, ‘Firewalls and Power: An Overview of Global State Censorship of the Internet’ in 
M. Klang and A. Murray (eds.), Human Rights in the Digital Age (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2005), pp. 121-
22. 
15
 The ban was briefly lifted between October 30 2010 and November 3 2010: A. Hudson, ‘Turkey lifts its ban 
on YouTube-agency’ (30 October 2010), at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/10/30/oukin-uk-turkey-
youtube-idUKTRE69T1JE20101030  (last visited 21 July 2011), and I. Villelabeitia, ‘Turkey reinstates YouTube 
ban’ (3 November 2010), at www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/03/us-turkey-youtube-
idUSTRE6A227C20101103 (last visited 21 July 2011). 
16
 See for example, discussion of blocking of access to twitter: D. Kravets, ‘What’s fueling Mideast protests? It’s 
more than Twitter’ (28 January 2011), at www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2011-01/28/middle-east-protests-
twitter?page=all (last visited 22 July 2011).  Egypt went so far as to shutdown connection to the Internet 
nationwide in January 2011 (see M. Crete-Nishihata, ‘Egypt’s Internet Blackout: Extreme Example of Just-in-
Time Blocking’ (28 January 2011), at http://opennet.net/blog/2011/01/egypt%E2%80%99s-internet-blackout-
extreme-example-just-time-blocking (last visited 22 July 2011).  Google traffic reflected what was being 
reported: Google, ‘Transparency Report’, at www.google.com/transparencyreport/traffic/ (last visited 22 July 
2011). Google and Twitter created a ‘Speak to Tweet’ tool that enabled Twitter users to post tweets by leaving 
voice messages which the tool then turned into tweets: Google, ‘Some weekend work that will (hopefully) 
enable more Egyptians to be heard’ (31 January 2011), at http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/some-
weekend-work-that-will-hopefully.html (last visited 22 July 2011).   
14 
 
Filtering is not limited to Asian or Middle Eastern countries.17  Germany blocks certain 
Nazi/hate websites.18  Europe now has a ‘notice and takedown’ regime for defamatory 
content.19  In the United Kingdom, access to sites with child sexual abuse images is 
blocked20, and Communication Minister Ed Vaizey has held a series of meetings with ISPs to 
discuss the potential for filtering all pornographic material.21  There are discussions 
underway in Europe to expand the range of material filtered online.  Leaked minutes from a 
February 2011 European Union Working Party showed discussion of a European wide filter 
of illicit material.22  
While these concerns remain, more recently, we have moved into a new phase aptly 
described by one scholar as the time of the ‘cyberrealists’,23 where discussions of the 
Internet as a democratising force are re-emerging but with more sophistication and less 
naivety than in the past.  Partly this is due to the speed with which the Internet is becoming 
the very things that the writers of the early 1990s forecast it would be.  The Internet has 
quickly moved from primarily being used for information access, to become a participatory 
environment more closely mimicking the democratic participation traditional in the physical 
world.  Although this interactivity was available on the early Internet in the form of message 
boards and the like, they were not mainstream and did not offer the same range of tools as 
are available now.  This participative environment, coined ‘Web 2.0’ by Tim O’Reilly24, is 
difficult to define comprehensively, although it is best captured by Stephen Fry’s definition: 
Web 2.0 is an idea in people’s heads rather than a reality. It’s actually an idea 
that the reciprocity between the user and the provider is what is emphasised. 
                                                          
17
 See http://opennet.net/research/regions/europe (last visited 22 July 2011). 
18
 Diebert and Villeneuve n. 14, p. 121. 
19
 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects 
of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market. 
20
 See work of the Internet Watch Foundation, and see the case study in chapter four of this thesis. 
21
 G. Halfacree, ‘Ed Vaizey calls for mandatory filth filter’ (22 December 2010), at www.bit-
tech.net/news/bits/2010/12/22/vaizey-calls-for-filth-filter/1 (last visited 22 July 2011).  The UK has even toyed 
with the idea of filtering terrorist sites: See Out-law.com, ‘Government will introduce ISP pirate-blocking 
obligation next week, says leak’ (12 December 2008), at www.out-law.com/page-8868 (last visited 22 July 
2011). 
22
 http://opennet.net/blog/2011/05/proposed-eu-internet-filtering-condemned-civil-liberties-groups (last 
visited 22 July 2011). 
23
 Shane n. 5, p. xii. 
24
 See the following discussion by Tim O’Reilly about the coining of the term: ‘What is Web 2.0’ (30 September 
2005), at www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.html (last visited 22 July 
2011).  
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In other words, genuine interactivity, if you like, simply because people can 
upload as well as download.25 
It is a notion that describes the maturing Internet’s combination of ‘aspects of the 
telephone, post office, movie theatre, television, newspaper, shopping mall, [and] street 
corner’.26 Users are simultaneously creators and consumers of content.27  They are citizen 
journalists, pirates, gossips, politicians and artists.   
The Internet will only become increasingly participatory as it continues to develop, with 
increasing possibilities for democracy.  The next generation of the Internet is the semantic 
web,28 which is best described as ‘an enhancement that gives the Web far greater utility.’29  
In this future, computers will be able to meaningfully read and process the data on networks 
such that if I input a question online the answer is customised to me.  It will also mash data 
together, as Tim Berners-Lee describes it,30 and manage information for you.  Pictures you 
take might be linked to your calendar so that you know where and when you took them, 
planned travel might trigger updates of your medical file and booking of flights, car rentals 
and entertainment.31  The World Wide Web Consortium sees the semantic web as a 
standardisation of two things, first of the formats integrating and combining data, and 
second of the languages used to relate data to the real world.32  It is within this interactive 
environment that we can readily identify opportunities for participation in democratic 
culture, and identify the growing power of private gatekeepers to shape discourse. 
  
                                                          
25
 Video interview with Stephen Fry available at http://www.videojug.com/interview/stephen-fry-web-20 (last 
visited 22 July 2011).   
26
 R. Rosenzweig, ‘How Will the Net’s History Be Written? Historians and the Internet’ in H. Nissebaum & M.E. 
Price (eds.), Academy & Internet (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2004), p. 26. 
27
 D. Rowland, ‘Free Expression and Defamation’ in Klang and Murray n. 14,  p. 56. 
28
 The vision of the semantic web was articulated by Tim Berners-Lee. See ‘The Semantic Web’ (17 May 2001), 
at www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=the-semantic-web  (last visited 22 July 2011). 
29
 L. Feigenbaum  et al., ‘The Semantic Web in Action’, Scientific American (Dec 2007), reproduced with 
permission, www.thefigtrees.net/lee/sw/sciam/semantic-web-in-action (last visited 22 July 2011).  
30
 K. Franklin, ‘Google may be displaced, says World Wide Web creator Tim Berners-Lee’ (13 March 2008), at 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/03/13/nweb113.xml (last visited 22 July 2011).  
31
 Feigenbaum n. 29.   
32
 See explanation by the World Wide Web Consortium: http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/ (last visited 22 July 
2011). This would include such things as the tags used to identify the subject matter of an article, blog post or 
discussion. See n. 29. 
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II. WHICH DEMOCRACY FOR THE INTERNET? 
 
Every communication technology from the printing press to the radio has at one time been 
celebrated as having a democratising force, but in this context few ask what is meant by 
democracy.33  This is compounded by the difficulty in defining the very idea of democracy, 
depending so much (as it invariably does) on one’s discipline or perspective.  It is an elastic 
concept that can be approached both as an institutional construct and as an aspiration. It 
has cynically been described as a non-existent34, or as a ‘vague endorsement of a popular 
idea’. 35 The goal here is not to join the debate with my view of the proper definition of 
democracy, nor to engage in a discussion of the various forms of government in which 
democracy is manifest36; rather it is to articulate the democracy most capable of facilitation 
by the Internet, and most capable of facilitation or hindrance by IIGs. 
We are living in an Information Age,37 where access to information and participation in the 
circulation of information is a distinguishing feature of our world.38  It is an era represented 
by a shift from the manufacturing jobs typical of the industrial society to a world in which 
jobs are increasingly devoted to the creation, handling or circulation of information.  In this 
networked society information flows dominate and shape our ways of life, because of the 
speed and distance that information circulates39 and our dependence on ‘the production 
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and distribution of information [as] a key source of wealth.’40   In this information society, 
the Internet has emerged as a key tool for the creation and circulation of information, but 
more broadly, it has developed into an important mechanism for participation in democratic 
culture.   
Yochai Benkler was correct in commenting that the early Internet theorists’ beliefs that the 
Internet is a democratising force ‘was correct but imprecise.’41  With the costs of entry low 
and the architecture decentralised42, the Internet invites mass participation at 
unprecedented levels.  In this sense, it finds favour with Ithiel de Sola Pool’s seminal work 
Technologies of Freedom, in which the author describes decentralisation of communication 
networks as the ‘fostering’ of freedom.43  For example, users can immediately publish their 
reactions to news stories in sections such as the BBC’s ‘Have Your Say’ or on Twitter.  Yet if 
the Internet is to achieve its democratic potential it must tackle difficult problems of the 
digital divide; the division between the haves and have-nots of the information society; 
concentration of the market; fragmentation of discourse; and of quality control.44  There are 
also unpredicted problems such as the balkanisation of knowledge through the continual 
viewing of the same small group of websites45, and the entrenchment of these websites at 
the top by the self-referencing of these sites in blogs, Twitter, or on search engine results.46  
However, this does not mean that the Internet does not have democratic potential, but 
rather that it is more complex than was previously thought.  What it means is that how we 
think of notions of democracy, the public sphere, and information must be tweaked to 
better reflect the complex and swiftly evolving Internet.47   
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Under traditional conceptions of democracy there are three types that the Internet might 
facilitate: electoral, monitorial and deliberative democracy.48  Electoral democracy is 
commonly known in the Internet context as e-government, the direct political 
communication between the state and its citizens.  For example, countries are increasingly 
delivering public services and information to citizens directly through the Internet by setting 
up websites to recruit volunteers and seek financial support for election campaigns.49  
States are increasingly embracing the electronic casting of votes.50  In addition, countries are 
exploring ways to facilitate citizen to government discourse, such as the UK Government’s e-
petition website to facilitate citizen petitions.51  Monitorial democracy refers to the bottom-
up, grassroots activism that can be facilitated by the Internet.52  These groups monitor 
political actions of governments and non-governmental organisations by using the Internet 
to organise protests and disseminate information.53  Deliberative democracy refers to 
participation by individuals in open debate in the belief it will lead to better decisions on 
matters of common concern.54  It reflects ‘the participative practice of democratic life’55 and 
was said to have originated in town halls and public squares, and in pubs and coffee houses, 
anywhere where groups came together to exchange their views on issues of the day.56  
Most commonly it is framed as participation in the public sphere, a term most notably used 
by Jürgen Habermas, and discussed further below.   
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While the Internet can certainly contribute to all of these facets of democracy, its key 
contribution to democracy is as a facilitator of participation.  Although participation is 
present in all three forms of democracy identified above, it finds its home most closely in 
deliberative democracy.  This is because participation is experienced in cyberspace by 
communication and deliberative democracy is at its core a communicative framework.57  
However, deliberative democracy does not quite capture what is so significant about the 
participative practices on the Internet either, being altogether too narrow a concept for 
what I have been describing here, something that will be explored in more detail shortly.  An 
examination of deliberative democracy is necessary, however, as it has a presence in the 
democracy promoted here, in particular concerning the concept of the public sphere.  This 
thesis, however, will frame its definition of democracy in none of the three areas we have 
been discussing up to now but rather in the broader notion of democratic culture, which 
better embodies the participative practices we have been discussing. 
A. Deliberative Democracy 
 
The Deliberative democracy concept has two essential features for the purposes of analysis 
here, both of which have different potentialities and drawbacks as embodying the 
democratic potential of the Internet.  First, at its core, deliberative democracy is about 
valuing the rational and open exchange of opinions as the ideal way to reach understanding 
and agreement concerning common issues of concern.  
One of its key theorists is Jürgen Habermas, who takes a normative approach in which he 
idealises what he has described as the rational debates that took place within bourgeois 
society in the coffee houses of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.58  He argues that 
legitimate decisions are only made when preceded by a period of rational discourse that 
satisfies certain rules. 59   This is described as the ideal speech situation, and requires, for 
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example, that everyone who wishes to speak must have the opportunity to do so, and that 
all speakers must be free from coercion.60  Thus the communication sought in deliberative 
democracy is more than simple communication: it requires that the interchange is reasoned 
and open and pushes toward the goal of publicly acceptable decisions.61  As Vincent Price et 
al. state, ‘[w]hat makes opinion deliberative is not merely that it has been built upon careful 
contemplation, evidence, and supportive arguments, but also that it has grasped and taken 
into consideration the opposing view of others.’62  There is a mythical tint to deliberative 
democracy, a nostalgic idealisation of citizens meeting in coffee houses to exchange 
reasoned political thoughts.63  Most Internet-based discourse would fail to satisfy these 
rules.64   
In a 2006 journal publication Habermas made a ‘passing remark’ on the applicability of his 
theory to the Internet.  He commented that while the Internet provides egalitarian 
opportunities for communication, it fragments discourse, and in a way that echoes the 
arguments of Cass Sunstein (discussed in more detail later in the chapter) said this: 
The Internet has certainly reactivated the grassroots of an egalitarian public of 
writers and readers. However, computer-mediated communication in the web 
can claim unequivocal democratic merits only for a special context: It can 
undermine the censorship of authoritarian regimes that try to control and 
repress public opinion. In the context of liberal regimes, the rise of millions of 
fragmented chat rooms across the world tend instead to lead to the 
fragmentation of large but politically focused mass audiences into a huge 
number of isolated issue publics.65 
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Most of the technologies discussed later in this chapter, such as blogs, social networking 
sites and message boards, are not decision-making tools, but are rather solely tools for 
discourse.66 And most of the social norms or Terms of Service that govern behaviour on such 
sites would fail Habermas’s rigid rules of discourse.67  Deliberation also excludes many forms 
of communication that the Internet is particularly good at facilitating, such as poetry, 
humour and satire.  Such communications are meaningful to what I have been calling here 
democratic culture.68   
The second element of deliberative democracy is ‘the institutional arena’69 in which such 
rational communication takes place.  This is the concept of the public sphere for which there 
has been considerable discussion with regard to the Internet’s democratic potential.70  The 
Internet might not necessarily facilitate the type of discourse deliberative democracy 
envisions, but by offering spaces for such discourse it might be said to play, in an 
institutional sense, a democratising role.    Granted, rational communication might be a pre-
condition to the public sphere, but equally one first needs a space in which deliberative 
communication might take place.71  In this sense, it might be better to describe the Internet 
as creating a new public space, as contended by Zizi Papacharissi, which does not yet 
constitute a public sphere. 72   
The public sphere, as Habermas describes it in The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere73, is a ‘network for communicating information and points of view’.74  It is a 
metaphorical space where individuals gather to participate in rational discourse on issues of 
                                                          
66
 Froomkin n. 64, p. 14. 
67
 A thorough discussion of this is outside of the scope of this chapter, but see part V of M. Froomkin’s article, 
A.M. Froomkin, ‘Habermas@Discourse.Net: Towards a Critical Theory of Cyberspace’, HLR, 116(3) (2003) 751. 
68
 A. Pinter & T. Oblak, ‘Is There a Public Sphere in This Discussion Forum?’ in Sarikakis and Thussu n. 4, p. 156. 
69
 Dahlberg n. 48, p. 168. 
70
 In a modern account, P. Dahlgren conceptualises it as consisting of three dimensions:  the structural 
dimension focused on institutional characteristics of ownership, regulation, laws and finance, the 
representational dimension focused on media output in the form of broadcasts, newsletters and so on, and 
the interactive dimension focused on individuals interactions with both the media and between themselves: P. 
Dahlgren, ‘The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation’, Political 
Communication, 22 (2005) 147, p. 148-150. 
71
 This is also discussed in chapter five regarding the need of access to a forum of communication in order to 
engage in freedom of expression, and see E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 2
nd
 edn (Oxford University Press, 
2005), p. 274. 
72
 Z. Papacharissi, ‘The Virtual Sphere: the internet as a public sphere’, New Media & Society, 4(1) (2002) 9, pp. 
22-23. 
73
 Habermas n. 58. 
74
 Habermas quoted in Pinter and  Oblak n. 68, p. 99. 
22 
 
the day, such as the coffee house discussed above.  Through this role it is seen as a vehicle 
for societal integration.75  In modern society as social organisation took on a larger scale, the 
mass media became viewed as ‘the chief institutions of the public sphere.’76 It became their 
role to express the varying viewpoints of the day and keep the public informed.  In 
Habermas’s view, the modern public sphere has collapsed in comparison with this earlier 
period and he has sought to revive it by placing discourse firmly at its centre.   
The Internet might be an answer to Habermas’ call for a reinvigorated public sphere by, as 
Michael Froomkin describes it, ‘draw[ing] power back into the public sphere,’77 because it 
uniquely offers a participatory environment unavailable with traditional media.  It is a shift 
from the mass-media public sphere, where relevance was decided by a select few 
constrained by space (for newspapers) and time (radio and television), and fed to the 
masses in a one-to-many structure, to a many-to-many structure where groups of 
individuals can simultaneously be contributors and consumers of their culture.  At the same 
time cultural technologies such as the telephone, television, and cinema have been 
multiplying and ‘our identities increasingly come to be constructed by, and expressed 
through, what we consume.’78   
By opening up a discourse tool to mass participation, it also has the potential of facilitating 
the creation of communities;79 democracy is partly something experienced, which is done 
through the social organisations that educate citizens on how to engage socially and 
politically.80  Before the Internet, full democratic participation was hamstrung by the sheer 
inability of bringing together numerous people in one place for rational discussion.81  With 
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the removal of spatial and temporal bounds,82 and the freedom to participate anonymously 
or pseudonymously, the Internet facilitates town-hall type gatherings and the creation of 
communities that might not have otherwise formed.  Although Internet communities are 
hard pressed to compete with the strength of a real-world community, this may change as 
the younger digital generation ages.  The Internet can be a way to create a community 
despite distance and despite borders.83  
We must be mindful not to stretch Habermas’ theory of the public sphere too far.  In his 
2010 interview Habermas opined that the Internet is not, in itself, a public sphere.  He 
describes the Internet as a ‘centrifugal force’ for disparate communications and discussion, 
but which cannot, on its own, produce any public spheres:84   
But the web itself does not produce any public spheres. Its structure is not 
suited to focusing the attention of a dispersed public of citizens who form 
opinions simultaneously on the same topics and contributions which have been 
scrutinised and filtered by experts.85 
 However much the Internet might reinvigorate the public sphere by activating public 
participation, it is difficult to argue that the Internet itself qualifies as a public sphere. 86  
Increased access to information does not automatically translate into a more informed or 
participatory citizenry.  The Internet, it is argued, is best viewed not as one public sphere, 
but as multiple spaces, some public, some private, with multiple public spheres akin to Peter 
Dahlgren’s description of the public sphere as a ‘constellation of communicative spaces’.87  
It is not a freestanding public sphere.88  Rather, it creates new spaces for participation, 
which at times mimic the physical world and at other times involve entirely new species of 
participation.  The Internet’s distributive architecture prevents centralised control over 
communication and in so doing ‘decenters the public sphere’: ‘it is a public of publics rather 
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than a distinctively unified and encompassing public sphere in which all communicators 
participate.’89   
Structurally, new types of public spheres are emerging, such as e-governments, advocacy 
domains, cultural and social domains, and the journalism domain.90  Rather than compare 
the public sphere to Habermas’s utopian model, perhaps it should be compared to the 
media public sphere.91  In such a comparison, Internet users are not passive consumers of 
information picked, crafted and presented by the mass media,92 but have the opportunity to 
be empowered participants in their democratic life.  Anyone can be a publisher, and anyone 
can access an abundance of information and ideas unavailable in the tailored mass-media 
environment.93   Conceiving of the Internet in this way embodies the broader definition of 
democratic culture promoted here.  The kernel that can be taken from deliberative 
democracy is its emphasis on the participative part of democratic life, and most particularly 
participation in the public sphere. 
B. Democratic Culture 
 
Democratic culture is a theory developed by Jack Balkin that the Internet has changed the 
social conditions of speech such that promotion of democratic culture is one of its central 
purposes.94  Democratic culture refers to the following: 
[It] is more than representative institutions of democracy, and it is more than 
deliberation about public issues.  Rather, a democratic culture is a culture in 
which individuals have a fair opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning 
making that constitute them as individuals.  Democratic culture is about 
individual liberty as well as collective self-governance; it is about each 
individual’s ability to participate in the production and distribution of culture.95 
This approach to democracy is framed in terms of democratic participation rather than 
democratic governance, meaning that it is a form of social life that underlies culture and 
exists beyond the confines of representative democracy.  It focuses more broadly on 
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culture, on the forms of meaning-making in society, because it includes within its ambit non-
political expression, popular culture and individual participation.  It is democratic because 
anyone can participate regardless of race, age, political ties or economic status.  This 
participation is of value because it creates meaning for culture, promotes a sense of self, 
and encourages active engagement in the world.96  Thus in this thesis, when it is said the 
Internet is a democratising force, the substance of what is being asserted is that the Internet 
can help facilitate deliberation and participation in the forms of meaning making in 
democratic society. 
Balkan’s theory finds its roots in semiotic democracy, a term coined by John Fiske with 
regard to television to describe active public participation in creating and circulating 
meaning and pleasure.97  Although television is a one-to-many medium, its’ viewers are on 
equal footing with the producers and invited to ascribe meaning to what is seen.  The 
viewer in effect becomes part of the discursive practice by taking pleasure in making 
meanings and participating in the creation of social identities.98  Using this theory, Balkin 
asserts that the Internet has changed ‘the social conditions of speech,’ bringing to the 
forefront previously less important features of speech necessitating a revisiting of free 
speech theory.99  The Internet, he concludes, accentuates the cultural and participatory 
features of freedom of expression.100   
Freedom of expression, like the Internet’s topology, can be described as an interconnected 
network; a system of cultural and political interactions, experienced at both individual and 
collective levels.101  Information and communication technologies (ICTs), largely owned by 
private companies, allow for participation in such interactions at a level, speed, distance and 
reduction of cost previously unimagined.  For example, by contributing to a message board, 
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a person uniquely communicates in a many-to-many format to individuals potentially all 
over the world. It is also appropriative in the sense that participants can borrow from, 
manipulate, build on, or simply co-opt existing cultural resources.102  This interaction 
expands what is meant by democracy beyond the political to the cultural.  What democratic 
culture does is broaden our conception of what it means for the Internet to have democratic 
potential, and it recognises that democracy is as much something experienced as a political 
structure; it is a way of life inextricably tied up with community and culture.  
Democratic culture also recognises the importance of freedom of expression to democracy 
and to human rights.  Democracy has always been embodied in the practices of 
communication,103 and freedom of expression has consistently been identified by the courts 
as central to democracy.  In Lingens v. Austria, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
famously commented that freedom of expression ‘is one of the essential foundations of a 
democratic society.’104  Jürgen Habermas’s theories concerning deliberative democracy 
cannot be applied seamlessly to the Internet environment.  However, his work tying 
together democracy and human rights by identifying the link as communication is 
persuasive.105  Human rights, he articulates, is the enabling condition, the language, for 
legitimate and democratic decision-making.  He summarises:  
The internal connection between popular sovereignty and human rights that we 
are looking for consists in the fact that human rights state precisely the 
conditions under which the various forms of communication necessary for 
politically autonomous law-making can be legally institutionalised.106 
Freedom of expression and access to a wide range of sources of information has been 
described as the ‘lifeblood of democracy’.107  In an Information society, the importance of 
communication rights as a type of human right is accentuated, because of the central role 
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played by information in wealth and development:108  ‘[I]n the deliberative process, 
information plays a central role along with achieving equality of access to it.  Equality of 
access to information and an unrestricted means of access are fundamental to a more 
ambitious practice of discourse.’109 
This right is more comprehensive than is often understood.  Most human rights instruments 
explicitly or implicitly include the right to receive information in the right to freedom of 
expression.  This can be clearly seen in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights which states: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interferences and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.110 
Similar language is used in the European Convention on Human Rights,111 and German Basic 
Law.112  The need for human rights to underpin a communications technology such as the 
Internet is being explicitly recognised by states, with the European Commission issuing such 
an advisory113 and the Council of Europe adopting a resolution affirming the importance of 
freedom of expression on the Internet.114   
Participation in communication – in discourse – is the core of the deliberative democracy 
framework, but as has we have seen, it falls short of being a democracy that the Internet 
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can facilitate because of the rigidity of the types of discourse that qualify as deliberation, 
and the expectation that such deliberation will lead to legitimate public decisions. Instead, 
we should understand the Internet as being multiple spaces some of which are less-
idealised public spheres.  In this way the Internet’s potential as a force within democratic 
culture reveals itself.  Such spaces, although they might not show such extensive 
deliberation and risk being in form a ‘thin democracy’,115 can be seen as ‘tentative forms of 
self-determination and control “from below”’.116  These are new forms of public spheres, 
because the very act of visiting the spaces and engaging in discussions is a movement 
toward participation in democratic life that has been waning.  In this sense they enhance 
community and culture as well, both of which are, as we have seen, critical to the broader 
definition of democratic culture embraced here.  
III. PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 
 
This section now examines more closely the ways that the Internet facilitates participation 
in democratic culture.  The goal is to relate this to the focus of the thesis on IIGs and their 
power to facilitate or hinder the Internet’s democratic potential.  Viewed from the 
perspective of democratic culture, two forms of participation emerge as important to 
democracy: information access, and political and cultural participation.  Protection and 
facilitation of these participations is key to moving forward with a democratic vision of the 
Internet.  With information access, the reader will note our growing reliance on privately-
owned information guidance instruments to organise the overwhelming amount of 
information on the Internet.  With increasing participation online in politics and culture, 
discourse takes place in spaces and using technologies that are privately-owned, with such 
owners setting the terms of use and deciding what information is censored.  Blocking access 
to information through the use of filtering technologies and control of information guidance 
mechanisms comprise the case studies in chapters four and five. 
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A. Access to Information and Participation in Discourse 
 
We are increasingly dependent on the Internet to function in our daily lives.117  We use the 
Internet to email colleagues, students, friends and family, to research professional and 
personal issues, shop for groceries, pay bills and purchase consumer goods and services.  It 
is not a separate space as proposed by Johnson and Post,118 but an essential component of 
our daily life, reflecting the complexities of the physical world and expanding the range of 
tools and thus experiences for communication.  Access to information on the Internet is 
integral to furthering democratic culture.  The importance of the Internet to the Information 
society is also reflected in the rapid increase in Internet access and the importance people 
assign to having this access. In 2010, 73 per cent of households in the UK had Internet 
access, an increase of 12 per cent since 2007, and increase of 48 per cent since 2002.119  In 
the US, the Internet penetration rate is 79 per cent for adults.120 
Recent developments recognise the importance of freedom of expression to democratic 
culture.  A BBC poll of 27,000 people in 26 countries found that four out of five people 
consider Internet access a fundamental right.121  Many states, such as Estonia, Finland, 
France, Greece and Spain, haven taken this a step further and legislatively recognised 
Internet access as a fundamental right.122  Most recently, access to the Internet as a 
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fundamental right received the UN stamp of approval in a report by Frank La Rue, the 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression. 123 
This infiltration of the Internet into our daily lives reflects the increased importance of 
information to the functioning of society, which is the communicative link between 
Habermas and democratic culture set out above.  The Internet contributes to democratic 
culture by increasing the information that is available to us124 through the creation of new 
tools to receive and circulate information.  Citizen journalists who use a variety of online 
tools have emerged.  Stories that may have gone unnoticed by traditional media might be 
picked up by the blogosphere and spread globally in a blink.  This happened during 
President Barack Obama’s run for the democratic nomination in 2008. At a fundraiser in San 
Francisco in April 2008, Obama remarked unwisely that small-town Pennsylvanian voters 
are ‘bitter’.  One of the attendees blogged about the comment on the popular Huffington 
Post website. The story was then picked up by the mainstream media, a media, it should be 
emphasised, which was not permitted to attend the event.125   
With this expanded access to information come increased opportunities to participate in 
circulating information, commenting on it, or even modifying its content.  This reflects what 
Balkin describes as the appropriative aspect of democratic culture, because the interaction 
builds on ‘existing cultural resources.’126  The Internet’s importance to political participation 
and, more broadly, its importance to the circulation of information as valuable in itself can 
be seen in numerous examples around the world.   
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In the US, sites such as www.moveon.org, www.techpresident.com and www.dailykos.com 
have become increasingly popular resources.127 Moveon.org, for example, claims to have 
over five million members.  In Barack Obama’s presidential race he launched an aggressive 
Internet campaign using his social networking site http://my.barackobama.com to engage 
with and inform supporters and volunteers.128  Just a few years later and the use of social 
media and new media are basic components of successful political campaigns.  In 
preparation for the 2012 re-election campaign, President Obama has launched MyBO, which 
integrates with Facebook to allow Facebook users and communities to interact with the 
campaign.129  As Rob Salkowicz comments, ‘[t]hese erstwhile novelties are now the 
minimum price of admission for a modern campaign.’130  This interactivity and access to 
information empowers users arguably reinvigorating the public sphere. 
More dramatic examples of the power of social media are to be found in the coverage of 
recent events in the Middle East.  Everyone remembers the face of the Iranian protests of 
2009; a young woman named Neda Agha-Soltan, whose death was seen as a rallying cry for 
the protesters.131 Grainy, shaky cell phone video footage of her being shot and killed by 
militia men during a protest was taken and distributed online anonymously.132 The video 
was later awarded a George Polk award for journalism, the first time such an award has 
been made for anonymous work.133  Such examples show, as Colin Maclay describes it, ‘the 
power of new technologies to support human rights.’134 
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The more recent Arab Spring, however, demonstrates the power of social media as a tool 
for democracy as well as the power of the gatekeepers, whether state or private,135 to shut 
down these avenues of discourse. Protesters across the Middle East communicated with 
each other using a variety of social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube, 
using them to spread information and further mobilise protesters.  Egypt responded by first 
blocking access to social media sites, then shutting down Internet connectivity entirely as 
well as blocking mobile networks.136  Google and Twitter then created a “Speak to Tweet” 
tool that enabled Twitter users to post tweets by leaving voice messages which the tool 
then turned into tweets.137   
As we can see, there are various dimensions to online engagement with democratic culture.  
We can tease out four types of participation as furthering democratic culture for discussion 
here: social, interactive, appropriative and anonymous/pseudonymous participations.  With 
respect to social networking, Twitter has been the most surprising tool in facilitating 
participation in democratic culture. What started out as a platform for celebrities and 
narcissists to voice the most mundane minutiae of their ever day lives, has rapidly become 
an important tool for spreading information.  When Twitter broke the story before the 
mainstream press of the crash landing of US Airways Flight 1549 in the Hudson River in 
January 2009138 it came of age. It is used to spread news and ideas, link to articles and 
reports, and entertain.  
Twitter consolidates tweets through ‘trending’, where the most popular topics at any given 
moment, ‘Twitter trends’, are listed in the sidebar on the right side of the site.139  The top 
five trends of 2010 were the Gulf Oil Spill, FIFA World Cup, Inception, Haiti Earthquake and 
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Vuvuzela.140  In so doing Twitter is not only a tool for discourse, but shapes democratic 
culture by acting as an information manager, guiding us through Twitterverse and thereby 
cyberspace beyond.  Similarly, a site such as Facebook has 30 million users in the UK 
alone,141 and while it might appear to only be of use for gossip and keeping in touch with 
friends, it is increasingly being used for professional networking, political activism and 
educational purposes.142  For example, the Internet Governance Forum has a Facebook 
Group143 as did Barack Obama.144  The European Union started a space on 
www.youtube.com called ‘EU Tube’ for ‘free speech and open debate’.145 
In addition, the way that we consume information has become increasingly interactive. 
Blogs such as the Huffington Post have ‘comments sections’ for readers.146  The website 
Television Without Pity is a biting and humorous scene-by-scene account of popular 
television shows.147  It has developed, however, into a forum for the voice of the viewers as 
television producers increasingly turn to this website to determine how their shows are 
being received.   
Discussion fora such as www.slashdot.org (‘news for nerds. Stuff that matters.’) offer a 
range of reading material from the technical to the political, and users participate in rating 
the comments or discussions started by other users.  It is unique because visitors can set 
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their preferences so that only those comments that have received a particular rating will be 
displayed.  In this way they manage the information they receive.   A similar site is 
www.digg.com, a site devoted to sharing content and websites.  In 2007, the administrators 
removed a link to an article explaining how to decrypt HD-DVDs.  The site was besieged by 
users re-posting the link, objecting to what they saw as censorship, and the administrators 
eventually bowed to the will of the million-plus users stating ‘[w]e hear you, and effective 
immediately we won’t delete stories or comments containing code and will deal with 
whatever the consequences might be.’148 
Most of these interactions fall short of the demands of deliberative democracy.  Message 
boards, for example, are rife with negative, inflammatory or irrelevant comments to insult 
participants or spur arguments.  This has occurred since the first message boards and are 
mostly regulated through social norms.149  In a democratic culture, the focus is less on 
participation in the idealised town hall and more on valuing the very act of engaging in such 
‘a dialectical free-for-all’.150  
The Internet also facilitates what is described above as the appropriative aspect of 
democratic culture, because Internet users can take part in culture by producing it and 
modifying it themselves.151  While under a deliberative democracy framework such activities 
would be dismissed as purely entertainment, under democratic culture such activities play a 
more central role.  For example, we all remember the spate of memes parodying a pinnacle 
scene in the movie Der Untergang (Downfall) depicting Adolf Hitler ranting during one of his 
final days in the Berlin bunker.  Voice-over parodies ranged from Hitler ranting about Hillary 
Clinton losing the Democratic party candidacy for president to Hitler trying to find Wally to 
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commenting on the sub-prime mortgage crisis.152  There was even a parody of the removal 
of the parodies from YouTube for claims of breach of copyright.153  In addition, 
humanitarian organisations are increasingly using the Internet to persuade and educate the 
public about issues.  For example, MtvU in partnership with the Reebok Human Rights 
Foundation and the International Crisis Group created an online game called ‘Darfur is 
Dying’ to highlight the atrocities in the Sudan and educate users on ways to help.154   
Entertainment and culture are necessarily intertwined, and democratic culture recognises 
that culture and politics are intertwined as well.  This is exemplified with a penguin video 
that circulated on www.youtube.com in 2007 mocking Al Gore’s film An Inconvenient Truth.  
What most viewers did not realise was that the purportedly amateur movie was in fact the 
creation of a public relations firm for several of the major American oil companies.155 
The final participation on the Internet that furthers democratic culture discussed here is the 
option to participate anonymously or pseudonymously.  For example, in joining the virtual 
world Second Life, one can create an avatar of any gender, race, species, or hybrid thereof 
that one’s imagination permits.   One can participate anonymously on a message board, or 
create a fictitious blog. This gives users more freedom to break with convention and shape 
new cultural identities. It can also enhance an individual’s capacity to decide what 
information to seek out or in which community to participate online. In this way it creates a 
zone of autonomy.  Further, anonymity has served several beneficial purposes to freedom 
of expression, such as facilitating whistle-blower communications that might serve a public 
interest, and creating spaces for communication of sensitive personal information 
concerning, for example, HIV, cancer, or abuse.  We must be cautious in blindly celebrating 
their virtues, however, as anonymity has served a darker purpose, giving voice to 
discriminatory and threatening speech,156  and pseudonymity has been used to mislead or 
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misdirect discourse.157  There are limits to the virtues of anonymity and pseudonymity, and 
the struggle continues to find the right balance. 
The promise of the Internet as a tool in furthering a democratic culture is presented here 
with much fanfare. This is done on purpose to tease out for the reader what is at stake. 
There is incredible discursive promise to the spaces and technologies made possible by the 
Internet environment. And one commonality threads its way through this discussion: the 
capacity of private companies to gatekeep the flow of information, whether as innovators, 
facilitators or as censors.  They own the spaces and technologies of discourse, the 
implications of which are the focus of the case studies in chapters four and five. The 
following section addresses the main concerns put forward by sceptics of the Internet’s 
democratic potential, highlighting further the power of the Internet to be a force for good 
and bad and the critical role that these private gatekeepers inevitably play. 
B. Concerns of Fragmentation and the Demise of Traditional Media 
 
The expansion in the range of discourses that further democracy risks pushing the idea of 
democratic culture too far, where any communication can be dressed up as important to 
democratic culture and therefore worthy of protection.  Two things must be clarified. First, 
while democratic culture is a more inclusive notion that deliberative democracy, it is not 
without limits and what is proposed here is not a form of cyber-utopianism criticised by 
authors such as Evgeny Morozov.158  These issues can often be politicised unnecessarily, 
distorting the debate and preventing a nuanced discussion of the policy framework, legal 
and otherwise, that will best move us forward. As Rick Lambers notes, ‘[s]uch political 
polarisation may leave little room for legal subtleties.’159  Second, the limits are less about 
what is said in this space, and more about the infrastructure that makes the communication 
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possible, about freedom of expression in practice. In looking at how private companies can 
facilitate or hinder participation in democratic culture I am examining the administrative 
structure of freedom of expression.160  
Part of the concern in an environment of endless information and communities for 
participation is that users go online for the ‘reinforcement effect’ of being political if you are 
political, or disengaged if you are disengaged and most often just to be entertained.161  Such 
a concern can be partly dismissed as simply reflective of the realities of democratic life in 
the physical world transposed online.  However, the argument becomes more powerful 
when pushed further to a concern that the Internet fragments discourse and attention.162  
One of the leading scholars expressing this view regarding the Internet is Cass Sunstein.   
 In Republic.com Sunstein describes this fragmentation as ‘the daily me’ (a term early coined 
by Nicholas Negroponte)163 where people choose to filter the information that they read, 
see and hear to their interests, thus avoiding ever being exposed to, for example, 
international news or sports, but having a steady stream of celebrity gossip and fashion 
news.  Liberals, conservatives or neo-Nazis seek out websites, forums or blogs with like-
minded people that reinforce their views of the world.  In this way, discourse and 
community are fragmented and we suffer a loss.  Online media is therefore distinct from 
traditional media: if one flips on the news on television, one is forced to view whatever 
news stories the mass media chooses to run, thus exposing oneself to opposing points of 
view and thereby gaining a fuller perspective.   
In his updated book Republic.com 2.0, Sunstein emphasises at the outset that freedom of 
expression is not simply freedom from censorship, but requires affirmative steps as well. It 
must challenge people by exposing them to opposing points of view.164  This is lost by the 
‘daily me’ of Internet fragmentation: 
The fundamental concern of this book is to see how unlimited consumer options 
might compromise the preconditions of a system of freedom of expression, 
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which include unchosen exposures and shared experiences. To understand the 
nature of this concern, we will make the most progress if we insist that the free-
speech principle should be read in light of the commitment to democratic 
deliberation.  In other words, a central point of the free-speech principle is to 
carry out that commitment.165 
Sunstein’s concern regarding fragmentation is not the death knell to the Internet’s force as 
part of democratic culture.  Rather, it is the narrower concept of deliberative democracy 
with which he is concerned, and which is undermined by this fragmentation of discourse.   
Examination of how to guard against fragmentation is an important examination, but 
fragmentation is not as polarising as Sunstein expresses.166  First, Sunstein’s criticism here is 
essentially of the choices people make when they go online.  Further, fragmentation already 
occurs in the physical world by the very existence (and mushrooming) of advocacy groups 
and other issue-oriented organisations.  In addition, a certain amount of fragmentation is 
part of being a member of a group where the group might first flesh out its membership, 
views and bonds internally before entering the fray of the public sphere.167  Of concern in 
cyberspace is whether such groups do more than associate internally, but cyberspace has 
also created the ability for  many of the groups to form at all, bridging previously 
insurmountable spatial and temporal boundaries and often, through anonymity and 
pseudonymity, facilitating membership of the otherwise reclusive and shy. 
The Internet has also been criticised on a different basis by authors such as Andrew Keen,168 
for creating a ‘cult of amateurs’ which has caused the demise of traditional media and 
ultimately harmed society.  His concern is that traditional media is being replaced by 
personal media169, and as a result we increasingly rely on unreliable, amateur, non-vetted 
posts on, for example, Wikipedia, Digg, YouTube or Twitter, for our news and education.  In 
turn traditional media are floundering, with profits plummeting as fewer buy newspapers 
and classified advertisements are alternatively posted for free online at such websites as 
www.craigslist.com.170   He cautions that traditional media are facing extinction and with it 
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‘today’s experts and cultural gatekeepers – our reporters, news anchors, editors, music 
companies and Hollywood studios.’171  The overriding concern arising from this ‘cult of 
amateurs’ is who will play the watchdog role. 172 
The Internet is not replacing traditional media, but is another tool for participation in 
democratic culture.  In terms of political participation, a study of the 2006 American 
midterm elections found that television was still the main source of political news at 69 per 
cent of respondents, trailed by newspapers at 34 per cent and the Internet at 15 per cent.173  
What the researchers found was that use of the Internet for political news doubled since 
the 2002 election, while use of television and newspapers remained static.174  This indicates 
that use of one is not replacing the other, but being used in combination.   
In addition, traditional media have a strong presence online and are arguably a core part of 
the Internet’s public sphere,175 with the nature of their role having simply changed.  Charlie 
Beckett describes it as a shift from a manufacturing industry to a service where: ‘[i]t is a 
change in practice, from providing a product to acting as facilitators and connectors. It 
means an end to duplication and a focus on what value every bit of journalism production 
adds.’176 
Further, as the public becomes more mistrustful of traditional media and question whether 
the fourth estate is in fact fulfilling its watchdog obligations, citizen journalists emerge as 
both partners with the media, such as the blogger about Barack Obama’s comment on 
Pennsylvanian voters, and watchdogs of the media.  While it is true that citizen journalists 
cannot investigate issues as thoroughly as paid reporters with the backing of a commercial 
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media company, on the other hand they are not beholden to corporate interests, and 
therefore are not influenced by corporate advertisers or the risks of litigation.177   
What is important in terms of the Internet’s potential in democratic culture is that citizens 
can participate in the discussion.  The news becomes interactive.  Citizen journalists, by 
participating in the process, add a new layer to the information sources available to users, 
information that if discussed and circulated enough in the blogosphere forces traditional 
media to report on it, and perhaps engage in the in-depth investigative reporting.   
The opportunities for participation in democratic culture opened up by the Internet have 
also reinforced our dependence on private companies for its effective use.  With the influx 
of information that the Internet has empowered comes the issue of information overload, 
also known as the Babel objection.178  A user is confronted with an endless array of 
information without the vetting of a professional media organisation as to its’ quality and 
reliability.  It becomes the task of modern Internet users to sort through large amounts of 
information and determine what is relevant and reliable. And as we move toward a 
semantic web, it has become the task of innovators to create more tools for information 
management.179   
Information management technologies have emerged to help guide the user through the 
clutter.  For example, without a search engine, a user must know the URL (uniform resource 
locator, or web page address).  As a result, most users rely on search engines such as Google 
or Yahoo! to organise the information on the Internet for them.180   Other more subtle 
information guidance instruments play a similar role.  Google News181 selects and categories 
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news stories.  Hootsuite organises tweets.182  These innovations are critical to users having a 
meaningful experience of the Internet, and to facilitating the Internet as a force within 
democratic culture. 
Are we doomed to the same websites, same information and same self-reinforcing views? 
Some might find comfort in the Internet’s use as such.  But this is not fatal to the Internet’s 
democratic potential.  Rather, as Benkler states, the Internet ‘structures a networked public 
sphere more attractive than the mass-media-dominated public sphere.’183  As the Internet 
begins to permeate every aspect of our lives, it increasingly begins to reflect the real world.  
It increasingly becomes part of the real world.  This is not an invasion of cyberspace that 
nullifies the Internet’s democratic potential, which some have argued.184  What it does is 
usher in the same complexities and variables of the real world.  Not everyone watches the 
news, nor will everyone seek news online.  However, the Internet does offer new tools for 
participating in such discussions for those interested, and an abundance of resources for any 
individual that might have a specific issue of interest.  The hope is that digital technologies 
will eventually increase concern and participation in politics and culture.185   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The Internet has the potential to facilitate participation in democratic culture by inviting 
widespread involvement of Internet users in creating and defining the things that mean 
something in our democratic society.  Through the increasingly interactive nature of the 
online experience and the endless spaces available for the creation of communities, users 
are able to seek out and circulate information and ideas, and build on, modify and comment 
on their culture.  This communicative process, enabled by technology, is what makes 
democratic culture the type of democracy for which the Internet is most facilitative. 
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 As the Internet continues to develop, this participatory relationship between users and the 
media, public officials, corporations and other users will become further embedded into the 
fabric of democratic life. While criticisms are expressed that the Internet fragments 
discourse and promotes unreliable citizen journalism to the downfall of traditional 
journalism, these reflect the growing pains of an increasingly complex communication 
environment.  They do not diminish the revolutionary ways that the Internet has expanded 
the information that is accessible and meaningful in the Information society, nor the 
expansion and creation of new ways that individuals and groups can participate in the forms 
of meaning making in democratic society. 
The thread through this chapter is the critical role freedom of expression plays in furthering 
participation in democratic culture online and the therefore central role information 
gatekeepers play in facilitating or hindering this expression.  If the Internet has the potential 
to be a democratising force, the other side of the coin is that it can be used as a tool to limit 
participation, which threatens to draw the Internet away from its democratic potential.  The 
technology itself is neutral and its use for democratic or undemocratic purposes depends on 
those who control the technology.  Since in western democracies privately owned 
companies for the most part own the technologies that control the pathways of 
communication, they become the focal point for the realisation of the Internet’s democratic 
potential.  This means focusing on the governance structure of the gatekeepers.  What this 
thesis will show is that the corporate governance frameworks that currently govern many of 
their activities are insufficient to facilitate this potential and rather hamper the ability of the 
Internet to work as a tool for democracy.  The next chapter examines what is meant by the 
term gatekeeper, and will define for reader the term IIG discussed here, proposing a human 
rights driven framework for their identification. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
A FRAMEWORK FOR IDENTIFYING 
INTERNET INFORMATION GATEKEEPERS 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the gatekeepers that are the primary subject of 
this thesis.  They will be referred to as Internet Information Gatekeepers (IIG).  We have a 
broad understanding of the entities that are gatekeepers and what it is about the Internet 
that has placed them in this position.  They include, for example, search engines, Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs), high traffic social networking sites and portal providers. Yet, a 
focused analysis of what is meant by gatekeeper in the Internet context, but most 
particularly in the context of viewing the Internet as a force within democratic culture, is 
needed to not only confirm that these parties are indeed gatekeepers, but to also find a 
method for identifying other gatekeepers, and for finding the boundary between what is a 
gatekeeper and what is not.  
The need for the latter is particularly acute when one attempts to draw a conceptual line 
between some hosts of message boards or other web 2.0 platforms, and others.  What we 
want to avoid is imposing the same gatekeeping responsibilities on, for example, John 
Smith’ s personal blogging site, in which friends sometimes comment in a conveniently pre-
fabricated comments section, as found on interactive sites around the world, such as the 
BBC’s ‘Have Your Say’ discussion forums.  Likewise, while such interactive sites might have 
many visitors, they are instinctively different from gatekeepers such as ISPs, which control 
our very access to the Internet, or search engines, which organise the information available 
online.   Thus, an examination of what is meant by the term gatekeeper not only serves a 
definitional purpose, but guides the nature and extent of their legal duties.  
In this chapter, first, the historical development of the term gatekeeper will be traced.  
Second traditional conceptions of gatekeeping will be assessed and their conceptual 
inadequacy for the Internet explained.  Third, a human rights driven framework for 
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identifying IIGs will be articulated, setting the framework for the case studies in chapters 
four and five. 
I. FROM CUPCAKES TO YAHOO! 
 
At a general level gatekeepers are entities whose job it is to decide what shall or shall not 
pass through a gate.  What makes gatekeepers unique is that they usually do not benefit 
from the misconduct although they are in a position to prevent it, because they control 
access to the tools, area or community required to commit the misconduct.  Thus, shaping a 
liability regime around gatekeepers instead of those breaking the rules can at times be more 
effective.1  One famous example involves oil tankers.  The goal was to reduce oil spills and 
the use of segregated ballast tanks and a system of crude oil washing was identified as the 
solution.  Top-down legal controls targeting the ship owners were implemented to 
encourage the use of these technologies, but with little effect.  So instead, regulators 
targeted the gatekeepers: the insurers, classification societies and builders.  The insurers 
required that the tankers were registered with classification societies, which societies 
required that the ships had segregated ballast tanks and crude oil washing, and builders 
therefore only built such ships.  The gatekeepers here did not benefit from the use of unsafe 
ships. On the contrary, a more expensive and safer ship was in their interests.  It was an 
effective regulatory solution achieving 98 per cent compliance by shifting the focus away 
from the perpetrators of the misconduct to the gatekeepers.2 As John Braithwaite put it, 
‘[w]here mighty states could not succeed in reducing oil spills at sea, Lloyd’s of London 
could.’3 
Gatekeeper regulation tends to emerge where a government’s capacity to regulate a 
specific issue might be limited, while a third party gatekeeper’s capacity to regulate the 
conduct, whether owing to resources, information, or authority, might be better.  
Sometimes, such regulation arises simply by the nature of the activity engaged in.  For 
example, librarians and bookstores choose which books to order, and where to place them 
on the shelves.  Still other gatekeepers emerge because of their role in shaping our social 
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worlds.  This can be seen with the media where the gatekeeping metaphor has been used 
extensively.  By selecting what news stories to run, print or discard, at which time, and in 
which order, they act as ‘surrogates or shortcuts for individual people’s decisions’.4  In 
contrast, management studies tend to view the gatekeeping role as facilitative,5 while 
cultural theories in information sciences view gatekeepers in their role as representatives of 
their communities: ‘individuals who move between two cultures to provide information that 
links people with alternatives or solutions.’6   
The term gatekeeping was first deployed in this way by Kurt Lewin in 1947.  He used the 
term to describe how a wife or mother was the gatekeeper because of her role in deciding 
which foods are placed on the dinner table.7  His ‘theories of channels and gate keepers’ 
used this example to illustrate how one can change the food habits of a population.  The 
food moves through channels, such as grocery stores, to reach a dinner table.  One enters 
the channel through a gate, and a gatekeeper makes selection decisions on what foods to 
accept and reject thus controlling movement within the channel. This ranges from the store 
manager selecting food to sell to the mother selecting foods to prepare for dinner.8   
However, this idea of gatekeeping may be traced back even further to the tort doctrine of 
vicarious liability.  In what continues to be the most influential work on gatekeeping, R.H. 
Kraakman mainstreamed Lewin’s theory and teased out its roots in vicarious liability, 
showing that the liability of accountants and lawyers for their clients, and employers for 
their employees, was in essence an issue of gatekeeper liability.9  More recently tort law has 
been used to pursue gatekeepers in the online environment, as seen in the use of vicarious 
or contributory liability to pursue peer-to-peer providers such as Grokster, Napster and 
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Pirate Bay for breach of copyright for the illegal downloading of music by third parties.10  
Vicarious liability is also at the root of the notice and takedown provisions in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)11 and the Electronic Commerce Directive (E-Commerce 
Directive).12 
More broadly positioned within regulatory studies,13 gatekeepers are non-state actors with 
the capacity to alter the behaviour of others in circumstances where the state has limited 
capacity to do same.  This is what Julia Black calls decentred regulation, a shift ‘in the locus 
of the activity of “regulating” from the state to other, multiple, locations, and the adoption 
on the part of the state of particular strategies of regulation.’14  This combination of capacity 
and duty is what Kraakman refers to in his definition of gatekeeper.   
Most relevant to this thesis is the public law concerns created by this shift in the location of 
regulating away from the state.  It can produce an accountability glut concerning 
fundamental democratic values such as freedom of expression when such non-state actors 
take on roles, or share roles with others, which are traditionally reserved for public actors.  
As Jody Freeman observes, such gatekeepers are not agents of the state and expected to 
serve the public interest, but additionally they are not subject to the norms of 
professionalism and public service one normally finds imposed on such institutions.15  In 
addition, they ‘remain relatively insulated from legislative, executive and judicial 
oversight.’16  The crux of the problem, as she sees it, applies equally to the issues raised on 
the Internet: 
To the extent that private actors increasingly perform traditionally public 
functions unfettered by the scrutiny that normally accompanies the exercise of 
public power, private participation may indeed raise accountability concerns 
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that dwarf the problem of unchecked agency discretion.  In this view, private 
actors do not raise a new democracy problem; they simply make the traditional 
one even worse because they are considerably more unaccountable than 
agencies.  In addition, private actors may threaten other public law values that 
are arguably as important as accountability.  Their participation in governance 
may undermine features of decision making that administrative law demands of 
public actors, such as openness, fairness, participation, consistency, rationality 
and impartiality.17 
II. THE INADEQUACIES OF TRADITIONAL GATEKEEPING 
ONLINE 
 
There are two fields where the concept of gatekeeper has been most fully explored. First, 
there is the role of journalists and publishing institutions as gatekeepers who select the 
stories and information we consume.  Second, in the financial services industry the concept 
of a gatekeeper has been used to describe the monitoring role of auditors, credit ratings 
agencies and investment bankers.18  Whichever area is discussed, two gatekeeping roles can 
be identified:  
1. the gatekeeper that controls access to information, and acts as an inhibitor by 
limiting access to or restricting the scope of information; and   
2. the gatekeeper that acts as ‘innovator, change agent, communication channel, 
link, intermediary, helper, adapter, opinion leader, broker, and facilitator’.19 
This recognises that gatekeepers at once can have two roles – one inward-looking by 
inhibiting behaviour or access, and the other outward-looking shaping behaviour or 
perceptions.  Recognising such dual purposes transfers well to the Internet environment, 
where gatekeepers have the capacity to act both as facilitators of and impediments to 
participation in democratic culture. 
Traditional definitions of gatekeeper in the literature have been narrower and therefore 
transfer less well to the networked environment of the internet.  This is for two reasons.  
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First, traditional definitions tend to focus on gatekeepers’ capacity to prevent third party 
misbehaviour.  Second, the gated (a term introduced by Karine Barzilai-Nahon to refer to 
those on whom the gatekeeping is exercised) tend to be treated in static terms with little 
attention devoted to their rights.20  With regard to the first Kraakman’s traditional definition 
is narrowly focused on liability imposed on gatekeepers to prevent third-party misconduct.  
This is replicated in the financial services industry, where gatekeepers are mainly conceived 
as John Coffee defines them: ‘an agent who acts as a reputational intermediary to assure 
investors as to the quality of the “signal” sent by the corporate issuer.’21  In other words, the 
gatekeeper acts as a proxy for corporate trustworthiness, enabling investors or the market 
to then rely on the corporation’s disclosure or assurances. A broader definition is used in 
the media where the term has become a metaphor for the way the media make decisions 
about what stories to run or discard and when, and how much attention to give to the 
stories once they pass through the initial gate.  Most recently, Pamela Shoemaker defined 
such gatekeeping as ‘the process of culling and crafting countless bits of information into 
the limited number of messages that reach people every day’.22  However, even such a 
definition is targeted to the media’s role as an information publisher and the debate is 
simply about the nature and extent of this gatekeeping role. 
The online gatekeepers targeted here are not usually engaged in the tasks covered by 
such traditional definitions. The concept of gatekeepers as builders of our social reality 
resonates when examining the pivotal role certain online gatekeepers play in shaping 
our online experience, such as our reliance on ISPs simply to gain access to the 
Internet, or our reliance on search engines to sort through the clutter of information 
online.  However, there are limits to such parallels.   For example, most ISPs are not in 
the business of providing users with information, but rather run a business of 
providing access to the Internet and possibly hosting services.  While media and online 
gatekeepers share a common gatekeeping role of information control, some online 
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gatekeepers come to this role by a more indirect route.   ISPs are not exactly CNN or 
the New York Times, but neither are they simple telecommunications carriers either. 
Indeed, it is this inability to seamlessly draw comparisons between the Internet and various 
other media models that has proved the major stumbling block to the development of a 
coherent and cohesive gatekeeping model in this area.  Early jurisprudential and legislative 
debates revolved around whether to categorise intermediaries using traditional media 
models of print, broadcasting and common carrier. Currently in the US, for example, under 
the good Samaritan provision of the Communication Decency Act,23 section 230, any service, 
system or access provider is shielded from liability for not only failing to act when aware or 
notified of unlawful content, but for any steps taken to restrict access to content.  Europe 
has opted for a notice-and-takedown regime with the E-Commerce Directive.  These 
regimes have been widely criticised and it is arguable that this is, in part, because the 
concept of gatekeeping has not yet been sufficiently developed for the digital 
environment.24  
In addition, the static way in which the gated have been treated in traditional gatekeeping 
literature fails to capture the dynamic environment of the Internet.  This is because the roles 
people and institutions play online changes. The technology of the Internet is generative, 
allowing the gated to directly participate in the sharing of content and code.25  Generativity 
causes one to question the one-way approach of traditional gatekeeping theory, which see 
information flow from the gatekeeper out to the gated.  In a Web 2.0 world the gated are 
dynamic players in creating and managing the Internet environment. This means that there 
are an infinite number of possible gatekeepers and gated whose roles are fluid and 
constantly changing, operating in a dynamic regulatory environment.  For example, an 
individual who runs a blog might be gated by the terms of service of the blog host, yet might 
also act as gatekeeper for the comments section of his or her blog. At the same time the 
blog might be viewed by few readers, or become so mainstream that it is read by millions. 
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Thus far, traditional definitions of gatekeeping have been used in Internet regulation 
scholarship.  In Jonathan Zittrain’s earlier work he identifies two kinds of gatekeepers: first, 
the classic kind where gatekeepers are enlisted to regulate the conduct of third parties, and 
second, technological gatekeepers, where technology is used to identify and regulate 
individuals.26  His definition broadly identifies the types of business activities that move 
businesses into the position of gatekeepers, describing them as ‘businesses that host, index 
and carry others’ content’.27  However, he still relies on Kraakman’s definition of 
gatekeeping treating them as bodies that can prevent or identify wrongdoing by third 
parties. Ronald Mann and Seth Belzley also adopt the Kraakman approach and focus purely 
on whether liability should be imposed on gatekeepers, separating this notion from 
responsibilities the intermediary might undertake.28 With generativity Zittrain reconceived 
the notion of how information is produced, stored, processed and consumed, and the next 
step is to understand what this means for our traditional conceptions of regulatory players 
such as gatekeepers. It is proposed here that it is not third party misconduct that is at the 
heart of democracy-shaping gatekeepers, but rather their power and control over the flow, 
content and accessibility of information.  How they exercise this power determines the 
opportunities for participation in democratic culture online.   
III. INTERNET GATEKEEPERS 
 
This chapter differentiates between two types of gatekeepers: Internet gatekeepers, which 
are those gatekeepers that control the flow of information, and IIGs, which as a result of this 
control, impact participation and deliberation in democratic culture. This thread of 
information control is the key to understanding online gatekeeping.  For the first criteria, we 
can turn to Barzilai-Nahon’s Network Gatekeeper Theory (NGT); this theory helps bring the 
gatekeeping concept into the networked world. 
Barzilai-Nahon was driven to develop NGT because traditional gatekeeping literature 
ignored the role of the gated thus failing to recognise the dynamism of the gatekeeping 
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environment. Most relevant is not only the fact that NGT was developed specifically with 
the Internet in mind, but also that it moves gatekeeping from a traditional focus on 
information ‘selection’, ‘processes’, ‘distribution’ and ‘intermediaries’ to ‘information 
control’: 
Finally, a context of information and networks makes it necessary to re-examine 
the vocabulary of gatekeeping, moving from processes of selection 
(Communication), information distribution and protection (Information Science), 
and information intermediary (Management Science) to a more flexible 
construct of information control, allowing inclusion of more types of information 
handling that have occurred before and new types which occur due to 
networks.29 
NGT helps identify the processes and mechanisms used for gatekeeping, and most 
particularly highlights information control as the thread that ties the various online 
gatekeepers together.  Her theory, however, can only take us so far, because she focuses on 
gatekeepers who have the power to choose to be in a gatekeeping position.  This can be 
seen in her definition of a network gatekeeper as ‘an entity (people, organisations, or 
governments) that has the discretion to exercise gatekeeping through a gatekeeping 
mechanism in networks and can choose the extent to which to exercise it contingent upon 
the gated standing.’30  This theory, thus, can only be used as a starting point for this thesis 
because often the gatekeepers we are concerned with here do not choose to be in that 
position, and quite often might just fall into that role by happenstance because of 
technology or social behaviour.  For example, they might become gatekeepers as a side-
effect of top-down regulation such as the E-Commerce Directive or Data Protection 
Directive.31  Or they might become gatekeepers because of the popularity of their product 
or services, such as Facebook.  Nevertheless, her theory is useful for articulating what 
qualifies as a gatekeeping process and mechanism. 
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Under NGT, an act of gatekeeping involves a gatekeeper and gated, the movement of 
information through a gate, and the use of a gatekeeping process and mechanism. A 
gatekeeping process involves doing some of the following: selecting, channelling, shaping, 
manipulating, and deleting information.  For example, a gatekeeping process might involve 
selecting which information to publish, or channelling information through a channel, or 
deleting information by removing it, or shaping information into a particular form. Her 
taxonomy of mechanisms for gatekeeping is particularly useful.  The mechanisms include, 
for example, channelling (i.e. search engines, hyperlinks), censorship (i.e. filtering, blocking, 
zoning), value-added (i.e. customisation tools), infrastructure (i.e. network access), user 
interaction (i.e. default homepages, hypertext links), and editorial mechanisms (i.e. 
technical controls, information content).  For an expansion on what these terms means see 
a reproduction of Barzilai-Nahon’s chart at Appendix A.32 
Pursuant to NGT, therefore, online gatekeeping is the process of controlling information as 
it moves through a gate, and the gatekeepers are the institutions or individuals that control 
this process.  However, just because someone is an online gatekeeper does not mean that 
they are an IIG in the sense that human rights responsibilities should be incurred.  
Traditional approaches see the gatekeeper as somehow uninvolved, or the gated as being 
unaffected, at least in the sense that the focus is purely on gated misconduct rather than 
gated rights as well.  Human rights theory helps flesh out the facilitative aspect of how 
gatekeepers work that is missing from such traditional approaches. By incorporating the 
gated’s rights into the mix, a fuller picture emerges. Barzilai-Nahon focuses on this as the 
role of the gated, while Andrew Murray focuses on this as ‘nodes’ in a polycentric regulatory 
environment.33  Add to that a human rights conception of gatekeeping emphasising the 
rights of the gated to freedom of expression, and we have a better picture of the complex 
environment within which we are tasked with identifying IIGs.   
The human rights framework proposed here depends on the extent to which the gatekeeper 
controls deliberation and participation in the forms of meaning-making in democratic 
culture. As was set out in chapter one, democracy here is conceived of in semiotic terms, 
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meaning that the public plays an active role in creating and circulating meaning and 
pleasure.  Democracy has always been embodied in the practices of communication, and 
freedom of expression has consistently been identified by the courts as central to 
democracy.  Thus when it is said here that the gated have rights and are not just the sources 
of the misconduct, this shift in focus incorporates human rights as the driver of gatekeeper 
responsibility. Or more specifically, it incorporates a gatekeeper’s impact on democratic 
culture as the driver of its responsibility.  The following sections expand on this concept and 
articulate a framework for identifying IIGs.   
IV. A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNET 
INFORMATION GATEKEEPERS 
 
When does a company’s responsibilities go from semi-private, where no gatekeeping 
function is occurring, to something more where a gatekeeping function necessitates certain 
responsibilities? When does an entity go from being a gatekeeper to an IIG?  We can say 
that even individuals running their own blogs act as gatekeepers. They can accept, reject or 
delete comments by others.  But they are not yet IIGs.  It is when space for which they 
intermediate becomes one that facilitates or impeded democratic discourse that the entity 
is a gatekeeper for participation in democratic culture as we have envisaged it in chapter 
one. 
A. Internet Information Gatekeepers: Identification 
Two things are required for a framework of analysis. First, we must identify what qualifies 
an entity as an Internet gatekeeper. Second, we must identify what elevates such a 
gatekeeper to an IIG.  As shown above, for the first criteria, Barzilai-Nahon’s NGT can be 
used.  Once an entity has been identified as a gatekeeper through such an assessment, it 
must be determined whether the gatekeeper is an IIG.   
Conceptual Basis of Internet Information Gatekeepers 
An IIG is conceptually different than any other online gatekeeper, because it attracts human 
rights responsibilities.  Whether human rights responsibilities should be incurred and the 
extent of the responsibilities depends on the extent to which the gatekeeper controls 
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deliberation and participation in the forms of meaning-making in democratic culture.  This 
reflects the most mainstream conception of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) model, 
which is that businesses are responsible for human rights within their sphere of influence.  
Sphere of influence is a concept articulated in one of the leading CSR instruments, the 
United Nations Global Compact:  
While the concept [of sphere of influence] is not defined in detail by 
international human rights standards, it will tend to include the individuals to 
whom the company has a certain political, contractual, economic or geographic 
proximity. Every company, both large and small, has a sphere of influence, 
though obviously the larger or more strategically significant the company, the 
larger the company’s sphere of influence is likely to be.34   
John Ruggie, the former Special Representative to the Secretary General on issues of human 
rights and transnational corporations, whose work is discussed in detail in the following 
chapter, has suggested that the sphere of influence approach is problematic.35  He states 
that it focuses on a limited set of rights but with expansive and imprecise responsibilities, 
and proposes that instead we focus on all human rights and set out business-specific 
responsibilities in this regard. To that end he suggests that we focus on the potential and 
actual human rights impacted, and imposes a requirement of due diligence on companies.  
His work will have a dramatic impact on the development of CSR, and signals there will likely 
be a shift away from the concept of sphere of influence.   
What is proposed here, unlike Ruggie’s approach, does not wholly reject the sphere of 
influence notion that has emerged in CSR literature.  It does not, however, fall victim to 
Ruggie’s criticisms either.  The reason is that while human rights are broader than 
democracy-related rights, the human rights referred to in the context of this thesis, 
specifically the human rights engaged on the Internet in a democratic culture, are narrow.  A 
broader conception of democracy engages rights such as the right to vote, and it arguably 
depends on such rights as the right to life, and prohibition of torture.  However, when the 
term human rights is used here, and when the term IIG is used, the focus is on the right to 
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freedom of expression.  Thus, we start from the position of specifically engaged human 
rights, and the issue is identifying the gatekeepers that impact these rights.  The regulation 
that results would be, as Julia Black describes it, the ‘outcome of the interactions of 
networks, or alternatively “webs of influence” which operate in the absence of formal 
governmental or legal sanction.’36  
An IIG is an entity, which due to the role it takes on, the type of business it does, or the 
technology with which it works, or a combination of all of these, has the capacity to impact 
democracy in a way traditionally reserved for public institutions.  An IIG’s human rights 
responsibilities increase or decrease based on the extent that its activities facilitate or 
hinder democratic culture.  This scale of responsibility is reflected not only in the reach of 
the gatekeeper but in the infiltration of that information, process, site, or tool in democratic 
culture.  While at this juncture we will not identify what those responsibilities are, it is 
necessary to understand that the responsibilities are a sliding scale to help identify who the 
gatekeepers are.  A typical figure of the public sphere uses concentric circles to illustrate 
that a business’s human rights obligations are strongest to its workers where it has the most 
influence, and gradually weakens as its sphere of influence decreases out to the supply 
chain, marketplace, community and government.  A typical figure is as follows: 
 
Figure 1: Sphere of Influence 
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For the purposes here the model can be set up in exactly the opposite manner.  It is not 
thought of in terms that the sphere of influence lessens as one moves to the outer circles, 
but rather that as the democratic impact increase, so does ones’ responsibilities.  This begs 
an important question: how does one as a gatekeeper have a greater or lesser impact on 
participation in democratic culture? There are two ways: 1. when the information has 
democratic significance; and 2. when the communication occurs in an environment more 
closely akin to a public sphere.   
Characteristics of Internet Information Gatekeepers 
First, one must keep in mind the broader definition of democratic culture discussed in 
chapter one, which encompasses more forms of speech as furthering democracy than is 
reflected in traditional human rights jurisprudence.  Freedom of expression, like the 
Internet’s topology, can be described as an interconnected network; a system of cultural 
and political interactions, experienced at both individual and collective levels.  Information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) allow for participation in such interactions at a level, 
speed, distance and cost previously unimagined.  Thus, as we have seen in chapter one, the 
democracy offered online is not restricted to the notion of deliberative democracy, but 
rather is the broader notion of facilitation and participation in democratic culture, which 
brings within its ambit cultural participations such as non-political expression, popular 
culture and individual participation. Therefore, in assessing the impact on democratic 
culture, it is not just political discussions that are heralded and protected, but any 
communication which is part of meaning-making in democratic culture.  
What this means for identification of IIGs is that at the far end of the scale of clearly 
protected speech would be overtly political speech. Historically political speech is given a 
preferred position over other forms of expression.37  Discussing issues pertaining to the 
governance of one’s community or country are considered crucial to the healthy functioning 
of democracy.  This can serve as a marker of the most protected form of speech for which 
businesses incur the most extensive responsibilities.  However, non-political speech that 
furthers democratic culture is offered more protection than might have been available in a 
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traditional conception of democracy. This can be seen with the increasing reliance by 
individuals on the Internet to help them cope with major life experiences.  For such users, 
the Internet is not only an information resource, but provides platforms for various 
communities they can visit to seek comfort and guidance from others going through similar 
experiences.  For example, online communities have become an increasingly important 
resource for cancer patients.38 The operators of such message boards, therefore, exercise 
significant power to exclude members and censor content. Under a traditional conception 
of freedom of expression, such content might be accorded less weight, yet through the lens 
of democratic culture such content is found to be more significant and its gatekeepers in a 
greater position of responsibility as a result.    
Second, it must be remembered that the notion of the public sphere discussed here is 
necessarily relaxed, as shown in chapter one.  The Internet has multiple spaces, some 
private, some public, with opportunities to participate in forms that mimic the real world, 
and at other times, with opportunities to participate in new forms of communication.  As we 
have seen, most, if not all, of these spaces would fail Jürgen Habermas’ utopian model of 
the public sphere, but they empower participation in democratic life creating a form of self-
determination from below. Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale talk about it in terms of the 
Internet’s structure. They say:  
[The web’s] structure results in a bottom-up filtration system.  At the lowest 
level, a large number of speakers receive relatively broad exposure within local 
communities likely composed of individuals with high-intensity interest or 
expertise.  Speakers who gain salience at the lower levels may gradually gain 
recognition in higher-order clusters and eventually reach general visibility.39   
While this focuses on speakers, we can think of this also in terms of those who receive 
information.  The “speaker” might be a blogger. In a Web 2.0 world, the blogger writes in an 
interactive environment.  It is not a one-way communication where the writer is separate 
from the gatekeeper and/or the information is received by a static gated. Rather there are 
multiple channels of communication.  The writer writes, readers comment, information is 
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hyperlinked, and eventually a blog might become so well known that the conversation 
becomes relevant to democratic culture and the entity becomes a gatekeeper.   
Such gatekeepers support or constrain the public sphere through the various ways they 
control the information that is communicated in online spaces. In a participative democracy, 
this is information that is of democratic significance, being content going closer to the core 
protected by freedom of expression discussed above, which by reason of (1) reach or (2) its 
structure, can be described as a modern public sphere.  This structure, to adopt part of 
James Bohman’s approach, has two dimensions.40  First, visitors can express their views and 
others can respond.  Second, the space is inclusive in that the communication is to an 
indefinite audience.  Bohman adds that the interaction is in an environment of free and 
equal respect, but this is perhaps rather a duty of the gatekeeper to facilitate, instead of 
being a quality of the structure itself. If required it would mean that someone was not a 
gatekeeper as long as the interaction was disrespectful and unequal.  For example, a blog 
might not be interactive as comments are not permitted, and therefore only engages issues 
as to the right of the gated to seek and receive information, but because of its reach to 
many readers takes on democratic significance elevating the blogger to the level of IIG.  
We can imagine a figure beginning to emerge as follows:  
 
Figure 2 Internet Information Gatekeepers Model – Democratic Impact 
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B. Internet Information Gatekeepers: A Framework 
We must then identify what the different levels are in the model.  Barzilai-Nahon’s 
functional approach to gatekeepers is very useful and is partially used to flesh out the 
model.41 The analysis of the democratic impact of gatekeepers is structured as a sliding scale 
from macro-gatekeepers down to micro-gatekeepers or vice versa.  The figure for such an 
analysis is as follows: 
 
Figure 3 Internet Information Gatekeepers Model: Webs of Influence 
At the top-level we have macro-gatekeepers, something various authors seem to recognise 
using terms such as ‘chokepoint’ or ‘bottleneck’. Barzilai-Nahon refers to them as ‘eternal’ 
gatekeepers.42  Bracha and Pasquale implicitly recognise these macro-gatekeepers when in 
discussing the same theory of democratic culture used here they comment, ‘though 
speakers in the digital network environment can occasionally “route around” traditional 
media intermediaries, the giant intermediaries are likely to maintain significantly superior 
salience and exposure, both on and off the Internet.’43  It is when they are a certain size, 
influence, or straddle several types of gatekeepers and have strong information controls, 
they are macro-gatekeepers.  These macro-gatekeepers are not categorised on their own in 
any other models.  
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They are distinguished from the other levels because users must inevitably pass through 
them to use the Internet and thus engage all aspects of the right to freedom of expression. 
This can be literal as in the case of our reliance on ISPs for access to the Internet, or 
figurative, as in the case of search engines on which we depend to organise the information 
on the Internet.  Such bodies incur the strongest human rights obligations. In contrast, 
portals were once macro-gatekeepers, but have since been downgraded to the next level of 
authority gatekeepers, because while central to a user’s Internet experience, they are no 
longer inevitable to it. A more recent macro-gatekeeper is mobile network providers.  As 
mobile users increasingly move to smart phones, with pc-like capabilities, mobile network 
providers become one of the key gatekeepers setting the terms of access to and use of the 
Internet.  
At the next level is what Barzilai-Nahon calls authority sites, sites which are high traffic, and 
control traffic and information flow.  They are, for example, portals and high traffic sites 
such as Wikipedia. They too impact all aspects of the rights of freedom of expression.  They 
are identified separately from other websites and macro-gatekeepers because they play a 
significant role in democratic culture, both in reach and in impact on culture, but their use is 
not an inevitable aspect of using the Internet.  Some of them started out in small capacities 
with no obligations and then meteorically shot to the level of authority gatekeeper 
attracting human rights obligations, such as Facebook. 
At the base level are micro-gatekeepers, which are not well known sources of information 
or discussion.  They do not necessarily engage all aspects of the rights of freedom of 
expression.  A website might engage the right to seek/receive information because it is a 
source of one-way communication of information to the masses, but not the right to speak, 
because visitors are unable to leave comments or engage in any interactive discourse.44  The 
smaller the reach the less the right is engaged.  In addition, the less the site is of significance 
to democratic culture, the less of a gatekeeping obligation is incurred. In Barzilai-Nahon 
terms, these are administrator sites such as application and content moderators, and 
network administrators.  They can be designated gatekeepers or take the role of 
administrator.  At its most basic level, there are no gatekeeping obligations that it does not 
impose on itself or develop in the community.  This is where there is the most fuzziness and 
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the categorisation of a website depends on its function, and in a dynamic environment this 
can change.  If one worries that, say, a particular discussion might elevate a message 
board’s impact on democratic culture thus instantly and temporarily inviting obligations, 
this would not be the case.  In such a situation, it is surely up to the site to decide how to be 
governed.  Something more sustained would be needed to move up a level from a micro-
gatekeeper to a middle-level gatekeeper, or from a simple gatekeeper to an IIG.   
In order for a gatekeeper to qualify as a micro-gatekeeper, the content of the site must 
pertain to democratic culture and the space must have attributes of a public sphere in 
either reach or structure.  For example, this author’s family blog would not qualify as a 
micro-IIG, although gatekeeping is exercised, as the information is not of democratic 
significance, it is read by few people, and it is not structured as an interactive space.  
However, this author’s work blog, www.laidlaw.eu, has the potential to be an IIG, although 
is not one yet, as the information has democratic significance, is read by more people and is 
structured to allow user comments, although such comments require approval to be posted.  
A greyer example is a website such as www.dooce.com, which started out as a personal 
blog, but over time attracted a large audience, which in turn attracted advertisements and 
revenue for the author.  A clearer example of an IIG is Huffington Post.  Some reader 
contributions have broken important stories that have been subsequently picked up by 
mainstream media. A website such as Huffington Post is arguably of such democratic and 
discursive significance, and with such great reach, that it has moved up a level from a micro-
IIG to be an authority gatekeeper. 
A figure exemplifying various gatekeepers is as follows: 
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Figure 4 Internet Information Gatekeepers Model: Webs of Influence 
Such a model helps pinpoint the gatekeepers along the scale of responsibility to tackle 
certain issues such as Internet filtering.  In the United Kingdom, for example, a body such as 
the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), the industry’s self-regulatory body for addressing 
unlawful content, would be a macro-gatekeeper.  This is because the content a UK user 
accesses is inevitably moderated to a degree by the IWF.  The IWF will be the focus of the 
case study in chapter four.  The IWF sends its members a blacklist of child sexual abuse 
images to be filtered, but the body also makes use of the notice-and-takedown regime to 
issue notices for the removal of criminally obscene content hosted in the UK. The members 
themselves are a mix of macro-gatekeepers, such as ISPs and search engines, and authority-
gatekeepers, such as Facebook and the BBC.45  Such gatekeepers have greater impact on 
democratic culture and thus invite greater scrutiny as to their responsibilities.  Using this 
model to identify the gatekeepers for filtering has an additional benefit.  It reveals that the 
dynamics are happening largely at the outer-reaches of the model, where there is the most 
democratic impact, inviting greater scrutiny of the regulatory arrangement between these 
various gatekeepers. 
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A contrasting dynamic involves users, bloggers and blog providers. A blog provider such as 
Google’s Blogger service has Terms of Service that the blog owner is gated by, which can 
include sweeping powers to, amongst other things, delete the blog.  Blogger represents the 
type of gatekeeper that on its own would be an authority gatekeeper, but under the 
umbrella of Google and the breadth of services it offers, is arguably a macro-gatekeeper. 
The blog writer has the power to create and select its content, whether to allow comments, 
and whether to delete them.  For example, as a result of complaints under the DMCA of 
copyright infringement, Google deleted a series of popular music blogs.  Some of the 
bloggers disputed the copyright infringement claims, arguing that they had been asked to 
post the music by either the promotional company, record label or the artist.46 The purpose 
of this example is not to analyse the issues it raises concerning copyright or the DMCA.  
Rather, this incident serves to highlight the value of the human rights driven framework that 
is being argued for here.  It also illustrates the layers of gatekeeping which simultaneously 
operate in the Internet environment.  By shifting the perspective to the gated’s rights, the 
question becomes the significance of the blogs to democratic culture.  One of the blogs 
might be a place, whether due to numbers or its structure, which elevates it to micro-
gatekeeper and occasionally to the authority gatekeeper level. Thus users might have a 
stronger right to the content of the blog, and the blogger a stronger right against the blog 
provider to run his or her blog. In turn, the blog provider might have greater human rights 
responsibilities and deletion of the blog require greater regulatory scrutiny. Shifting the 
perspective gives a fuller account of the concerns raised by Google’s deletion of the blogs.  
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(26 August 2009), at http://buzz.blogger.com/2009/08/let-music-play.html (last visited 27 July 2011).  See also 
Google’s response to the incident, ‘A quick note about music blog removals’ (10 February 2010), 
http://buzz.blogger.com/2010/02/quick-note-about-music-blog-removals.html (last visited 27 July 2011).  The 
DMCA takedown letters are archived at Chilling Effects, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited 27 July 
2011).  For the Blogger Terms of Service see http://www.blogger.com/terms.g (last visited 27 July 2011). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
The above framework targets a particular type of gatekeeper termed IIGs, which as a result 
of their control over the flow of information, facilitate or hinder deliberation and 
participation in democratic culture.  Whether a gatekeeper has this impact, and the extent 
of it is determined by the gatekeeper’s web of influence, where a gatekeeper with less 
impact on democratic culture incurs less responsibility or may not be an IIG at all, sliding up 
the scale to a gatekeeper that has a significant impact on democratic culture and incurs 
more responsibility.  Where a gatekeeper fits on this range, as either a macro-gatekeeper, 
authority gatekeeper, or micro-gatekeeper, is determined by the extent to which (1) the 
information has democratic significance; and (2) the reach or structure of the 
communicative space. While a simpler model might clearly delineate what qualifies as a 
gatekeeper from what does not, such a simple, categorical model would artificially hive off 
certain entities from the gatekeeper label.  This artificiality cannot work when taking a 
human rights approach to gatekeeping as the human rights impact crosses categories.  The 
consistency here is in the method for assessing gatekeeper qualities, which then provides 
guidance on the scale of human rights responsibilities it attracts. 
Now that we have identified the gatekeepers that are the primary subject of this thesis, we 
can proceed with an investigation of CSR and the way CSR frameworks have been used to 
govern the activities of IIGs in terms of their human rights impact. Ultimately the question is 
whether such frameworks are sufficient for the goal of the facilitating the Internet as a force 
within democratic culture. The following chapter will examine the concept of CSR and how it 
is being used in the human rights and Internet governance fields, orienting the reader to its 
strengths and weaknesses.  This will frame the enquiry in the case studies in chapters four 
and five concerning how such CSR frameworks have fared for two particular macro-
gatekeepers, ISPs and search engines.  
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CHAPTER 3  
 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
IN CYBERSPACE 
In the 2011 Arab uprising the Egyptian Government ordered Vodafone to turn off mobile 
telephone networks.  What should it have done? Resist the Government order? 
Immediately cease work in Egypt? Comply? In the end Vodafone did comply, as well as allow 
pro-government text messages to be sent using its networks.  Would a corporate 
governance framework have helped Vodafone navigate such issues as these? It was one of 
the key drafters of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), one of the leading corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) frameworks for technology companies concerning issues of human 
rights (discussed further below).  Yet, Vodafone pulled out at the last minute.  The question 
is, would being a member of the GNI have saved it or at least guided it on what to do?1  
Similarly, at the height of the Wikileaks Saga in December 2010 surrounding the release of 
various confidential documents, most notably the diplomatic cables, Amazon decided to cut 
off hosting of a key Wikileaks site.2  This raises a slightly different question to the Vodafone 
one.  While there was most certainly pressure from government, there was no government 
order that we know of compelling Amazon to shut down the site.  The question concerns 
what Amazon was entitled to do.  Is a private company free to decide the types of speech it 
supports, or is there a right of access to certain forums and platforms of communication 
even if privately owned? Who should decide such matters? 
                                                          
1
 The Global Network Initiative, at www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/ (last visited 27 July 2011).  For interesting 
ideas on what Vodafone should have done, see the commentaries of the Institute of Business and Human 
Rights S. Tripathi: ‘How should Internet and Phone Companies respond in Egypt?’ (4 February 2011, at 
www.ihrb.org/commentary/staff/internet_providers_in_egypt.html (last visited 27 July 2011), and ‘How 
Businesses have responded in Egypt’ (7 February 2011), at 
www.ihrb.org/commentary/staff/how_businesses_have_responded_in_egypt.html (last visited 27 July 2011). 
2
 E. MacAskill, ‘Wikileaks website pulled by Amazon after US political pressure’, at 
www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-website-cables-servers-amazon (last visited 27 July 2011). 
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While the focus of this thesis is on the activities of these gatekeepers in the United 
Kingdom, these incidents help frame the issues for discussion.  All of these questions are 
rooted in three fields of study: CSR, regulation (more broadly law), and human rights.  All 
three fields of study ask questions about where the law ends and social responsibility 
begins, and it is in this perilous land of in-between that Internet gatekeepers operate.  The 
question underlying this chapter, and indeed this thesis, is whether CSR has the capacity to 
be the structural regime for governance of digital human rights.  In order to delve into this 
issue, the concept of CSR and how it relates to human rights and the law must be examined.  
What is revealed is a lacuna in governance concerning IIGs, where human rights laws, 
regulation and current CSR regimes do not quite apply to what they are doing, even though 
IIGs are at the centre of the Internet’s democratising force.  The promise of CSR, it will be 
shown in this chapter, is as a bridge between the extra-legal dimensions of human rights 
and rule-making nature of the law. 
As a term CSR is mired in conceptual disagreements plaguing its development as an 
academic field.  This led the editors of The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social 
Responsibility to comment, ‘[it] has become a major area of research despite a degree of 
ambiguity and disagreement that might ordinarily be expected to lead to its demise’.3  
Researchers have not agreed on a common definition of the term, nor whether a company 
should even have social responsibilities, much less what the core principles of such 
responsibilities should be.4  For example, a study by the Ashridge Business School identified 
147 species of CSR.5  This contentiousness concerning how to define CSR even played out 
online when contributors to Wikipedia, both supportive and critical of CSR, tried to define it.  
Unable to achieve any consensus, the phrase was eventually flagged for its neutrality.6   
Through the years it can be seen appearing under the terms social responsibility, business 
ethics, stakeholder theory, sustainability, corporate citizenship, corporate social 
responsiveness, corporate social performance, and so on.  Yet, despite its vagueness CSR is 
emerging as its own academic field and this can be attributed, at least in part, to the 
                                                          
3
 A. Crane et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2008), 
p. 4. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Discussed in M. Blowfield and A. Murray, Corporate Responsibility: a critical introduction (Oxford University 
Press, 2008), p. 15. 
6
 Crane n. 3, p. 5. 
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following.  As Ronen Shamir comments ‘corporate global rule is already here.’7 Consider the 
following statistics.  Multinational companies account for two-thirds of the world’s trade in 
goods and services and 51 per cent of the world’s top one-hundred world economies.  27.5 
per cent of the world’s gross domestic product is generated by two hundred corporations, 
and their combined annual revenue is greater than the 182 states which make up 80 per 
cent of the population.8   
It is not only their economic power that is significant.  Companies are increasingly state-like, 
often influencing the development of laws, as seen in their lobbying efforts to strengthen 
intellectual property protections of businesses in the development of TRIPS (trade-related 
aspects of intellectual property rights).9  Yet, there are minimal international regulatory 
structures in place to articulate any corresponding duties on companies for such issues as 
human rights.10  A chasm has developed: 
There is a growing recognition among scholars and activists alike of the widening 
gap between the transnational character of corporate activity and the 
availability of transnational regulatory structures that may be effectively used to 
monitor, assess, and restrain corporations irrespective of any specific territory in 
which they may happen to operate at a given moment.11   
It is in this grey area where CSR (however it is defined) operates, not just as a public 
relations tool but as a facilitative force for socially responsible governance.12 
With this background, it is evident that a single chapter on CSR is hard-pressed to give 
a thorough accounting of what CSR is.  The examination that follows, however, is 
narrowed by the purpose of the thesis being the examination of the viability of CSR as 
                                                          
7
 R. Shamir, ‘Corporate social responsibility: a case of hegemony and counter-hegemony’ in B. De Sousa Santos 
and C.A. Rodriguez-Garavito (eds.), Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 92. 
8
 Ibid.  For more such statistics see www.corpwatch.org (last visited 13 October 2011), in particular S. 
Anderson et al., ‘Top 200: The Rise of Corporate Global Power’ (4 December 2000), at 
http://corpwatch.org/article.php?id=377 (last visited 13 October 2011). 
9
 See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm (last visited 27 July 2011). 
10
 Shamir n 7, pp. 95-96. 
11
 Ibid. John Ruggie’s work will be discussed extensively below, but note here his comment that the result of 
this governance gap is a ‘permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate 
sanctioning or reparation’: J. Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human 
Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ (2008), at www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-
report-7-Apr-2008.pdf (last visited 27 July 2011), p. 3. 
12
 Shamir n. 7, p. 95. 
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a framework through which the human rights obligations of Internet Information 
Gatekeepers (IIGs) can be embedded into their practices.  There is no need for this 
chapter, or indeed this thesis, to seek to resolve the varying theories and approaches 
to CSR (and indeed whether CSR should be a theory or simply a management 
practice).  Rather, CSR as a concept will be harnessed here to show the regulatory 
environment within which the business and society relationship has developed, and its 
focus will be tailored to its use for the promotion and protection of freedom of 
expression.  It is further tailored by the focus on the ICT sector in developed countries. 
Under this umbrella, the various conceptions of CSR can operate – voluntary and 
binding, indirect and direct. It is the effectiveness of these various CSR initiatives as 
regulatory settlements for the promotion and protection of human rights that is of 
interest here. 
Thus, in order to manage the vagueness and expansiveness of the CSR subject matter, this 
chapter will be approached as follows.  It will examine what CSR is as a concept, discussing 
its’ historical development and the criticisms of its use as a governance tool.  Having 
established how the term CSR is used in this thesis, the chapter will then examine two 
conceptual problems for the analysis of IIGs: the relationship between CSR and the law, and 
CSR and human rights.  The chapter will conclude by identifying Article 10(2) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)13 as the appropriate standard against which 
to assess CSR frameworks, which forms the methodology of the case studies in chapters 
four and five. 
I. THE CONCEPT OF CSR 
 
In order to understand CSR as a concept, we must understand the historical context of the 
relationship between businesses and society, because this gives a sense of the public’s 
changing expectations of businesses concerning their responsibilities.  For example, while a 
modern understanding of corporate responsibilities tends to focus on the paramountcy of 
responsibilities to shareholders, this was not always so.  Indeed, early American enterprises 
                                                          
13
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. 
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were subject to democratic control.  The state controlled the issuance of corporate charters, 
which set out certain public interest obligations, which if a company failed to fulfil, would 
result in the withdrawal by the state of the charter to operate.14  An examination of the 
historical context also helps us understand the regulatory framework within which 
businesses operate.   As the reader will recall, businesses are affected by various regulatory 
modalities, not just the law, but also norms, markets and architecture.15  The law, on its 
own, is not necessarily the most effective way to protect digital human rights. 
A. Where CSR came from 
 
The evolution of the relationship between businesses and society can be classified in four 
eras: the Industrial Revolution, the Great Depression, post-World War II, and globalisation.16  
The industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries was an era of major changes in 
agriculture, manufacturing, mining and transport. With the rise of the factory system came 
concerns regarding child and female labour, pollution, poverty and other social problems.17 
This caused civil unrest giving way to the industrial welfare movement, which sought to 
prevent labour abuses by improving safety and health conditions of work places, employee 
wages and hours, and the like.18  It was also a time of loosened regulatory oversight.19  In 
the United States, the right of states to revoke charters was curtailed, and corporations 
                                                          
14
 J. Richter, Holding Corporations Accountable: Corporate Conduct, International Codes, and Citizen Action 
(London: Zed Books Ltd., 2001), p. 6. 
15
 Alternatively as A. Murray and C. Scott frame it hierarchy, community, competition and design: ‘Regulating 
New Media’, MLR, 65 (2002) 491. 
16
 There are many different ways to categorise these phases, although the descriptions of the time seem to be 
consistent. I have created four, although in Blowfield and Murray n. 5, the authors only talk about 3, merging 
the time between the wars and after WWII.  Also, generalisations are made here about the social, legal and 
political history of varying countries.  The focus is mostly on the US and the UK, and even there we find quite 
divergent histories but this is only intended to offer broad brush strokes of the state of the business-society 
relationship at the time, and there is enough commonality during these eras to do this. The discussion draws 
extensively from the often cited work of Archie Carroll, who has examined extensively the history and theory 
of the concept of CSR, most recently in Crane n. 3. 
17
 A.B. Carroll, ‘A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices’ in Crane n. 3, pp. 20-21 
18
 Ibid., p. 21  It was not just technological innovation that characterised the period of the Industrial Revolution 
relevant to businesses and society.  It was also a time of institutional innovation, such as the debut of the 
limited liability company: Blowfield and Murray n. 5, p. 45. 
19
 Richter n. 14, p. 6-7. 
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were granted the equivalent status of citizens, including constitutional rights of free 
speech.20   
The fulfilment of the responsibility by the community at this time largely took the form of 
philanthropy, with business executives such as Cornelius Vanderbilt and John D. Rockefeller 
regularly, and quite publicly, making contributions to various charities.  While this practice 
of philanthropy was not new to society,21  it was frowned on by the public, who thought 
these businessmen were effectively ‘giving away stockholders’ assets without their 
approval.’22  In this pre-Great Depression period, companies exercised great economic 
power concentrated in the hands of few, which created an environment ripe for corruption 
and irresponsibility.  Although the scars of World War I led people to rethink the social order 
and found bodies such as the International Labour Organization which were aimed at 
promoting social justice, this ‘new capitalism’ failed to take off: the period was in reality a 
time of deference to market control.23 
The second era started with the Great Depression.  Robert Hay and Ed Gray characterise it 
as the ‘trusteeship management’ phase, where corporate managers were held responsible 
to not only shareholders but also customers, employees and the community.24  In this era 
companies increasingly began to be seen as having social responsibilities akin to 
governments.  In the UK, it was a period of nationalisation of major industries such as coal, 
railway, power, and gas, reflecting a belief that the public good was best protected by state 
control of businesses.25 
However it is the period after World War II, starting in the 1950s where we see modern CSR 
beginning to take shape.26  This third era, often referred to as the era of ‘social 
responsibility’, was a time of awareness raising and issue spotting, where the role of 
businesses in society began to receive attention on issues such as the environment, race and 
                                                          
20
 Ibid., p. 6-7.  Other countries did not view corporations as citizens, but rather treated them as artificial legal 
personalities, so they could sue, hold property be held liable and enter transactions: ibid., p. 7. 
21
 One can see this practice traces back to patrons of the arts for churches, sculptures, and endowments to 
universities: Carroll n. 17, p. 21. 
22
 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
23
 Blowfield and Murray n. 5, pp. 46-47. 
24
 Carroll n. 17, p. 23. 
25
 Blowfield and Murray n. 5, p. 48. 
26
 Carroll n. 17, p. 25. 
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poverty, and the main work involved trying to simply define what CSR is.27  In the 1980s the 
subject matter splintered as researchers tried to recast CSR in other theories or models, 
such as stakeholder theory and business ethics, the latter growing as the public learned of 
scandals such as the infant-formula boycotts,28 and the controversy of companies doing 
business in South Africa.29  In the 1990s environmental concerns came to the forefront once 
again, and the role of a company as a ‘corporate citizen’ began to gain traction.30 
The fourth era, which overlaps with the latter part of the third era, is the current era of 
globalisation.  Experts debate how to define the term, but it generally refers to the view that 
economic growth can be achieved ‘by creating a global market built on free trade.’31  The 
privatisation movement in the 1980s in the UK and US under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan, respectively, and the establishment of World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, 
helped pave the way for globalisation.32  In the context of CSR, this era raises issues 
concerning the responsibilities of transnational corporations (TNCs), an issue particularly 
relevant to this thesis; most macro-IIGs, such as Google are Apple, are TNCs.   
                                                          
27
 It moved the subject matter away from a focus on CSR as a form of philanthropy and onto how businesses 
manage their social impact.  The idea of CSR as a management practice was popular in the 1970s, where issues 
came to the public forefront such as hiring of minorities, the environment, civil rights, and contributions to arts 
and education, truth in advertising and product defects: ibid., p. 33. 
28
 The infant formula scandal occurred in the 1970s, when Nestle was boycotted for its marketing of formula in 
developing countries. The advertisements pushed formula as being better for babies than breast milk.  
However, in these economically starved areas many did not have access to clean water and sanitation 
equipment, all of which was needed to use formula, and due to the high cost of formula many diluted the mix.  
Many babies are argued to have become sick and died as a result. 
29
 Carroll n. 17, p. 36.  In the 1980s concepts of corporate social responsiveness and corporate social 
performance were introduced, where less emphasis was placed on the philosophical meaning of CSR, and 
more on how an organization can act responsibly: Blowfield and Murray n. 5, p. 12. 
30
 Corporate citizenship refers to ‘the role of business as a citizen in global society and its function in delivering 
the citizenship rights of individuals.’  With the focus on the environment, terms such as ‘corporate 
sustainability’ were also used: ibid. 
31
 Ibid., p. 72. See R. McCorquodale and R. Fairbrother, ‘Globalization and Human Rights’, Hum. Rts. Q., 21(3)) 
(1999) 735, noting it is a contested term: p. 736.  In particular see discussion section VI on the intersection of 
globalization and human rights in the communications industry. See also K. Webb (ed.), Voluntary Codes: 
Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Carleton Research Unit for Innovation, Science and 
Environment, 2004). Webb defines it as: ‘a complex process of interdependency or convergence resulting from 
dramatically increasing levels of exchange in goods, information, services and capital’: K. Webb, 
‘Understanding the Voluntary Codes Phenomenon’ in ibid., p. 8. 
32
 Under Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States, a set of policies 
known as the Washington Consensus were enacted, which promoted global free trade: Webb ibid., p. 8. See 
also Richter note 14, p. 12. 
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The price of globalisation, however, is regulatory oversight.  In fact, the current international 
regulatory environment resulting from globalisation is notable mostly for its lack of 
regulation or oversight.33  The call for regulation of TNCs has been renewed, and this is 
where CSR and globalisation are intertwined.  Many CSR initiatives are spurred on by 
concerns that arise from globalisation and relate to standards for health and safety, human 
rights and the environment, such as the Rio Earth Summit concerning the environment, the 
United Nations Global Compact and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) guidelines for multinational enterprises.34  In the context of 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) companies, CSR frameworks such as the 
Electronic Industry Code of Conduct (EICC) and the GNI have gained prominence in recent 
years, with the former focusing on such issues as labour, health and safety, and the 
environment, and the latter on issues of freedom of expression and privacy.35  The GNI, in 
particular, will be discussed in more detail below. 
Having contextualised the story of CSR with this very brief history of the relationship 
between business and society, a modern accounting of CSR as a concept is needed.  This will 
frame how the concept will be used to assess the sufficiency of IIGs governance structures.  
B. What CSR Is 
 
As we have seen with the above history, the story of the relationship between business and 
society has not only been contentious, but far-reaching in its impact.  CSR has been used to 
describe a variety of responsibilities from charitable to legal, in a variety of fields from the 
environment, to labour and to financial services.  Various theories and definitions of CSR 
have developed, all with inevitably different views on what CSR is depending on the field of 
research informing the perspective.  As Dow Votaw states, ‘corporate social responsibility 
means something, but not always the same thing to everybody.’36 A universal definition is 
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 Ibid., p. 8. 
34
 Ibid., pp. 13-14; Blowfield and Murray note 5, p. 88. 
35
 See www.eicc.info/ and www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/ (last visited 27 July 2011).   
36
 D. Votaw, ‘Genius Became Rare: A Comment on the Doctrine of Social Responsibility Pt 1’, Calif. Manage. 
Rev., 15(2) (1972) 25, p. 25.  The full quote is worth replicating here: ‘Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
means something, but not always the same thing to everybody. To some it conveys the idea of legal 
responsibility or liability; to others, it means social responsible behaviour in the ethical sense; to still others, 
the meaning transmitted is that of ‘responsible for’ in a causal mode; many simply equate it with a charitable 
contribution; some take it to mean socially conscious; many of those who embrace it most fervently see it as a 
73 
 
unfeasible, and for our purposes, unnecessary.  Here we are concerned with CSR in its legal 
and human rights context.  This gives structure to what is otherwise a relatively loose 
concept.  We draw on human rights for the theoretical framework of a company’s 
responsibilities and look at the law to understand the ways that CSR responsibilities are 
different from or overlap with legal obligations. 
In regulatory theory, CSR can be described as a term for the tangled web of networks that 
govern businesses.  Yet, unlike the tendency of regulation to focus mostly on regulation by 
state agencies or the various forms of self-regulation, CSR is outward looking, having both a 
legal and social aspect to its responsibilities: ‘[p]erhaps the crux of the matter is ultimately 
there is no such thing as corporate social responsibility, but rather a social dimension 
inherent in all company’s responsibilities, just as there is an economic dimension to 
exercising of all its responsibilities.’37  Viewing modern CSR trough this conceptual lens 
involves recognising the artificiality of the division before the 1950s, as we saw above, 
between the role of government in protecting social cohesion and the like, and the role of 
business to create wealth.  In seeking responsibility38 and not just accountability for 
minimum standards, it is engaging with a more reflective and self-conscious form of self-
governance.39   
To be certain the search for a universal definition of CSR seems to be the holy grail of CSR 
research.40  This is because, as Adaeze Okoye notes, the lack an accepted definition has 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
mere synonym for legitimacy in the context of belonging or being proper or valid; a few see a sort of fiduciary 
duty imposing higher standards of behaviour on businessmen than on citizens at large.’ 
37
 J.M. Lozano et al., Governments and Corporate Social Responsibility: Public Policies beyond Regulation and 
Voluntary Compliance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 15. 
38
 The meaning of ‘responsibility’ in CSR has been researched extensively.  For example, A. Voilescu sees the 
concept of CSR as raising a ‘more fundamental normative question related to the nature of responsibility 
itself’: A. Voilescu, ‘Changing paradigms of corporate criminal responsibility: lessons for corporate social 
responsibility’ in D. McBarnet et al. (eds.), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility 
and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 399.  Tom Campbell frames the word ‘social’ in CSR as 
having three possible meanings: obligations owed to society, a contrast between social and legal, and a 
question of the content of the obligations to stakeholders rather than shareholders: T. Campbell, ‘The 
normative grounding of corporate social responsibility: a human rights approach’, in McBarnet ibid., p. 534.  
Most important for our purposes later on, responsibility carries a certain meaning in terms of business and 
human rights through the work of John Ruggie, the former Special Representative of the United Nations 
Secretary General on business and human rights. 
39
 C. Parker, ‘Meta-regulation: legal accountability for corporate social responsibility’, in McBarnet ibid., p. 213. 
40
 There are compelling theories of CSR, notably the theory of A. G. Scherer and G. Palazzo that CSR should be 
viewed from a Habermasian perspective where corporations are not just subject to rules but are part of the 
democratic process of rule setting: ‘Toward a Political Conception of Corporate Social Responsibility: Business 
and Society Seen from a Habermasian Perspective’, Academy of Management Review, 32(4) (2007) 1096.   
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been linked to a lack of agreement on the normative underpinnings of CSR.41  The issue, to 
put it simply, is: what exactly is CSR rooted in?  Okoye persuasively argues that a definition 
of CSR is subject to never ending disputes concerning its meaning and that therefore a single 
definition is unattainable.42 Rather, what is needed is what she calls a common reference 
point.  This ‘sets out the parameters of the debate and identifies the common basis that 
indicates that all such arguments relate to the same concept.’43  The common reference 
point for CSR, she argues, is the relationship between business and society.44  This approach 
finds company with other authors, such as Michael Blowfield and Alan Murray, who 
approach it this way stating that treating CSR as an umbrella term ‘captures the various 
ways in which business’ relationship with society is being defined, managed, and acted 
upon.’45   Therefore in approaching CSR conceptually in this thesis, what we will be doing is 
treating CSR as an umbrella term for the business and society relationship. 
The appropriate theoretical framework for CSR in the context of this thesis is human rights. 
There have been several human rights based approaches to CSR instruments, notably the 
United Nations Global Compact46 (discussed later in this chapter).  All such approaches draw 
their theoretical framework from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  As noted by 
Tom Campbell, ‘CSR is replete with human rights concepts (and vice versa)’.47  Campbell 
argues that regardless of how one approaches CSR, it arguably draws on human rights 
discourse, the notion that there are basic and universal standards of morality48, which 
inform ones obligations as a member of society: 
When using human rights discourse to legitimate CSR (and indeed to legitimate 
existing and proposed human rights law), we are drawing on the moral and 
political discourse of human rights on which social as well as legal obligations 
may be founded.  In this mode, human rights are those basic human interests 
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 A. Okoye, ‘Theorising Corporate Social Responsibility as an Essentially Contested Concept: Is a Definition 
Necessary?’, J. Bus. Ethics, 89 (2009) 613, p. 614. 
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 She argues that CSR constitutes an essentially contested concept (ECC), a theory that states that certain 
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 Ibid., p. 623. 
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 United Nations Global Compact, ‘The Ten Principles’, at 
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rights: see J. Habermas, ‘Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican Versions’, Ratio 
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75 
 
that ought to be recognised and guaranteed by the social, economic and political 
arrangements in place in all human societies.  What we are drawing on here is 
the idea of basic universal interests of overriding moral significance, rather than 
any existing set of international conventions or positive legal systems.49 
As opposed to Campbell, it is not argued here that human rights discourse forms the basis of 
all social responsibilities of businesses, but rather I seek to highlight that in asking whether 
IIGs have any human rights responsibilities, human rights principles naturally become the 
theoretical underpinning of the framework.  We are left with many questions, namely how 
does one judge whether such principles have been met.  The best approach will be outlined 
in section V below.  In addition, the difficulty, Campbell rightly notes, is in articulating the 
nature of the human rights duties of companies, and conceptually distinguishing such duties 
from those imposed on citizens or the state.50  The question of how a business is 
responsible, for what and to whom dominates CSR research, and is especially problematic in 
the arena of digital human rights. It is this dilemma that is tested in the case studies in 
chapters 4 and 5.   
There are two aspects to how CSR will be approached in this thesis that must be untangled 
further. As we have seen, the operation of IIGs and their impact on democratic culture takes 
place at the fringes of where the law ends and social responsibility begins. There is a nexus 
here of CSR, law and human rights.  We must therefore unpick the relationship between the 
law and CSR, as well as the relationship between CSR and human rights to pave the way for 
more thoughtful assessment of the responsibilities of IIGs for freedom of expression. 
Regardless of the theoretical approach we take to CSR, as a governance tool CSR struggles 
to overcome criticisms that it is weak window-dressing that only serves to deflect or delay 
much needed legislative attention.  In the area of Internet governance, as will be shown in 
the case studies, some of these criticisms resonate more than others, thus the following 
section will highlight some of the leading criticisms of CSR in practice.  The goal is not to 
resolve the various criticisms of CSR. Quite the contrary.  The question in then examining 
IIGs is whether the CSR frameworks that govern their activities are subject to the same 
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weaknesses identified regarding CSR frameworks in general, and whether this renders such 
frameworks incapable of protecting and respecting freedom of expression.   
C. Critiques of CSR 
 
There are four main critiques of CSR.51  The first argument says that CSR is anti-business 
because it stifles the primary purpose of business, which is to serve the shareholders’ 
interests.  This would be the Milton Friedman argument that corporate responsibility 
hampers a company’s ability to maximise profits.52  Under this argument some go so far to 
as to assert that CSR is against the law as it constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty of the 
owners to the shareholders to maximise their profits: ‘CSR can be seen in this context not so 
much as management proudly going beyond legal obligation, but, in effect, as management 
going beyond its legal powers (acting ‘ultra vires’) or even breaching its fiduciary duty to the 
owners.’53  This has been generally dismissed as an over-simplification of the law,54 but we 
must be mindful of not stretching corporate responsibilities too far, particularly concerning 
potential positive duties on companies to facilitate freedom of expression. 
The second argument is the exact opposite, arguing that CSR is pro-business, by favouring 
the needs of business over the needs of society.  As with the first argument, this one is 
based on the idea that the role of business in society is in need of re-alignment, but it then 
disagrees as to the causes of this imbalance and the way to solve it.  This argument sees CSR 
as too weak to protect the public good.55  For example, Enron had a code of conduct to 
prevent corporate crime, but because the culture of Enron was geared primarily to 
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increasing the price of stock, the code was ignored or overrode, with executives aiming 
instead for the bottom line, relying on legal advice that what they were doing was lawful.56 
There are many variations within this argument – that CSR needs a better framework; that it 
is not enough; that it has been captured by business interests; and so on – but the essence 
is the same. One aspect of this will be teased out further, and this is the idea that CSR has 
been captured by business interests.  
This argument proposes that businesses used to engage in philanthropy, but now CSR is 
treated as something to be managed by their public relations department.57  This ‘social 
branding’, as Ivan Manokha describes it, involves associating a company’s products or 
services with ‘morally good’ notions, creating an emotional attachment for consumers to 
the product (by buying the product they feel they too are helping the environment or 
protecting human rights), thus attracting brand loyalty and boosting sales.58  Here CSR is a 
‘project’ or ‘marketing device’, thus commoditising social responsibility and concealing the 
deeper issues underlying this uneasy relationship between business and society.59   
Google’s philanthropy site, www.google.org, for example, aims to use technology to address 
‘global challenges’,60 such as mapping deforestation or tracking flu trends.61  Is this 
corporate responsibility or mere social branding?  For the purposes of the beneficiaries of 
these activities, does it matter? Google also has a crisis response project through this site. 
After the devastating earthquake and tsunami in Japan in 2011 Google launched a tool to 
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help find missing people.62  This might be both philanthropy and branding at work.  To those 
who are looking for a missing loved one, this question is largely irrelevant. This serves as a 
good reminder in proceeding with the analysis in these chapters.  We must be mindful not 
to get lost in theoretical questions of what the IIGs intent may or may not be.  This risks 
drawing attention away from the questions concerning the sufficiency of the corporate 
governance structure.  Thus for our purposes, social branding is beside the point and the 
focus is rather on effect of the governance structure on the exercise of free speech. 
The third argument is that CSR is too narrow excluding from its remit key elements of the 
business-society relationship.  Here, CSR is often faulted for not being a formalised 
codification of law, which tends to misunderstand what CSR is supposed to be, and also 
misunderstands the incapacitating effect of globalisation on a government’s power to act.  
The fourth argument is that CSR simply does not achieve what it sets out to achieve.  In 
reference to the UN Global Compact, discussed below, where only 3 per cent of TNCs have 
signed up, one author commented ‘In what realm of life other than the strange world of 
[corporate responsibility] would a 2-3 per cent take-up rate be considered to be a 
success?’63   
These criticisms highlight what we saw above; that perhaps we haven’t moved much 
beyond simply trying to define what CSR is as a field of research.  Some of these problems 
are resolved by approaching CSR as a term for the business and society relationship.  
However, in order to address these critiques in the context of IIGs, two conceptual problems 
require further examination.  The first to be addressed is the relationship between CSR and 
the law to tease out differences between purely voluntary responsibilities and legal 
obligation and when the two overlap.  The second to be examined is the relationship 
between CSR and human rights and how state and businesses human rights responsibilities 
operate in the context of international human rights law and policy. 
II. CSR AND THE LAW 
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One of the main conceptual problems for CSR is its relationship with the law and this 
ultimately becomes a question of the legal nature of voluntary codes, because many CSR 
frameworks are voluntary in nature.  The struggle to understand this and then determine 
whether CSR is consequently sufficient as a governance structure is threaded through the 
critiques of CSR as we saw above. Voluntariness is particularly significant in the area of 
Internet governance, where voluntary codes are a key governance tool of the type of 
companies that qualify as IIGs.64 
Within Europe there is disagreement concerning whether to treat CSR as something purely 
voluntary in nature.  The European Commission has rooted its approach in voluntarism, 
pushing for multi-stakeholderism with governments taking on more of a supportive than 
legislative role and companies being positioned as the ‘principal actors’.65  The European 
Parliament, in contrast, favours regulatory mechanisms.66  The United Kingdom has sided 
with the European Commission and promotes a voluntary approach to CSR backed by soft 
regulation, with management of CSR taking place through the Department of Business, 
Innovation & Skills (BIS).67  Lozano describes the UK regime as the business in the 
community model, where government acts as the promoter and facilitator of CSR.  While 
human rights were historically not a focus of the UK government’s approach to CSR, human 
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Gatekeepers: Corporate Ethics on a Filtered Internet’ in Global Information Technology Report (World 
Economic Forum: 2006-2007), and U. Gasser, ‘Responsibility for human rights violations, acts or omissions, 
within the “sphere of influence” of companies’, Working Paper Series, (December 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1077649 (last visited 27 July 2011). 
65
 For history of EU approach see Voilescu n. 38.  The EU has published a significant number of papers on the 
subject maters. See the following reports: Green Paper, ‘Promoting a European Framework for Corporate 
Social Responsibility’ COM (2001) 366; European Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR: Final Results and 
Recommendations (29 June 2004); Communication, ‘Implementing the partnership for growth and jobs: 
making Europe a pole of excellence on Corporate Social Responsibility’ COM (2006) 136.  
66
 See discussion in Voilescu n. 38, pp. 382-386. 
67
 Created in 2009 after the disbandment of the Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
(BERR), which was also created on the disbandment of another department, the Department of Trade and 
Industry in 2007. CSR, as defined by BIS is ‘essentially about companies moving beyond a base of legal 
compliance to integrating socially responsible behaviour into their core values, in recognition of the sound 
business benefits in doing so.’ See now archived 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/sectors/sustainability/corp-
responsibility/page45192.html/ (last visited 29 July 2011).  While human rights was historically not a focus of 
the UK Government’s approach to CSR, human rights issues are increasingly infiltrating their considerations, 
though the focus is still on conduct of businesses overseas: See HM Government, Corporate Responsibility 
Report (BERR, February 2009). Compare it to HM Government, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Government 
Update (DTI, May 2004) where there was no mention of human rights.   
80 
 
rights issues are increasingly infiltrating their considerations, though the focus is still on 
conduct of businesses overseas.68 
It would be wrong to conceive of CSR as purely extra-legal.  With increasing enforcement 
measures and pressure on CSR initiatives, the image of CSR as purely voluntary is becoming 
more difficult to argue. 69  CSR embraces elements of both: ‘[i]f CSR is self-governance by 
business, it is nonetheless self-governance that has received a very firm push from external 
social and market forces.  From the start “voluntary” CSR has been socially and economically 
driven.’70  These social and economic factors show that CSR can be driven by many things – 
governments, NGOs, consumers, investors, and branding. Such drivers can take legal and 
non-legal forms.  There are thus two levels to CSR as it is used in relation to the law, which 
will be elaborated on below.  At the first level is what I term pure-CSR, which refers to solely 
the use of voluntary codes as a governance tool.  At the next level, is the indirect ways that 
CSR can influence the development of the law and the law can encourage CSR-type 
responsibilities.   
 The main difference between voluntary codes and public law legal regimes is that the latter 
apply to everyone, whether or not they agree to be bound by the regimes, while it is the 
opposite with voluntary codes.  Voluntary codes are based on consensus, so it is difficult to 
compel companies’ to abide by the codes, yet such companies might free ride off the 
legitimacy and goodwill such codes create. 71  This can create a race to the bottom, where 
companies operate in jurisdictions with the least regulatory oversight on matters of social 
concern such as the environment, human rights or health and safety regulation, in order to 
compete with other firms that have chosen the same route. In addition, if the codes are 
poorly-drafted this will cause frustration and misunderstandings and attract negative 
publicity.  It might even slow the adoption of needed laws to govern the area or create 
barriers to trade.  Often the creation of the code is spurred by efforts of industry to stave off 
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government regulation,72 something Aurora Voiculescu calls ‘interactive voluntarism’.73  In 
addition, voluntary codes risk ‘muting’ real political struggles on important social issues 
behind the mask of management allocation of duties,74 effectively internalising public 
interest issues.  
However, voluntary codes are not wholly incompatible with the public interest; rather they 
can be a method for operationalising policy objectives.75  Such codes can be a method for 
putting into place policy objectives in a way that the law cannot, because the law is limited 
to setting minimum standards while codes have the advantage of being able to harness 
compliance with its spirit, and can embrace the wider notion of responsibility at the core of 
the concept of CSR.  Kernaghan-Webb in his book Voluntary Codes summarises the main 
advantages and disadvantages of voluntary codes as follows:  
Compared with laws, the main advantages of voluntary rule systems centre 
around their flexibility and lower costs, speed in developing and amending rules, 
avoidance of jurisdictional concerns, potential for positive use of market, peer 
pressure, internalization of responsibility, and informality.  Compared to laws, 
typical drawbacks of voluntary codes include generally lower visibility, 
credibility, difficulty in applying the rules to free riders, less likelihood of rigorous 
standards being developed, uncertain public accountability, and a more limited 
array of potential sanctions.76 
The relationship between the law and voluntary codes therefore can be seen to be dynamic.  
They often work together to achieve positive results with the law affecting the development 
of codes and vice versa. 77  The law might enable the development of codes by creating the 
framework or tools for the drafting of the code.  The law in this respect might also act as a 
constraint on the nature of the rules set out in a code, setting limits on acceptable 
behaviour as much as enabling it.78  For example, creative commons licensing is an 
alternative regime for copyright protection, where the copyright owner, working within the 
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regime of copyright and contract law, licenses out their work pursuant to an alternative and 
voluntary set of rules.79  The licensing scheme can be seen here to run alongside the law.  
Codes can also affect the creation of laws.  For example, voluntary codes might be referred 
to in the drawing up of legal requirements.80  Carola Glinski distinguishes between two types 
of corporate self-regulation: ‘published codes of conduct, guidelines or agreements on the 
one hand; and internal regulation in contracts, management handbooks or simply through 
the internal organisation by multinational enterprises of their environmental and safety 
management on the other hand.’81  This does two things.  First, it creates for the market 
legitimate expectations in, for example, contracts law, misleading advertising or reasonable 
consumer expectations under sales law.  Second, it establishes a standard against which 
courts and tribunals judge legally required conduct such as in tort or when examining due 
diligence.82  Thus voluntary codes can be referred to in a tort case to determine the 
standard of care, or have contract law implications for breaches thereof by industry 
members.83  Doreen McBarnet summarises the complex relationship as follows: 
Legal doctrines and processes are being used by NGOs as part of their strategy, 
and market forces are being stimulated and facilitated by legal measures.  At the 
same time, of course, much of the momentum for legal intervention has come 
from the CSR movement and from the change of culture it reflects and 
promotes. 
How is law being brought into play? Governments are fostering CSR through 
indirect regulation, old legal rights are being put to new uses, and private law – 
tort and contract law – are being used, tort law to extend the legal enforceability 
of CSR issues, contract law to give CSR standards the weight of legal obligation.84 
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CSR-type considerations are increasingly being incorporated into corporate legislation and 
judicial decisions.  For example, the UK Government indirectly regulated it by introducing 
legislation that required disclosure of whether social, environmental and ethical 
considerations (basically CSR considerations) were taken into account in investment 
decisions concerning pension funds.85  Although these considerations were not legally 
required, the disclosure of whether they were or were not considered led to an increase in 
the number of pension funds that took companies’ CSR policies into account.86  Two 
Canadian cases have held that the Canadian legal requirement that company directors 
consider the best interests of the corporation meant taking into consideration their 
responsibility to stakeholders as well.87  The US Congress amended its Sentencing Guidelines 
for Organizational Defendants ‘to require that boards of directors ensure that their 
companies have cultures that facilitate ethical conduct as well as legally compliant 
conduct.’88 
Christine Parker explores this relationship asking ‘how is it possible for the law to make 
companies accountable for going beyond the law?’.89  In her answer she employs the 
concept of meta-regulation, which in governance literatures is ‘seen as increasingly about 
“collaborations”, “partnerships”, “webs” or “networks” in which the state, state-
promulgated law, and especially hierarchical command-and-control regulation, is not 
necessarily the dominant, and certainly not the only important, mechanism of regulation.’90  
Brought within this term is the concept of regulation of other regulators, such as oversight 
of regulatory bodies by boards or accreditation agencies.91   
                                                          
85
 Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment, and Assignment, Forfeiture, Bankruptcy etc.) Amendment 
Regulations 1999, 1999 No. 1849, regulation 11A. 
86
 McBarnet n. 53, p. 32. This kind of indirect regulation is at the heart of gatekeeper regulation as seen in the 
oil tanker example discussed at the beginning of chapter two. 
87
 Pitts and Sherman n. 53, p. 9, referring to Teck Corporation Ltd. v. Millar [1972] 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288 and 
Peoples Department Stores v. Wise [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461. 
88
 Pitts and Sherman ibid., p. 16.  These Guidelines were enacted in order to create uniformity in the 
sentencing of companies for crimes carried out by its employees.  They were designed using principles of due 
diligence to prevent corporate crime: ibid., pp. 10-11. 
89
 Parker n. 39, p. 207. 
90
 Ibid., p. 210.  Colin Scott defines it as where ‘businesses should be required to take steps geared to acting 
with social responsibility, but without a detailed specification in the law as to what those steps should be.’ C. 
Scott, ‘Reflexive Governance, Meta-Regulation, and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Heineken Effect’ in N. 
Boeger et al. (eds.), Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Cheltenham, Eward Elgar, 2008), pp. 174-
175. 
91
 Parker n. 39, pp. 210-211. 
84 
 
Parker was interested in how the law can encourage CSR, and Colin Scott extends her work 
by looking at how non-law stimuli can act in a meta-regulatory capacity to encourage CSR.  
Scott cautions that legal responses, such as requiring reporting, risk being regarded by 
companies as just another obligation, while pressure from the market or community 
(referring to the Scott and Murray model of regulatory modalities)92 might encourage 
companies to take a more fundamental look at how they conduct business.93  He cites, for 
example the UK advertising industry self-regulating through its Advertising Association since 
1962, which was partly spurred by the publication of an influential 1957 book by Vance 
Packard, The Hidden Persuaders.94  The threat here was posed by the publication of a book, 
which incentivised the companies to act.  His point is that public shaming, boycotts and 
similar, all have the effect of incentivising firms to change behaviour so that they have the 
community’s approval to operate.95  Thus from a regulatory theory perspective, the 
question is how the various regulatory modalities can be used to encourage CSR-type 
initiatives, rather than as simple minimal accountability mechanisms. 
It is with this complex dynamic that we turn to human rights and see the potential and 
drawbacks of CSR to operationalise human rights objectives in the Internet environment.  
When looking at CSR and the law, we learn that the line between voluntariness and the law 
is not as neatly defined as it initially appears, and the two intersect and feed off of each 
other.  Ultimately, however, the law pulls CSR in the direction of rule-setting.  When looking 
at CSR and human rights, the following section will show that they have a lot in common.  
Both have legal and extra-legal dimensions with a common underpinning of morality.  This 
has allowed human rights to become the basis of many CSR initiatives, discussed below.  At 
the same time, however, human rights law applies directly to states not to private 
companies. CSR thus becomes a powerful link between human rights and the law in the 
private sphere, with much promise but also certain undeniable weaknesses.  The question is 
whether the weaknesses are insurmountable for governance of IIGs. 
III. CSR AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
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The debate about whether companies are required to be responsible for human rights 
standards, and if so the extent of this responsibility, has been a popular topic of discussion.  
In the Internet context, the transnational, instantaneous nature of Internet communications 
makes it difficult for governments to directly control the information that enters and leaves 
a country, while at the same time the power of Internet gatekeepers, which do control this 
information flow, increases. This is problematic for a human rights system that has treated 
human rights as a government responsibility,96 and has effectively privatised human rights 
in the digital environment.   
Neither this chapter nor this thesis argues for the direct horizontal application of human 
rights laws to companies.  There are many convincing reasons why human rights standards 
should not apply to companies, or at least, not the same obligations.  An attempt was made 
by the United Nations to apply state-like human rights obligations to companies with the 
2003 draft Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with regard to human rights97 (Norms). It was the controversy surrounding these 
Norms that led to the appointment of John Ruggie by the United Nations.98  In the end 
businesses are bound to make money for their shareholders not act as moral arbiters of the 
world’s problems.  They are also not under any legal obligation to positively protect human 
rights, nor are they in a position to protect all human rights.99  This latter issue is especially 
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problematic with regard to IIGs, as will be seen.  However, the increased power of these 
companies has ‘forced a reconsideration of the boundaries between the private and public 
spheres.’100  This blurring of the public/private divide is the fissure in which CSR has been 
flourishing.  
What is the link between CSR and human rights?  It is a common underpinning of morality in 
a framework with legal and extra-legal dimensions.  Joseph Lozano identified four 
dimensions to what he calls the ‘process’ of CSR.101  The first is ‘explicit’ CSR where CSR is 
formalised in things such as codes and statements, and the second is the ‘negative’ aspect, 
where minimum levels are set by, for example, procedural rules or sanctions, where certain 
activities are identified as improper.  These are the two areas where regulation can 
influence their development.  The other two processes are ‘tacit’ CSR, where we see the 
intangible elements of CSR such as in a company’s history, culture, organisation etc., and the 
‘propositional’ CSR, which is the facilitative and shaping aspect of managing CSR.  These 
latter two are less susceptible to regulation, showing that regulation cannot cover all areas 
or all aspects of CSR.102  There is an aspect to CSR where morality holds a business to 
account in a way that regulation cannot. Lozano sets it out in the following figure: 
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Figure 5 Lozano's CSR Grid103 
Complementary work is being undertaken by Bronwen Morgan concerning the related topic 
of the intersection of human rights and regulation.  While human rights tends to be 
aspirational and focused on mobilising social change, regulation tends to be instrumental 
and focused on targeted methods for achieving a particular public interest.104  The 
intersection, she posits, is that regulation emerges as the machinery for monitoring and 
enforcing human rights.  In much the same vein, this thesis examines the administrative 
structure of freedom of expression in the digital environment.  It just so happens that the 
administrative structure largely takes the form of CSR. 
Human rights are positive and negative rights.  They require states to avoid engaging in 
certain conduct, but also require states to take positive steps to enable human rights to be 
protected.105  In the arena of freedom of expression, this requires states to maintain a 
system of free expression by protecting individuals and groups from infringement by third 
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parties as well as promoting and encouraging freedom of expression through such things as 
perhaps the provision of facilities, regulation of communication mediums, education and 
ensuring information availability.106   
This push and pull becomes difficult when we attempt to articulate the responsibilities of 
companies.  It becomes more difficult in the arena of freedom of expression, where one is 
confronted with the question of whether a company is required simply to avoid infringing 
such rights, or whether it is required to also take positive steps to enable their protection 
raising further issues concerning what this would involve.  Thus, when looking at Lozano’s 
figure, the push-pull dynamic of human rights can almost be directly laid across the four 
aspects of CSR or vice versa.  There are the regulatory elements to human rights, but also 
extra-legal, moral aspects to it.  These moral aspects find parallels with the tacit and 
propositional aspects of the CSR grid.  Human rights it must be remembered is not terrain 
limited to lawyers, though they might like it to be as such.  It is as much a moral framework 
as a legal one.  Thus the outward-looking aspect of CSR finds commonality with the morality 
of human rights, as well as finding commonality with the regulatory elements. 
Under this patchy framework, CSR is broad-reaching, encompassing both hard and soft 
laws.107   As we have seen, CSR encompasses both indirect legal obligations (CSR influencing 
the law and vice versa) and pure-CSR (voluntary codes).  Under human rights, this would 
include two things: the positive obligations that are sometimes imposed on states to protect 
against human rights abuses by non-state actors; and voluntary human rights codes that try 
to harness a moral commitment to human rights where the activities fall outside the reach 
of the law or at the fringes of it.  This can be seen in Figure 6.   
CSR Human Rights 
n/a Direct state duties 
CSR/indirect Indirect (state and business) 
Pure-CSR Pure-CSR 
Figure 6 Cross-over of CSR and Human Rights 
 
Governments might fulfil their positive legal duties by passing national legislation binding 
companies to human rights responsibilities, such as through health and safety legislation 
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and media regulation.   At an international level there are various guidelines, which act as 
non-binding frameworks companies use themselves or governments use as a benchmark to 
hold businesses to account (not necessarily as a matter of law).108 They include, for 
example, the United Nations Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines.  They cannot be said 
to originate with companies though rely on their cooperation to be successful.  At an 
industry level some companies develop codes of practice that incorporate human rights 
considerations, such as the GNI.109  Companies have also addressed human rights in their 
internal governance frameworks such as in their codes of conduct or Terms of Use for the 
services or products they provide.   
The various CSR initiatives all tend to draw their legitimacy from the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR).  This approach can be seen in, for example, the United Nations 
Global Compact, the Global Sullivan Principles, and SA8000 (www.sa-intl.org/).  The UDHR 
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, has been elaborated on in a 
variety of international treaties,110  and forms the basis for most codifications of human 
rights.111  The reference in the UDHR’s preamble to the responsibility of ‘organs of society’ 
as well as states for the promotion of the Declaration, has often been cited as a basis for 
holding businesses responsible for human rights.112  However, the UDHR itself is not legally 
enforceable.113  Rather, it has moral force and ‘floats above all local and regional 
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contingencies and is a statement of more or less abstract moral rights and principles’.114  As 
a ‘moral anchor’,115 it has become the language of international human rights, and because 
of this moral force has become the language in CSR instruments for framing corporate 
responsibilities for human rights.   
At an international level any hard law obligations that exist are imposed on states through 
international human rights laws.  There is discretion as to how states fulfil their human 
rights obligations.116  These obligations trickle down to businesses because of the states’ 
obligations to protect against human rights abuses by third parties. This occurs because 
human rights instruments not only require states not to perpetrate human rights abuses, 
but requires states to ensure the enjoyment of these rights.117  For example, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires that a state ‘respect and 
ensure’ that human rights are not violated.118  Some international human rights instruments 
expressly state that nation-states should take steps to hold companies liable for their 
abuses, such as the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography to the Convention the Rights of the Child.119  Thus at a national level, one can 
see many examples of hard law human rights obligations imposed indirectly on companies.  
One can even see it in employment legislation with regards to provisions to regulate 
minimum wage, non-discrimination, and hours of work.120   
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However, there is incoherence, because states often sign on to human rights obligations but 
do not implement them in a way that binds businesses, or more commonly, agencies that 
directly shape business practices.  For example, securities regulators ‘conduct their work in 
isolation from and largely uninformed by their Government’s human rights agencies and 
obligations.’121  In addition, corporate law shapes what companies do, but up until now it 
has been viewed as distinct from human rights.  The companies, themselves, operate with 
relatively little knowledge of human rights and their potential responsibilities in this regard.  
A study by Twentyfifty Limited found that most companies see human rights as an issue of 
risk management, and only see human rights as being about employment rights, in 
particular as to their operations overseas.  More work is needed, this report argued, in 
guiding workers on what their day-to-day obligations are.122 
Most international human rights law is concerned with obligations on states to provide 
remedies for the abuse of human rights by businesses and others. Such frameworks do not 
easily apply to IIGs which are often not the wrongdoers, but gatekeep the wrongdoing of 
others.  The writers of the blog www.killbatty.com, which advocated the killing of gays and 
lesbians, would be in breach of local hate speech laws, not Google (as long as it was not 
aware of the content), which acted as the blog’s host.123  This is because Google makes 
available the platform for speaker, but is not the speaker itself. For such a situation there is 
little guidance in international human rights law.  Such laws are applicable where a 
gatekeeper is engaging in privacy invasive advertising techniques, because they are then the 
wrongdoer.  But when the IIG is acting in a judicial capacity deciding whether to take down 
material accused of being hate speech, it cannot be said to be parallel to the obligations of 
businesses to, for example, provide safe work conditions and avoid employing children.  
Thus in the context of Internet governance of gatekeepers, the focus becomes increasingly 
on bespoke codes, whether industry or internally drawn.   
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This is where the work of John Ruggie is so important, and has taken tremendous strides in 
helping bridge the governance gap between the human rights impact of businesses and the 
historical focus of human rights laws on states.  As previously discussed, Ruggie is the 
former Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the issue 
of human rights and business.  From 2005 to 2011 he undertook multiple multi-stakeholder 
consultations, research projects, and received input from a wide variety of sectors on the 
issue of how to frame the nature of businesses responsibilities for human rights.124  His 
mandate was much broader than the focus of this thesis.  He tackled the entire subject 
matter of business and human rights to help tease out a framework for moving forward.125   
Ruggie’s work was carried out in three stages, with the first being identification and 
clarification of existing standards and practices concerning human rights and businesses.126 
Then in 2008 he unveiled this ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework (hereinafter the 
Framework).127  He has since worked toward recommendations on how to operationalise 
this framework cumulating in his final report in 2011 on guiding principles.128  The United 
Nations Human Rights Council endorsed the guiding principles in June 2011 entrenching 
Ruggie’s framework and principles as ‘the authoritative global reference point for business 
and human rights.’129   
In the context of this thesis, Ruggie’s work is particularly useful in three ways.  First, Ruggie’s 
Framework helps tease out that there are conceptual differences between the human rights 
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obligations of the state and businesses, though how to apply this in practice is a matter of 
considerable difficulty.   Second, Ruggie also helps integrate pure-CSR codes into the process 
of assessment, and creates a taxonomy of governance characteristics to look for in a 
voluntary regime.  Third, he emphasises the importance of access to a remedial framework. 
Ruggie cautions that there is no ‘silver bullet solution’, concluding that (1) there should no 
limited list of human rights for which businesses are responsible; (2) nor should businesses 
responsibilities be the same as states.  Under the three pillars of the Framework he 
proposes, a state’s duty is to protect, respect and fulfil human rights by putting in place laws 
and policies to give effect to this obligation.  A company’s responsibility is rather to respect 
human rights, by which he means acting ‘with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights 
of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are involved.’130  The duty to 
respect also includes the obligation to not be complicit in human rights abuses.131  The third 
pillar is remedial in nature, stating that those whose rights have been negatively impacted 
must have access to a forum of remediation to address this impact.  
The state’s obligation is legal in nature, drawn directly from international human rights law, 
which already frames the nature of states duties, as set out above.  The corporate 
responsibility to respect, however, is something different.  It is not necessarily legal in 
nature and is separate from the state’s obligation to protect.132  It is defined rather by social 
expectations, an admittedly vague notion, and one that has received a significant amount of 
criticism.133  It is the baseline for a company’s social licence to operate.  Ruggie summarises 
the three pillars of his framework as follows: 
Each pillar is an essential component in an inter-related and dynamic system of 
preventative and remedial measures: the State duty to protect because it lies at 
the very core of the international human rights regime; the corporate 
responsibility to respect because it is the basic expectation society has of 
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business in relation to human rights; and access to remedy because even the 
most concerted efforts cannot prevent all abuse.134 
Ruggie’s framework has been criticised for failing to be specific enough, for failing to move 
itself beyond a theoretical framework of ‘protect, respect and remedy’ to something 
operational, and for conflating and confusing human rights duties.135  However, his 
framework is supposed to be broad strokes as it addresses all human rights for all types of 
businesses.  Within this one concrete system cannot be proposed.  Rather, it is a launching 
point providing the skeletal framework and language with which to develop a framework for 
specific fields of business. 
If we look closer at this notion of corporate responsibility to respect, it is mostly non-legal in 
nature.  Companies can occasionally be charged in court, but most often will be subject to 
negative public opinion.136  It is not, however, simply encouragement of voluntary codes. 
This is because he roots this duty to respect in a system of due diligence where companies 
are tasked with managing their human rights risks.137  As a first step companies must set in 
place human rights policies, which identify the company’s expectations of their employees, 
business partners, and those with which they are linked.  The policy would be publicly 
available and be embedded into the working of the company through operational 
procedures.138   
In addition, the duty to respect includes a process of due diligence, and a forum for 
remediation, the latter being the third pillar of the conceptual framework discussed above.  
A basic due diligence process would include human rights impact assessments.  These 
involve companies identifying their actual and potential human rights impacts, acting on 
these findings, monitoring and tracking their performance in this regard, including adjusting 
their responses with changing risks, and communicating such matters to the public.139  
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Ruggie notes ‘[b]usinesses routinely employ due diligence to assess exposure to risks 
beyond their control and develop mitigation strategies for them, such as changes in 
government policy, shifts in consumer preferences, and even weather patterns.’140  While 
such criteria are problematic when trying to operationalise them, the problems are lessened 
when simply using these as conceptual reference points to then develop a national 
framework specific to an industry.   
In the case of IIGs, by the nature of what they do they tend to fall into a grey category, one 
Ruggie adverted to in his research but did not form the focus of what he did. He identified 
companies that take on public functions as different from other companies to which human 
rights duties are imposed. Although Ruggie reminds us that corporations are ‘specialized 
economic organs, not democratic public interest institutions’,141 in his later research he 
identifies a special class of public interest company, which might invite additional corporate 
responsibilities beyond the duty to ‘respect’ human rights.142  IIGs, in particular macro-IIGs 
such as ISPs and search engines, have characteristics of public companies in determining 
public access to a critical communication medium, making them arguably more akin to a 
public interest institution.  Through the lens of human rights, this ultimately is a question of 
whether the Government has an obligation under its human rights responsibilities to 
legislate the obligations of these IIGs. 
Building on our understanding of the term CSR as used in this thesis and on how this relates 
to law and human rights, Ruggie’s framework helps further tease out the differences in 
these obligations.   Using his protect and respect language, we can see in Figure 7 that 
sometimes the state’s positive duties and a company’s duty to respect link up.  This helps 
further cement our understanding of what CSR means in the context of human rights and 
for the purpose of governance in the digital environment.  What it doesn’t do is help identify 
a standard against which to judge the conduct, for which section V will help clarify the way 
forward. 
 
                                                          
140
 Ruggie (2009) n. 98, p. 14. 
141
 Ruggie (2008) n. 11, p. 16. 
142
 Ruggie (2009) n. 98, p. 17.  As an example of a private company with public functions he offers prisons that 
have become privatised and the rights of prisoners remaining unchanged from this privatisation. 
96 
 
CSR Human Rights Ruggie 
n/a Direct State Duties Protect 
CSR/Indirect Indirect (state and business) Protect/Respect 
Pure-CSR Pure-CSR Respect 
Figure 7 Cross-over of CSR, Human Rights and Ruggie’s Framework 
 
Turning to the third pillar of Ruggie’s Framework and his recommendation that remediation 
services be provided particularly resonates concerning IIGs, because at present there is little 
in the way of remedial mechanisms available to the users who feel their rights have been 
impacted by the activities of these companies.143  In fact there is little in the way of such 
mechanisms for the business and human rights dilemma more broadly.144  At present, the 
punishment for violating most CSR initiatives is normally a matter of publicly drawing 
attention to the matter by ‘naming and shaming’ the company in question. 
Ruggie frames the remedial obligations as follows.  The  duty is on the state to ensure there 
is access to a remedy for those for whom their rights have been impacted, which duty 
includes an obligation to make the public aware there are such remedial services 
available.145  These mechanisms can take many forms, judicial and non-judicial, from 
apologies to injunctions to compensatory based remedies.146  The key is a mechanism 
whereby people with grievances can routinely raise a complaint and seek a remedy.147  The 
mechanisms suggested by Ruggie are quite formalised in nature, reflecting the adjudicative 
nature of any remedial mechanism, even mediation based ones.  Examples provided include 
courts, labour tribunals, the OECD National Contact Point (NCP) through BIS or National 
Human Rights Institutions such as the UK’s Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(EHRC).148  However, he also recommends as complementary to such remedial measures an 
avenue to address human rights concerns directly to the company, because this enables a 
company to address problems before they escalate to cases of abuse.149  Key to his 
recommendations are the criteria that must be present for any non-judicial grievance 
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mechanism to be effective.  Such procedures should be legitimate, accessible, predictable, 
equitable, transparent, rights-compatible and be based on findings from consultations with 
stakeholders.150   
Drawing from Ruggie’s work, a skeletal framework for analysis of the governance of IIGs 
emerges.  The Ruggie Framework helps bridge the gap between those that see CSR as purely 
voluntary and those that seek direct imposition of human rights laws on businesses akin to 
the state duties.  In so doing, Ruggie’s articulation of a requirement of due diligence acts as 
a checklist of attributes to look for in voluntary and quasi-voluntary regimes, the details of 
which will be discussed in section V below.   
There is more going on here, however, and that is the difficulty the various CSR instruments 
face in being a complete tool for addressing the free speech issues being raised by the 
activities of the IIGs.  The following section will offer a broad view of the CSR initiatives at 
work in the arena of Internet governance of IIGs.  It will show that there is a governance gap 
concerning their activities, with all the instruments not quite applying to or providing 
guidance concerning companies responsibilities for freedom of expression online.  This is so 
even when Ruggie’s Framework is used as the baseline for a CSR regime.  
IV. SETTING THE STAGE: CSR IN THE FIELD 
 
As we have seen, from the outset there are certain problems with the sufficiency of current 
CSR frameworks applied to IIGs.  Most of the frameworks have been developed to address 
socio-economic human rights, but are an uneasy fit with the civil and political type of rights 
that are engaged by the Internet’s democratic potential.  In addition, current frameworks 
are an uneasy fit with the nature of IIGs, which function in more of a judicial capacity than 
as direct perpetrators of human rights abuses.  As the reader will recall, CSR initiatives can 
range from international frameworks, to industry codes of conduct drawn up by 
governments, NGOs and/or industry, down to internal management processes.  A discussion 
of these various instruments highlights their limited appeal as governance solutions to 
furthering the Internet’s democratic potential. 
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The leading International CSR Instruments are, inter alia,151 the UN Global Compact, and the 
OECD Guidelines.  Industry CSR instruments for ICTs include, for example, the Global 
Network Initiative (GNI) and the Electronic Industry Code of Conduct (EICC).152  What one 
finds in reviewing these initiatives, and discussed in more detail below, is that (1) with the 
exception of the OECD Guidelines, they are usually voluntary; (2) they all frame the duty of 
companies as to ‘respect’ human rights, sometimes adding ‘promote’ to the list of duties; 
and (3) there is little, if any, elaboration provided on the duties regarding freedom of 
expression (or privacy for that matter), and sometimes they are not mentioned at all.   
These limitations are particularly evident in the international guidelines.  For example, the 
world’s largest and most embraced CSR initiative is the UN Global Compact, which was 
launched in 2000 at the instigation of then Secretary General Kofi Annan.  It is a multi-
stakeholder effort of governments, business, labour, civil society, and UN agencies to create 
a voluntary framework.  Currently it has over 7700 companies from more than 130 countries 
as members.153  It is operationalised by the signature of a company’s CEO committing to 
support its principles.154  One of the main problems faced in the arena of Internet 
governance, is that despite the Global Compact’s supposed popularity, it is not popular with 
ICTs.  A review of the membership list reveals that there are no UK or US ICT members as of 
yet.155  In addition, the Global Compact illustrates the difficulty in using generalised 
frameworks as governance regimes for human rights such as freedom of expression. 
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The Global Compact promotes ten principles.  The two human rights principles are: 
1. Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed 
human rights; and 
2. make sure they are not complicit in human rights abuses.156 
The Compact elaborates on the nature of the human rights involved in A Guide for 
Integrating Human Rights into Business Management.157  While it includes broader 
democracy related rights not the focus of this thesis, such as the rights of workers to freely 
associate and collectively bargain, as well as the right to non-discrimination, and even the 
right to consumer protection, no mention is made of freedom of expression in this matrix.158 
This does not mean the right is not included.  It is protected by reference to the UDHR, and 
the matrix is only offered as an example, but it is clear that freedom of expression is either 
less protected under the Compact, or more likely, how there are to be respected and 
protected is less understood or underdeveloped.  The end result is that such an instrument, 
even if it drew-in IIGs members, offers nothing in the way of guidance on how to address 
the free speech issues posed by the Internet and its increasingly important role in 
democratic culture. 
The OECD Guidelines are similarly vague concerning companies’ responsibilities for freedom 
of expression.159  The Guidelines are different than other frameworks in that states commit 
to the framework and set up an NCP, which manage promotions, queries and complaints 
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concerning the Guidelines at a national level.160 In the UK it is managed through BIS.  The 
Guidelines in the end are still simply guidelines to businesses.  The UK frames it as extra-
legal: ‘supplementary principles and standards of corporate behaviour of a non-legal 
character.’161 The Guidelines themselves were updated in May 2011 to incorporate Ruggie’s 
work.162  While the change improves on the earlier Guidelines by incorporating Ruggie’s 
conceptual and operational recommendations, we still face the hurdle of defining what it 
means to respect freedom of speech on the Internet, on which the Guidelines provide no 
further clarification.  This is no surprise for an instrument that is pitched so broadly.  On 
freedom of expression it only offers one point, which given the timing of the publication is 
clearly influenced by the Arab Spring.  It encourages enterprises (as distinct from the earlier 
section of recommendations setting out what a company should do) to: 
Support, as appropriate to their circumstances, cooperative efforts in the 
appropriate fora to promote Internet Freedom through respect of freedom of 
expression, assembly and association online.163 
It is difficult to imagine how this would have guided Vodafone in its decision whether to 
comply with the Egyptian Government demands to disconnect mobile phone access, or for 
example, guide ISPs in the UK concerning the content it blocks.  This is the only reference to 
freedom of expression in the Guidelines. 
Unlike the Global Compact, however, the Guidelines have a remedial framework.  The NCP 
manages complaints through a process of mediation, and can make findings of a breach by a 
company where appropriate, issuing a statement detailing the nature of the finding and 
making recommendations to bring their practices in line with the Guidelines.164  The 
remedial structure is criticised though as being toothless.165  For example, in one 
investigation into Vedanta Plc regarding its mining operations in Orissa, India, Vedanta 
simply refused to participate in mediation, and the UK NCP did not have any powers to 
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compel it beyond expressions of disappointment.166  Ruggie suggests giving them more 
weight by, for example, withholding access to government procurement and guarantees 
where a negative finding is made against a company.167  However, without properly 
elaborated responsibilities concerning freedom of expression, a remedial framework has no 
hope because there are no standards against which to then judge the activities of a 
company (or for that matter the companies to judge themselves). This puts in doubt the 
sufficiency of any of the international frameworks to address the free speech impact of IIGs. 
At an industry level, there are two main international initiatives for ICTs concerning human 
rights: the EICC168 and the GNI.169  The EICC can be dismissed outright, as while it deals with 
human rights, it does not deal with freedom of expression.  The focus of the EICC is on 
labour, health and safety and the environment.   There is no mention in the document of 
freedom of expression.170  Yet it is important to mention the EICC because in the US 
Congressional hearings on ‘Global Internet Freedom’, membership in the EICC was cited 
most often by companies as the reason they were not members of the GNI.171 
The GNI is particularly in point for this thesis as it is a CSR framework for ICT companies 
specifically concerned with freedom of expression and privacy.  The GNI is a multi-
stakeholder creature of companies, civil society, investors and academics.  Discussions of 
the GNI began in 2006 when ICTs in the US were receiving considerable attention from the 
Government and public concerning their human rights impacting activities.  Two particular 
incidents helped push formation of the group. First, Yahoo! handed information about one 
its email account holders to the Chinese authorities thereby exposing the identity of a 
Chinese journalist and leading to his arrest and imprisonment for ten years.  Second, Google 
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launched a version of its search engine in China that censored search results (it has since 
stopped this practice).172 
The ICT membership at the moment is limited to Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft.173  As all 
three offer search engine services as a component of their business, the GNI will be 
discussed in particular in the search engine case study in chapter five.  Vodafone was one of 
the drafters of the GNI, but pulled out just before it was launched, citing as the  main reason 
for its decision the focus of the GNI on Internet providers rather than its core business of 
the provision of telecommunication services.174  The focus of the GNI on Internet providers 
as well as the availability of the EICC as a purported alternative to the GNI have been some 
of the main reasons put forward by companies for not joining the Initiative.175  
The goal of the GNI is broadly to ‘protect and advance freedom of expression and privacy in 
the ICT sector’.176 There are four core documents: the Principles; the Implementation 
Guidelines; the Governance, Accountability and Learning Framework; and the Governance 
Charter. 177 As a governance framework it is promising, because it attempts to 
operationalise the broader Principles in detailed guidance to companies, a transition that 
most CSR initiatives have struggled to do if at all. Further, the presence of a Governance 
Framework to hold the body to account is an aspect to corporate governance power that 
has sorely been needing attention.   
It suffers from the kinds of criticisms with which, as we have already seen, this whole field of 
CSR is familiar, with one side arguing it does not go far enough to protect human rights, and 
the other side saying it does not offer enough flexibility.178  Amnesty International, for 
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example, in deciding late in the drafting process not to join the GNI, described the final 
framework documents as ‘a degree of progress in responding to human rights concerns – 
[but] they are not yet strong enough to allow Amnesty International to endorse them.’179  
More concerning is the lack of take-up of the regime, in particular the glaring absence of 
Twitter and Facebook and telecommunications companies as members, highlighting the 
risks associated with purely voluntary regimes.  However, the regime is quite young, but in 
the context of the Internet where things develop at rapid fire pace, the lack of take-up by 
now risks the subject matter moving on from what the GNI has to offer.   
As a governance structure, it is a positive starting point for framing the business and human 
rights discussion in the Internet environment.  However, there are legitimate criticisms of 
the framework’s scope and focus.  Some of the main concerns revolve around the proposal 
that compliance with the GNI Principles be independently assessed.  Such an assessment is 
in keeping with the idea of human rights audits suggested by Ruggie, and is particularly 
valuable in a pure-CSR framework such as the GNI.  However, there have been criticisms, 
such as that the assessments might be vulnerable to bias because the assessors are selected 
by the company itself, and that damaging information might be withheld by companies.  
There have been more general criticisms that the governance framework does not 
adequately take account of the data that will be retained, that there should be a clear set of 
procedures for advising users when their data has been handed to government authorities, 
and that more focus is needed on how to build human rights into technological design.180  At 
a fundamental level, the above criticisms translate into concerns the GNI is simply not 
accountable enough.181  The greatest strength of the GNI, on the other hand, is its 
promotion of the use of Ruggie-styled human rights impact assessments, which has the 
potential to embed human rights considerations into a company’s structure at an 
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operational level. The criticisms, however, illustrate the struggle in finding the line between 
a flexible governance structure that gives considerable leeway to companies in how to 
implement the framework, and a targeted and structured regulatory regime that delineates 
precisely the conditions under which a company can be said to be complying with the rules.   
The GNI has limited application to the issues raised in this thesis concerning the activities of 
IIGs that impact the Internet’s democratic potential.  This is for two reasons.  First, at the 
moment there is no remedial mechanism through the GNI, a mechanism which the case 
studies will show to be crucial for human rights compliance of IIGs, and which also (as we 
have seen) forms the critical third pillar of Ruggie’s conceptual framework. While the GNI 
acknowledges the need for a remedial framework, and is designing one, at present there is 
no such framework.  Concerns have been expressed that there will be an overwhelming 
number of complaints to field by the GNI with limited resources to handle them.182  The 
Governance Charter describes the state of affairs as follows: 
The GNI recognizes that it may receive complaints and grievances from users 
concerning company compliance with the Principles.  Due to the complexity of 
the global landscape regarding online freedom of expression and privacy, and 
the potential scale of complaints, the GNI will develop an appropriate 
complaints procedure consistent with its size and available resources.  This will 
focus on processes that can help the GNI to identify and resolve concerns raised 
by the public of significance to the Principles and to do so through a credible, 
efficient, and transparent process.  
Until that time, the GNI will forward all company-specific complaints, questions, 
and communications to the relevant company for resolution.183 
The GNI describes what it is doing as rather ‘defining shared standards’184 for the ICT sector, 
noting that the responsibility is ultimately on governments to ‘ensure that the human rights 
of their citizens are respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled.’185  This brings the matter 
back to a domestic level.  Ultimately we need Government leadership in setting the human 
rights expectations of companies.  
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Second, and related to the focus of the GNI as defining industry-wide standards, the GNI is 
geared toward helping companies in their conduct in countries where local laws conflict 
with international human rights principles.  For example, free speech responsibilities are 
limited to situations where the government makes demands on businesses: ‘[p]articipating 
companies will respect and protect the freedom of expression of their users by seeking to 
avoid or minimise the impact of government restrictions on freedom of expression…’186 The 
GNI also states: 
Participating companies will respect and protect the freedom of expression 
rights of their users when confronted with government demands, laws and 
regulations to suppress freedom of expression, remove content or otherwise 
limit access to information and ideas in a manner inconsistent with 
internationally recognized laws and standards.187 
Strictly speaking such provisions apply to all countries which might engage in human rights 
oppressive conduct, and Western states are by no means operating in perfect compliance 
with international human rights law.188  However, the reality is that the GNI is geared 
toward advising companies operating in oppressive regimes. It does not deal with situations 
where the government has simply encouraged companies to sort it out for themselves,189 
which largely defines the governance landscape of IIGs in the UK and most western states.   
This review highlights a lacuna in governance.  Human rights laws, regulation, and current 
CSR regimes don’t quite fit with what IIGs are doing.  Yet IIGs are at the centre of the 
Internet’s democratising force.  These instruments and laws simply circle them, not quite 
applying, and not quite guiding them.  There is promise in some of these instruments for 
further development to address the human rights impact of IIGs, and that is something 
explored in chapter six.  In addition, when we proceed with the case studies to examine 
these issues in specific contexts we must be mindful of two things.  First, the international 
CSR guidelines, both general and industry specific, in not quite applying to the activities of 
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IIGs focuses the attention more on domestic initiatives.  Second, it puts increasing pressure 
on companies’ internal governance structures to be human rights compliant.  
We are left still with a gap, which is a standard against which to judge whether a particular 
CSR regime has sufficiently discharged a business or state’s human rights responsibilities.  In 
the case of the state, human rights laws directly apply to assess whether positive duties are 
required to satisfy its obligations, in particular for the purposes here, Article 10 of the ECHR.  
It will be shown in the following section that the ECHR and related jurisprudence is the 
appropriate standard for assessment of both indirect and voluntary CSR regimes, helping 
identify when CSR is enough to protect and respect freedom of expression online. 
V. Measuring Human Rights Compliance: Article 10 
 
As outlined in section III above, the case studies draw from Ruggie’s criteria.  In examining 
the various frameworks and codes that make-up the regulatory environment of ISPs and 
search engines, the following questions are asked:  
(a) What is the regulatory environment in which the IIGs operate? 
(b) What are the due diligence processes, namely, is there guidance on human rights 
policies, monitoring and tracking of performance, and mitigation strategies? 
(c) What are the nature of the human rights obligations set out in the policies? 
(d) What remedial structures are there, if any?  Do they have any of the characteristics 
suggested by Ruggie of legitimacy, accessibility, predictability, equitability, rights-
compatibility, transparency and engagement with stakeholders? 
Ruggie’s due diligence criteria serves an evidentiary purpose.  It identifies regulatory 
measures one looks for in the assessment of a framework, but it is not enough, on its own, 
to provide guidance, particularly with regard to IIGs, regarding the standards against which 
human rights are judged.  For example, it does not answer the question whether satisfaction 
of Ruggie’s criteria ensure human rights compliance. Thus, while Ruggie’s criteria are part of 
the assessment, we cannot lose sight of the overarching question whether the framework is 
human rights compliant.  The question is how to measure the human rights compliance of a 
CSR instrument and it is argued that in the context of the right with which we are primarily 
concerned the appropriate approach is to judge it against ECHR principles, namely Article 
10(2).    
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As we saw with the CSR frameworks discussed, most include a general obligation to respect 
human rights, usually with reference to the UDHR, but do not advise how this is to be done. 
When we are examining the murkier arena of private human rights responsibilities, the 
question of how they are to respect human rights becomes that much more difficult to 
answer.  Ruggie makes the same criticism of such national and international CSR 
frameworks, but argues that his corporate responsibility to respect framework mends such 
shortcomings: 
Nevertheless, on the whole, relatively few national CSR policies or guidelines 
explicitly refer to international human rights standards.  They may highlight 
general principles or initiatives that include human rights elements notably the 
OECD Guidelines and the Global Compact, but without further indicating what 
companies should do operationally. Other policies are vaguer still, merely asking 
companies to consider social and environmental ‘concerns’, without explaining 
what that may entail in practice. To merit the term ‘policy’, even voluntary 
approaches by States should indicate expected outcomes, advise on appropriate 
methods and help disseminate best practices. The United Nations framework’s 
“corporate responsibility to respect” pillar can provide guidance in this regard.190 
Ruggie’s framework is developed, at the moment, more with companies operating in 
conflict zones in mind or human rights non-compliant countries, or lately, with regard to the 
regulation of financial services.  Freedom of expression and other civil and political 
orientated rights in western countries is not a focal point of his work, as of yet.191  As a 
result, the framework does not transfer seamlessly to the online environment to address 
the obligations of such bodies as IIGs. For example, what are ISPs obligations with regard to 
a duty to respect freedom of expression when it hosts a chat room and there is a complaint 
that some of the comments are defamatory? In this aspect an ISP is acting in a judicial 
capacity and assessing conflicting human rights, without a clear legal obligation regarding 
human rights. Ruggie’s criteria for, in effect, a human rights audit, asking if there have been 
implementation of monitoring or mitigation strategies or the like, is evidence of a 
commitment to human rights but does not help an ISP grapple with its responsibilities in a 
scenario such as the one above, nor advises a company how to be human rights compliant 
in the current legal minefield within which such businesses operate.  Ruggie asks if there is a 
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remedial structure – but in this scenario the question is – how do we then assess the human 
rights compliance of that remedial structure once in place? 
As we have seen the global CSR frameworks such as the United Global Compact and the 
OECD Guidelines show very little guidance regarding the obligations of businesses with 
regard to freedom of expression, except referring to the UDHR.  The UDHR is aspirational.  It 
provides guidance on the responsibilities of the parties that interfere with freedom of 
expression, which principles of proportionality and necessity helped guide the drafting of 
the ECHR and codification of most human rights frameworks in the world. However, its force 
is moral not legal, and therefore a body of jurisprudence grappling with its application in the 
field is not available in the same way as with specific codifications of human rights.  An IIG 
faced with the scenario mentioned above finds little comfort or guidance from the UDHR on 
what it means to be respect human rights. However, guidance is available from the wide 
body of law and policy in European human rights jurisprudence.  Specifically, Article 10(2) 
principles articulate the necessary criteria for a human rights compliant institution.   
Article 10 provides: 
(1)Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. this right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article 
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television 
or cinema enterprises.  
(2)The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure 
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.192 
The regulatory aspect of freedom of expression can be seen as ‘rules’ of communication:193 
1. Is the interference prescribed by law? 
2. Does it have a legitimate aim (national security, territorial integrity or public safety, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for 
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the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure 
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary); and 
3. Is the interference with the right to freedom of expression necessary in a democratic 
society, meaning that the ‘interference [must] correspond to a pressing social need 
and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.’194 
The application of ECHR principles to private or semi-private regulatory bodies is not new. 
The activities of media regulatory bodies are measured against the free speech standards of 
the ECHR. 195 A certain amount of caution must be exercised, however, in such an 
assessment. The law here is unclear as ‘the degree of “horizontal protection” offered by the 
ECHR for example (i.e. protection of speech rights against private bodies by controlling the 
restrictions placed on freedom of expression) has yet to be defined.’196  In addition, these 
case studies interest in the procedural aspect of freedom of expression has not been tested 
in the courts.197 For example, when examining voluntary codes it is a difficult task to 
determine whether the framework is prescribed by law as required under Article 10(2):  
At one end of a continuum, purely voluntary ethics codes of single companies 
are clearly not law, but at the other, codes that are encouraged through a 
legislative framework but administered by an industry association may be 
considered for these purposes to be law.198   
Finally, we are concerned here with fleshing out the legitimacy of CSR frameworks, and we 
can draw principles from ECHR jurisprudence to set minimum standards.199 
An Article 10 analysis helps identify when a pure-CSR versus legal framework is sufficient, 
with Ruggie’s framework helping to flesh out the kinds of criteria to look for in voluntary 
frameworks and remedial mechanisms.  This in turn helps pinpoint where on the scale of 
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effective remedy, but those are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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 Tambini n. 193, p. 282. 
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responsibility (as the term was used in chapter two to describe the nature of IIG 
responsibilities) a particular issue of free speech fits.  For example, an Article 10 analysis 
might reveal that voluntariness is adequate to address a problem or might reveal that in fact 
the state has positive duties to facilitate free speech that have or have not been discharged.  
The Article 10 rules would necessarily be loosened for voluntary regimes where there is no 
actual legal obligation engaged, but would help identify the line between legal and pure-CSR 
obligations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
It is against this backdrop of CSR that we proceed with the case studies on governance of 
filtering and search engines in the UK.  Some preliminary issues can be noted from the 
outset.  The notable absence of much elaboration on the duties of companies regarding 
freedom of expression in the initiatives discussed above, and no elaboration in a manner 
that covers the subject matters of concern in this thesis, perhaps highlights the inability of 
CSR to protect those human rights.  Pure-CSR for these issues might just not be adequate, 
and at minimum the government might have positive duties to, for example, oversee a 
regulatory framework.  Yet this chapter also shows that CSR has an important function in 
being the bridge between the legal and extra-legal dimensions of law and human rights.  It is 
more flexible and better able to capture the spirit of commitment from corporations in a 
way that the law in setting minimum standards struggles to achieve. This better 
encapsulates the moral underpinning of human rights and has more promise in addressing 
the human rights impact of businesses.   
 In examining the viability of CSR to govern IIGs, two overriding problems will be 
addressed.  First, the human rights engaged by the Internet, particularly freedom of 
expression, are less clear-cut and involve more weighing of one right against another than 
other areas for which CSR has been more fully developed, such as the environment and 
labour.  The literature thus far, while acknowledging a business’ responsibility to promote 
freedom of expression,200 has hesitated to critically examine what this means.  Second, the 
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 See the United Nations Global Compact ‘Ten Principles’, at United Nations Global Compact, ‘The Ten 
Principles’, at www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited 5 August 
2011). 
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case studies might reveal that IIGs, rather than being in a position to directly perpetrate 
abuses, by virtue of their being gatekeepers act in what could be described as a kind of 
judicial capacity.  Ultimately the question is whether the CSR frameworks that currently 
govern the activities of these information gatekeepers are sufficient to provide the 
standards and compliance mechanisms needed to protect and respect freedom of 
expression online.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DIRECT MECHANISMS OF 
INFORMATION CONTROL: ISP 
FILTERING 
On 5 December 2008 the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), the main body governing 
filtering of unlawful content in the United Kingdom, received a complaint on its hotline 
about a Wikipedia page.  The complaint was about an entry for the rock band the Scorpions, 
specifically, the entry for their 1976 album Virgin Killer, which featured the album’s cover: 
an image of a naked ten-year old girl with a smashed-glass effect covering her genitalia.1  
This album and its cover whilst controversial are available for sale online and in shops.2  The 
IWF promptly added the webpage to its blacklist of alleged child sexual abuse content, 
which it then distributed to its members, made up of broadly speaking the Internet industry.  
These members then blocked access to the Wikipedia page.  No one told the Wikimedia 
Foundation, the owners of Wikipedia, either before or after the web page was blocked.  In 
fact, Wikipedia only found out its page had been blocked3  when the blocking methods used 
by the ISPs caused other problems, such as slower connection speeds to Wikipedia and 
difficulty editing the site.4  A few days later, and under significant public pressure, the IWF 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, the wired article on this: C.J. Davies, ‘The hidden censors of the Internet’, Wired Magazine, 
(June 2006), at www.wired.co.uk/wired-magazine/archive/2009/05/features/the-hidden-censors-of-the-
internet.aspx?page=all (last visited 23 August 2011). 
2
 See for example, www.amazon.co.uk/Trance-Virgin-Killer-
Scorpions/dp/B000VR0F4S/ref=sr_1_6?ie=UTF8&qid=1320763078&sr=8-6 (last visited 8 November 2011). 
3
 J. Petley, ‘Web Control’, Index on Censorship, 38(1) (2009) 78, p. 89.  See article of Out-law arguing that the 
IWF should not have changed its mind: Out-law.com, ‘Why the IWF was wrong to lift its ban on a Wikipedia 
page’ (11 December 2008), at www.out-law.com/page-9653 (last visited 24 August 2011). 
4
 Petley ibid., p. 90. The technical aspect of the Wikipedia controversy was explained by Richard Clayton as 
follows: 
To sum up the key technical matters: the IWF chose to filter text pages on Wikipedia rather than 
just the images they were concerned about; the use of proxies by ISPs broke Wikipedia’s security 
model that prevents vandalism; the previous controversy about the Virgin Killers album cover 
meant that IWF’s URLs were quickly identified; however different capitalisations of URLs, the 
different blocking technologies, and the different implementation timescales led to considerable 
confusion as to who blocked what and when. 
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changed its mind and removed the web page from its blacklist.  This incident drew attention 
to a body that up until then had operated with relatively little public scrutiny or oversight, 
and yet it has significant control of our expressive opportunities online.  A decision by the 
IWF to add URLs to its blacklist is a decision on what information we can and cannot access 
on the Internet.  It begs the question: what human rights responsibilities does an 
organisation such as the IWF have? 
Going forward in this thesis we have three intersecting ideas identified in the first three 
chapters: first that the Internet has the potential to be a facilitative force in democratic 
culture; second, that for this potential to be fulfilled we are reliant on privately-owned 
gatekeepers, in particular a type of gatekeeper identified in chapter two as an Internet 
Information Gatekeeper (IIG); and three, governance of these gatekeepers has thus far 
largely taken the form of CSR.  The following two chapters are case studies of particular 
macro-IIGs and the gatekeeping role they play in facilitating or hindering participation in 
democratic culture.  The significance of the findings in these cases studies to the viability of 
CSR as a governance tool for IIGs will be examined in chapter six, where the case will be 
made for a new corporate governance model to address digital human rights.  
This chapter examines the role of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in governing filtering of 
content, in particular the role of the industry regulator the IWF.  In the following case study, 
the more subtle role of search engines in controlling and shaping information flows will be 
examined.  In each of these case studies the basic questions asked, with varying degrees of 
emphasis, are: (1) how do these gatekeepers impact participation in democratic culture 
(more narrowly freedom of expression); (2) how is their impact presently regulated; and (3) 
is this governance structure sufficient for the protection and respect of freedom of 
expression online? 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Some of these matters could be described as “human error” and might be done better in any re-
run of these events with any of the other questionable images hosted on Wikipedia (and many 
other mainstream sites). However, most of the differences in the effectiveness of the attempted 
censorship stem directly from diverse blocking system designs — and we can expect to see them 
recur in future incidents. The bottom line is that these blocking systems are fragile, easy to 
evade (even unintentionally), and little more than a fig leaf to save the IWF’s blushes in being so 
ineffective at getting child abuse image websites removed in a timely manner.  
See www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/12/11/technical-aspects-of-the-censoring-of-wikipedia/ (last visited 
24 August 2011). 
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An examination of filtering mechanisms, and the role of the gatekeepers in deciding what is 
filtered using these mechanisms, is a particularly appropriate case study for this thesis.  
Filtering of Internet content brings to a head deep legal, political and theoretical divisions 
concerning how the Internet should be governed, in particular issues surrounding the 
traditional public/private governance divide and how this should be accounted for in the 
digital environment.  It also raises fundamental questions about how to administer a system 
of freedom of expression in the Information society, particularly to facilitate the Internet’s 
democratic potential.  We have a tool that can block access to unlawful content, but it can 
equally block access to lawful content, and as we saw with the Wikipedia incident, much of 
the content in dispute lingers at the edges of social or legal acceptability.  The use of such 
mechanisms can be framed as a necessary tool to navigate the Internet unscathed or as a 
censorship mechanism.  Ultimately it functions as both, it just depends on who controls it 
and what they do with it.  At present these tools are largely controlled by ISPs, a particularly 
significant macro-IIG as identified in chapter two, because of their role in making access to 
the Internet even possible. 
In a commentary in Access Denied, one of the leading texts on Internet filtering, Mary 
Rundle and Malcolm Birdling capture the various issues that filtering raise concerning 
corporations: 
If a corporation has an effective monopoly on the supply of an Internet service, 
is it assuming a governmental function if it controls access to information 
according to what it determines to be acceptable content? Does it matter 
whether the corporation is doing so of its own accord or whether it is doing so in 
response to a government mandate? Should such corporations be considered 
agents of the state, bound by the same freedom of expression obligations to 
which the state is bound? What responsibilities does a state have for filtering by 
private actors operating within its jurisdiction? What rights does a person or a 
group of people have in this mix? How should jurisdiction for filtering be 
determined in cyberspace?5 
To that end this case study examines the frameworks that currently govern filtering of 
content in the UK to determine whether they are sufficient to provide the standards and 
                                                          
5
 M. Rundle and M. Birdling, ‘Filtering and the International System: A Question of Commitment’ in R. Deibert 
et al. (eds), Access Denied: the practice and policy of global Internet filtering (MIT Press, 2008), pp. 76-77.  This 
is also reminiscent of the east coast code versus west coast code debate. See L. Lessig, Code and other Laws of 
Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999), and R. Brownsword, ‘Neither East Nor West: Is Mid-West Best?’, 
Script-ed, 3(1) (March 2006) 15. 
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compliance mechanisms needed to protect and respect freedom of expression online.   
What will be shown in this case study is that filtering in the UK is largely carried out by ISPs, 
and the primary body in the UK that determines the content these ISPs filter is the industry 
body the IWF.  Going into this case study it may have been expected that I would find 
particular elements of the IWF’s governance structure failed to comply with Article 10 
human rights principles.  What is found, rather, is a total failure to account for human rights 
in any aspect of the framework.  The case study also reveals that the IWF’s filtering scheme 
goes to the essence of the right to freedom of expression, because it acts as an absolute ban 
on speech in this arena, thus it has a significant impact on participation in democratic 
culture.  What will be argued is that the IWF is a public authority under the Human Rights 
Act (HRA) and thus directly bound by it, and even if it is not, the failure here is one of the 
state for failing to take positive steps to ensure protection of users’ right to freedom of 
expression.  Even if the IWF is viewed as a form of pure-CSR, an analysis pursuant to 
Ruggie’s Framework reveals that human rights factors are entirely missing from its 
governance structure.   
I. FILTERING AND DEMOCRACY 
 
Most filtering involves a combination of IP blocking and DNS tampering6. Both types of 
blocking are effective and easy to implement, but they risk over-blocking, because all of the 
content hosted on, for example, www.youtube.com will be blocked, rather than the specific 
page with the offending content.  Since ISPs generally maintain the DNS servers for their 
customers, they are usually tasked with carrying out this type of filtering, which they do by 
configuring the servers so that the wrong IP address is returned, such as 1.1.1.1.  The most 
advanced type of filtering is URL filtering.  This is also the most accurate, because specific 
webpages can be blocked, but it is expensive to set up and maintain.  Whatever method of 
filtering is used – be it proxies, IP addresses or hybrids thereof – ‘to be reliable [such filtering 
mechanisms] must be at a choke point – a location that all communication must go 
                                                          
6
 For explanation of IP Address, IP blocking and DNS blocking in general see R. Faris and N. Villeneuve, 
‘Measuring Global Internet Filtering’ in Deibert (2008) ibid. 
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through.’7  Normally the chokepoint is an ISP.  If a state strictly controls connection to the 
Internet, then it is possible to set up the filtering mechanisms at international gateways, 
however this is more difficult for certain types of filtering such as DNS tampering.  Thus ISPs 
are at the centre of the filtering debate.   
In addition, the regulatory and legislative landscape means that the impetus to carry out the 
act of filtering can come from many directions. The filtering can be state-mandated, as seen 
in countries such as China, the Middle East or even Australia, or under threat of legislation 
as in the UK, or it might be entirely at the behest of industry or an individual ISP.   Consider 
some of the examples of the use of filtering technologies. The Canadian ISP Telus blocked a 
pro-union website during a labour dispute with its employees.8  The Australian government 
explicitly outsources filtering to ISPs via legislative mandate in the Australian Interactive 
Gambling Act.9  New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer threatened intermediaries such as 
PayPal and credit card issuing banks with criminal sanctions if they did not institute a 
framework for the refusal of transactions associated with Internet gambling.10 In the UK, the 
IWF has been repeatedly pressured to expand its remit to filter such content as terrorism-
related material and legal pornography.11 
It thus comes as no surprise that the use of filtering technologies to censor content, 
whether by the state or private parties, attracts significant attention from policy makers 
concerned not only about the human rights implications of the use of such technologies, but 
also more generally with the legitimacy of that form of governance.12 They reveal what T.J. 
Mcintyre and Colin Scott describe as a ‘deeper problem’ with filtering: they are ‘a very 
efficient mechanism for implementing rules, but not so good when it comes to standards’,13  
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 S.J. Murdoch and R. Anderson, ‘Tools and Technology of Internet Filtering’ in Deibert (2008) ibid., p. 65. It is 
more expensive to set up and maintain as ‘the requests intercepted by an HTTP proxy must be reassembled 
from the original packets, decoded, and then retransmitted, the hardware required to keep up with a fast 
Internet connection is very expensive’: ibid., p. 63. 
8
 T. Barrett, ‘To censor pro-union website, Telus blocked 766 others’ (4 August 2005), at 
www.labournet.net/world/0508/canada2.html (last visited 5 August 2011). 
9
 2001 no. 84.  See discussion T. McIntyre and C. Scott, ‘Internet Filtering: Rhetoric, Legitimacy, Accountability 
and Responsibility’ in R. Brownsword and K. Yeung (eds.), Regulating Technologies: Legal Future, Regulatory 
Frames and Technological Fixes (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), p. 121. 
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 T.J. McIntyre, ‘Intermediaries, Invisibility and the Rule of Law’, BILETA Conference Paper (2008), p. 5. 
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 See, for example, H. Mulholland, ‘Government targets extremist websites’ (17 January 2008), at  
http://guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/jan/17/uksecurity.terrorism (last visited 5 August 2011). 
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 McIntyre and Scott n. 9, p. 109. 
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 Ibid., p. 117. 
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which is where it crosses over with the human rights concerns of this case study.  Such 
governance concerns translate in human rights to a concern not only over the censorship as 
such but also over the privatisation of censorship.  By filtering access to a particular website 
or page, the information flow is interrupted, and particular information is then selected for 
removal from public consumption.  As a result, participation in democratic culture, as 
speaker or listener, is obstructed.  This becomes particularly problematic because the 
technology is prone to under and over-blocking, and there is a risk of function creep with 
any such system.14    
This is even more problematic because the decision on who and what is permitted to 
participate in democratic discourse is privately determined leading to what Damian Tambini 
et al. describe as ‘a trend towards the deconstitutionalisation of freedom of speech’.15  
What may be perceived as freedom becomes a way of avoiding constitutional obligations.  
For example, in the US with a tradition of negative treatment of freedom of expression, self-
regulation of broadcasting means that a decision by a broadcaster not to carry alcohol 
advertising does not even engage First Amendment protection.16 The idea that customers 
have a choice, have alternatives available to them, is illusory, as it is not easy for a customer 
to simply choose to use a different ISP, particularly when all the ISPs block the same 
content; nor are users particularly aware of the terms on which content is blocked.17  
In this deconstitutionalised world ‘proxy censors’18 operate without human rights 
obligations of proportionality and due process, but exercise considerable power over the 
exercise of participation in democracy. As things currently stand filtering need not be 
narrowly tailored, and the automatic mechanisms used need not differentiate between 
legitimate and illegitimate speech: 
Unlike an official determination, which assesses damages or penalties tailored to 
the prospect of public harm, censorship by proxy is an unavoidably blunt 
instrument.  Private censorship takes place at low levels of visibility.  It is neither 
coordinated nor reviewed. Often, neither speakers nor listeners will know that 
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 See in general discussion in ibid. 
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 D. Tambini et al., Codifying Cyberspace (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 275. 
16
 Ibid., p. 276.  In fact, filtering software provided voluntarily by content providers was viewed as the 
‘panacea’ for reconciling concerns regarding free speech and the protection of children: ibid., p. 276. 
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 S.F. Kreimer, ‘Censorship By Proxy: First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the 
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the message has not been conveyed, and there is no way to determine how 
dialogue has been deformed.19 
There are knock-on effects of such privatisation, as the censorship need not always be 
steered by government.  Bloggers might self-censor to avoid problems of access to their 
content. In addition, intermediaries often are dependent on advertising for their financial 
revenue, and are vulnerable to pressure by advertisers to carry or not carry certain content. 
Thus the power of censorship shifts to ‘powerful blocs of customers’.20  For example, Yahoo 
shut down a series of chat rooms with purported child sex content as a result of pressure 
from advertisers who withdrew their adverts.21 Thus ISPs become the focal point of 
powerful political forces from governments, consumers and business, and without a strong 
governance framework any commitment to human rights, for which they have no direct 
legal obligation, risk being compromised.  The question is then how filtering by ISPs is 
governed, and whether the governance framework has the necessary human rights 
safeguards built into it to address the risks and concerns associated with the impact of 
filtering on participation in democratic culture.   
II. REGULATION OF FILTERING IN A EUROPEAN AND UK 
CONTEXT 
 
The regulatory environment governing the filtering of content by ISPs in Europe is a 
complicated mix of self-regulation, co-regulation and state regulation similarly seen in 
communications regulation; it has been light touch placing the obligation to regulate 
through industry rather than judicially.22   
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 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
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 Ibid., p. 30. 
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 Ibid., p. 30. 
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 I. Brown, ‘Internet self-regulation and fundamental rights’, Index on Censorship, 1 (2010) 98.  The push has 
been for multi-stakeholder involvement: see discussion of historical context in C. Walker and Y. Akdeniz, ‘The 
governance of the Internet in Europe with special reference to illegal and harmful content’, at 
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discord between states on how to regulate the Internet regarding freedom of expression issues. Most notably 
see the “Safer Internet” action plan: Decision No 276/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 25 January 1999 adopting a multiannual Community action plan on promoting safer use of the Internet by 
combating illegal and harmful content on global networks, and the Action Plan on Promoting Safe Use of the 
Internet (now called the Safer Internet Plus Programme 2005-2008). The Council of Europe has issued soft law 
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The European Commission and the Council of Europe have produced an endless array of 
papers and guidelines, and spurred the creation of networks all commenting on the state of 
Internet governance, sometimes with the effect of simply adding to the mist of babble on 
the subject matter.  Bodies such as the European Internet Coregulation Network (EICN)23 
have been established, for the purpose of contributing to the debate on Internet 
governance. The Council of Europe has been very active in shaping regulation of the 
Information society, with the issuance of soft law guidelines on human rights for ISPs and 
online games providers.24  Further the European Commission went so far as to state in its 
White Paper on European governance that co-regulation might not be appropriate for cases 
engaging fundamental rights,25 stating, co-regulation, ‘is only suited to cases where 
fundamental rights or major political choices are not called into question.’26   
The significance of such a statement and it being accorded little weight in the practice of 
Internet regulation highlights the dilemma of current Internet regulation. The technology is 
so new, so changing, and the issues so vexing that multiple stakeholders are participating in 
discussions of what to do, and the effect is information overload. This is not to say that 
multi-stakeholderism is a blight on the progress of Internet governance.  Indeed, multi-
stakeholderism offers the promise of a well-rounded and represented discussion of Internet 
governance issues, but the downside is that it is slow, voluminous, and produces little in the 
way of practical results.27  
For UK ISPs, this provides the political and legal context of their operation.  It means that 
they are constantly affected by policy discussions, guidelines, reports and recommendations 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
guidelines on human rights for internet service providers and online games providers.  See ‘Human rights 
guidelines for Internet service providers’, at 
www.coe.int/t/informationsociety/documents/HRguidelines_ISP_en.pdf (last visited 8 August 2011), and 
‘Human rights guidelines for online game providers’, at 
www.coe.int/t/informationsociety/documents/HRguidelines_OGP_en.pdf (last visited 8 August 2011).  
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 Created by the Forum des Droits sur l’internet: E. Lievens et al., ‘The Co-Protection of Minors in New Media: 
A European Approach to Co-Regulation’, U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y, 10 (2006) 98, p. 136. 
24
 See Council of Europe guidelines n.22.  ‘Soft law’ has specific meaning in European law as a non-binding legal 
instrument that is followed as a matter of informal practice by member States, such as a Recommendation: 
Tambini n. 15, p. 5. 
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 Lievens n. 23, p. 147. 
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 European Commission, ‘European Governance: A White Paper’ COM(2001) 428, (25 July 2001), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf (last visited 8 August 2011), p. 21. 
27
 For an excellent discussion of the IGF from a regulatory perspective see R.H. Weber, Shaping Internet 
Governance: Regulatory Challenges (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2010).  
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on a social and political level, but that as a legal matter, these are only discussions and as 
such have no legal bite. ISPs, therefore, if they wish, can operate in a manner that 
effectively disregards these discussions. This state of affairs is compounded with regard to 
human rights, where as we have seen the international human rights regime is constantly 
grappling with its lack of legal force.28  However, there is one piece of legislation that does 
regulate some of the responsibilities of ISPs for filtered content: the Electronic Commerce 
Directive (E-Commerce Directive) 29 implemented into UK law through the Electronic 
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulation30 (hereinafter discussed in terms of the Directive).  
The Directive sets out the circumstances under which an intermediary is liable for unlawful 
content communicated by a third party.  The Directive’s term for the intermediary with 
which it deals is ‘information society service’ (ISS), a broad term meaning, ‘any service 
normally provided for remuneration at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the 
processing (including digital compression) and storage of data, at the individual request of a 
recipient of the service.’31  The services covered by this definition are currently unsettled in 
the law, though it would tend to include ISPs and search engines.32  
ISSs are liable for any unlawful content. Such content for the most part concerns 
defamatory content, content which breaches intellectual property laws, obscene content, 
terrorism-related content, and content which stirs up religious or racial hatred.33  The 
Directive allocates liability for unlawful content depending on the type of ISS service: mere 
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 Even the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, which is monitored and enforced by the 
UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), has weaker enforcement mechanisms.  The UNHRC can only issue a 
‘view’ which is of normative force rather than being an international court making binding decisions. 
29
 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects 
of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market;  
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 2002 No. 2013. 
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 See the Preamble, cl. 17 n. 29. 
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 The then Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR) advised that this definition covers 
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conduits, caching and hosting.34  If an ISS is a mere conduit it does not attract liability, 
however, if the ISS caches the material, meaning temporarily stores information in order to 
make the Internet work more efficiently, which ISPs do, liability can be incurred if there is 
actual knowledge.35  The most controversial issue is the liability imposed on ‘hosts’ of third 
party content, which would typically describe some of the activities of ISPs.  
‘Hosts’ covers ‘the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service’.36 This 
includes the provision of server space to store websites, newsgroups and so on,37 but the UK 
Law Commission indicated it might also cover web-based email services such as Google’s 
Gmail and Microsoft’s Hotmail and the Usenet service litigated in Godfrey v. Demon 
Internet.38 Hosts can only escape liability if they did not know, nor was it apparent, that the 
information was unlawful, or if they obtained such knowledge, provided they acted 
‘expeditiously’ to remove or disable access to the content.   
In practice what this means is that if an ISP, or more specifically an ISS, is advised that 
content is unlawful, it would be wise to remove the content, regardless of the legitimacy of 
the complaint, or risk falling foul of the Directive. This provision has been the subject of 
much controversy, with legitimate accusations that it privatises censorship.39  Tambini et al. 
conducted empirical research into the notice-and-takedown regime, concluding,  
Like the proverbial three blind monkeys, ISPs, IAPs and web hosting services 
should ‘hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil’.  As mere ciphers for content, 
they are protected; should they engage in any filtering of content they become 
liable.  Thus, ‘masterly inactivity’ except when prompted by law enforcement is 
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 E-Commerce Directive n. 29, Articles 12-14. 
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their only rational choice as it is the economically most advantageous course of 
action open to them. [emphasis added]40 
The concern here is not with challenging the legitimacy of the E-Commerce Directive though 
there is much to be concerned about.  Unlike the IWF, the Directive was at least enacted 
through a democratic process. However, the Directive does have significant implications to 
an assessment of the human rights compliance of a body such as the IWF.  First, this 
Directive makes ISPs vulnerable to organisations such as the IWF because ISPs, at least when 
they act as hosts of content, are not in a position to refuse to block content once the 
content is accused of being unlawful.  As Julian Petley notes, 
[The E-Commerce Directive] does indeed take a certain amount of pressure off 
ISPs, but it also renders them extremely vulnerable to pressure from corporate 
interests, law enforcement agencies and self-regulatory bodies such as the 
Internet Watch Foundation, who have only to allege that material is illegal for 
ISPs to become understandably nervous about carrying it.  And if they then 
decide to take it down, they effectively become a regulatory agent, thus to a 
significant extent privatizing the process of online censorship.41 
It results in a strange scenario where the censorship is framed as a ‘democratic expression 
of the public will’.42  After all, no one wants to be characterised as sympathetic to child 
pornographers and paedophiles.  However, the end result is a circumvention of 
governmental, police or judicial oversight. They are kept ‘out of the loop’43 with the result 
that ‘the IWF conveniently circumvents the need to justify censorship in a court of law.’44 
The IWF, in this respect, is inconsistent in its rhetoric, at times describing its blacklist as 
‘voluntary’ to ISPs45 and at otherwise a matter of legal duty.  On its website it describes the 
process as follows: 
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Once informed, the host or internet service provider (ISP) is duty bound under 
the E-Commerce Regulations (Liability of intermediary service providers) to 
remove or disable access to the potentially criminal content, expeditiously.46   
In the face of journalist questions, Sarah Robertson, the IWF’s head of communication 
commented, ‘We just provide a list of URLs.’47  While technically true, this is not an accurate 
statement on the law. Once a host is notified of unlawful content it is bound under the E-
Commerce Directive to block that content, so while it may appear that an ISP has a choice or 
chooses to block the content, the reality is that in its capacity as a host it is vulnerable to 
bodies such as the IWF who make allegations of unlawful content, and such bodies are built 
around this knowledge. 
The question then is what is the IWF and how did it become so constituted that it is the 
body in the UK which determines the online material that is blocked.  
A. The IWF 
 
The IWF is best described as a regulatory body with, as we have seen, broad membership 
from the Internet Industry, including ISPs, mobile operators, search engine and content  
providers, filtering companies, and licensees such as Cisco and MTN Group.48  Its main 
functions are to process reports from the public regarding suspected criminal content and 
to compile a blacklist of Internet content it deems potentially criminal.  This is then filtered 
by its members.  In its 2010 Annual Report, the IWF advised that over 98.6% of the UK 
population with broadband connection gained access to the Internet through an IWF 
member ISP.49  A decision of the IWF on what goes on the blacklist is effectively a decision 
as to what content is blocked in the UK.  Thus this seemingly non-descript private regulatory 
body wields considerable power. 
The IWF’s remit, set out on its website, is to minimise the availability of three types of 
content: (1) images of child sexual abuse hosted anywhere; (2) criminal obscene adult 
content hosted in the UK; and (3) non-photographic child sexual abuse content hosted in 
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the UK.50  Until April 2011, the remit also covered incitement to racial hatred content hosted 
in the UK, however, such content has now been re-directed to a new police body True 
Vision.51  The IWF views itself as a tool for CSR, stating ‘being a member of the IWF offers 
many benefits including evidence of corporate social responsibility’.52 
To satisfy its remit, it works together with industry and government to combat online abuse, 
but its main job is threefold.  First, it operates the anonymous hotline for the reporting of 
illegal content. In 2009 the IWF reported that it receives approximately 34,000 complaints 
from the public each year, of which it acts on about 25 per cent.53 It draws from this 
material for its second main function, which is the operation of a notice-and-takedown 
regime covering all potentially criminal content within its remit, not just child sexual abuse 
images. Under this regime it advises ISPs and hosting companies of any potentially criminal 
content, as well as providing such data to law enforcement authorities in the UK and abroad 
to assist them with their investigations. Third, specifically with regard to child sexual abuse 
images hosted outside the UK, it maintains a dynamic blacklist of URLs, which it passes on to 
its members to be blocked.54 The IWF advises that the list usually contains between 500 to 
800 URLs.55 It describes its role in blocking content as follows: 
We consider blocking to be a short-term disruption tactic which can help protect 
internet users from stumbling across these images, whilst processes to have 
them removed are instigated.56 
The blacklist is available to national and international law enforcement agencies, and 
INHOPE hotlines (International Association of Internet Hotlines).57  
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The IWF has been widely praised by the Government58 and regulatory bodies such as 
Nominet,59 and similar models have been created abroad.60  However, the history of the 
IWF is rife with controversy. The IWF was founded in 1996 by the Internet industry in 
cooperation with the Home Office and the police, and under direct threat that if the 
Internet industry did not regulate itself the government would legislate.61  The Internet 
industry was spurred into action by an open letter from the Chief Inspector of the Clubs & 
Vice Unit of the Metropolitan Police, Stephen French, to the Internet Service Providers 
Association (ISPA) in which he requested that access to 134 pornographic Usenet 
newsgroups be banned and threatened that if they did not establish procedures to remove 
child pornographic content that they would be held liable as hosts of such content.62 In 
October 1996 ‘Safety Net’, the predecessor of the IWF, was born under the design of Peter 
Dawe who co-founded and headed one of the UK’s first commercial ISPs, Pipex. 63 In 2000, 
after three years in operation, it was re-structured and re-launched, and importantly, 
endorsed by the Government and the then Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) now 
called the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS).64   
This re-structure served the laudable purpose of making the body more transparent and 
accountable to the public. It streamlined governance to a single Board, and in an effort to 
make it more independent of the industry that created it, the Board was then required to 
have a majority of and be chaired by non-industry member(s).65  It also started publishing its 
Annual Reports. However, it was also at this time that the IWF began to shift its role by 
expanding their remit, starting with criminally racist content.66 The IWF also started banning 
entire newsgroups, even though the majority of the content in the newsgroups was legal.  
This led to the resignation of several board members, many of whom had played an integral 
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role in the founding of the IWF.  One of those who resigned, Malcolm Hutty, at the time 
described the IWF as becoming a ‘child protection lobby’.67   
Three key things happened that pushed the ubiquity of the IWF’s blacklist. First, in 2002, the 
IWF released the blacklist to its members and any others who paid a licensing fee.  Then in 
2003 BT developed the technical system known colloquially as Cleanfeed, but officially 
called BT Anti-Child-Abuse Initiative,68 to block access to content on the IWF’s blacklist by its 
users.  BT made the critical decision to make Cleanfeed available to be used by other ISPs, 
which most have. Third, ISPs were pressured to follow BTs lead, and any effort to resist this 
pressure was laid to rest when the Government said that unless 100% of the industry 
regulated itself the Government would legislate.69  Thus the IWF’s blacklist became 
standardised across the UK internet industry, and as a result effective control was 
consolidated under one roof. 
Cleanfeed looks at individual URLs rather than simply domain names.  It is a hybrid system, 
which ‘redirects traffic that might need to be blocked to a proxy cache, which then takes the 
final decision.’70 What this means is that the destination port and IP address of traffic is 
examined, and if it is suspect, it is redirected to a web proxy, which examines whether the 
URL sought is one on the IWF blacklist, and if so, access is blocked.71 The blacklist is held on 
the server in encrypted form.72   
Cleanfeed has been criticised for failing to deal with child pornography distributed via peer 
to peer and instant messaging,73 arguably now the more popular approach to distribution of 
child pornography.  It has also been accused of being open to what are called ‘oracle’ 
attacks where users can find out the sites on the blacklist. 74  In addition, since the IWF does 
not dictate the filtering technology used, while most ISPs use cleanfeed it is not the case 
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that all of them do, and the system used for filtering in these instances is unknown.75  
Finally, not all ISPs advise users that the site they are attempting to access is blacklisted, 
returning instead a 404 (page unavailable) error page.76  The IWF has recommended in its 
Blocking Good Practice that users are advised access has been denied (returning instead an 
error 403 page).  However, this is not standardised at the moment.  The 2010 Annual Report 
advises the IWF is gathering evidence on the impact of this recommendation on members’ 
practices, but this information is confidential.77  What is clear, however, is that some ISPs, 
perhaps all ISPs, are not transparent concerning the sites that are blocked, and there is no 
standardisation of approaches across the industry.  The question is from where the IWF 
derives its legitimacy. 
B. The ISPA and Internal Codes of Conduct 
 
The UK ISPA is the country’s trade association for ISPs. It was established in 1995 and has 
over 200 members, including, BT, Virgin Media, Vodafone, Google and Yahoo!.78  
Membership is voluntary, but most companies are members of the Association. The ISPA 
defers to the IWF with regard to filtering of unlawful content. Members of the ISPA are 
bound by its’ Code of Practice:79  Section 5 sets out the procedure for handling the IWF 
blacklist. It explicitly states that membership in the IWF is not mandatory, however, it makes 
clear that the ISPA co-operates with the IWF and that its’ procedures in this regard are 
mandatory for ISPA members: 
5.1 ISPA membership does not automatically confer IWF membership. Members 
are encouraged to consider direct IWF membership. 
 
5.2 ISPA co-operates with the IWF in its efforts to remove illegal material from 
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Internet web-sites and newsgroups. Members are therefore required to adhere 
to the following procedures in dealing with the IWF.80 
The ISPA mandates that members must provide a point of contact to receive IWF notices, 
and that they must remove web pages or UseNet articles which the IWF deems and notifies 
them are illegal child abuse images.81  The Code only requires Members to ‘carefully 
consider’82 all other types of IWF notices and recommendations.  In addition, if a Member 
cannot technically remove the material, it is required to tell the IWF why.83  The effect of 
this provision is to mandate that ISPs take down any content on the IWF blacklist, whether 
they are members of the IWF or not. The IWF thus becomes something other than 
voluntary.  Rather, legitimisation by the ISPA makes the IWF the Industry’s standard setting 
body for content filtering in the UK.  
The ISPA and its members have also drafted ‘Best Common Practice’ documents, which are 
non-binding ISPA recommendations, and ‘Backgrounders’, which are informational 
documents for users.84 Of relevance here are two documents. In a Backgrounder on Content 
Liability, the ISPA confirms that it operates a notice and takedown procedure where if it is 
notified of illegal material by the IWF or law enforcement agencies, it removes it.85 The BCP 
on Blocking and filtering of Internet Traffic states that the ISPA must notify its customers of 
the nature of filtering it undertakes, which involves informing the customer of ‘the form of 
filtering and the general criteria used to filter but need not provide a complete set of details, 
particularly where they are subject to change.’86  In practice the threshold to meet this 
criterion is extremely low, as can be seen in the proffered example: ‘[w]e block access to the 
IP addresses that host those web sites which IWF informs us publish child abuse images that 
are illegal to possess.’87 
Indeed, in an examination of the Terms of Service (ToS) and Acceptable Use Policies (AUP) 
of leading ISPs, it was found that they use almost this exact language, and simply refer and 
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defer to the IWF. The internal codes of conduct of the top UK ISPs based on the number of 
customers was reviewed.  ISPreview compiled a list of the top 10 ISPs as of March 2010 
based on the companies’ public results on subscriber size and listed the top five as BT Retail 
(PlusNet), Virgin Media, TalkTalk Group (AOL, Opal, Tiscali, Pipex), Sky Broadband (BSkyB), 
and Orange.88  For example, PlusNet’s AUP advises it is a member of the IWF89 but does not 
provide any information on what or if it blocks.  Virgin’s Internet Security Team enforces 
Virgin’s Terms and Conditions and User Policy.90  They advise they are members of the IWF 
and follow its recommendations, but provide no other information.   
BT’s information on its filtering practices and its relationship with the IWF is even more 
difficult to find, and at least with regard to policy, its perspective seems to have changed in 
light of the Digital Economy Act and BT’s failed judicial review of its terms.91  Regardless, it 
still abides by the filtering practices of the IWF.  It has a Human Rights Policy, which 
acknowledges the difficult position they are placed in to balance freedom of expression 
against competing rights.92  With regards to child sexual abuse images it states, ‘[t]hrough 
our involvement with the Internet Watch Foundation, BT receives a daily list of child abuse 
sites which are then blocked, preventing customers from accidentally accessing them.’93 In 
2007 it described the IWF ‘as being highly effective, including through providing a good 
forum for discussion for a range of stakeholders.’94 It uses softer language now to describe 
its policy. Under the heading ‘Intervention only when necessary’, it states, ‘[when] we 
intervene it is to keep our networks and services running efficiently and in an exceptional 
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case, to block access to child sexual abuse images identified by the Internet Watch 
Foundation.’ 95   
It becomes clear therefore that key policy decisions concerning filtering are made by the 
IWF.  The IWF becomes a policy chokepoint on filtering in the UK and therefore emerges as 
an IIG in its own right separate from ISPs.  The attention is thus turned to the operation of 
the IWF to determine its human rights compliance and consequently its role in facilitating or 
hindering participation in democratic culture. 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLIANCE 
OF THE IWF 
 
The reader will recall from chapter three that CSR as it is used in this thesis has a voluntary 
as well as indirect legal component, and part of the work is in teasing out the legal versus 
voluntary elements of the body that is the focus of analysis.  We draw here from Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to ask first, whether the body is in fact 
a public authority and thus directly bound by the HRA and if not, whether the state has 
positive obligations under Article 10 that it has or has not discharged.  If there are no such 
legal obligations, we examine the IWF as a form of pure-CSR, drawing from Article 10 
principles, more loosely because it is not legally binding, by looking to the criteria in John 
Ruggie’s Framework as a guide.  We ask: 
(a) What are the due diligence processes, namely, is there guidance on human rights 
policies, monitoring and tracking of performance, and mitigation strategies? 
(b) Do the policies on human rights include negative and positive obligations?  What is 
the nature of the obligations? 
(c) What remedial structures are there, if any?  Do they have any of the characteristics 
suggested by Ruggie of legitimacy, accessibility, predictability, equitability, rights-
compatibility, transparency and consultation with stakeholders? 
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A. How ‘private’ is the IWF? 
 
Under the HRA s. 6 the Act is only binding on ‘public authorities’.  The definition of public 
authority differentiates between core public authorities, which are obvious public 
authorities such as government agencies and local authorities, and hybrid public 
authorities96, which under s 6(3)(b) is ‘any person certain of whose functions are functions 
of a public nature.’  In addition, courts and tribunals are public authorities.  The effect of the 
latter has been what has been called the indirect horizontal effect of the HRA in that any 
court is required to take account of the HRA in its proceedings, even if it is between private 
parties.  Thus, once a party establishes a cause of action in, for example, breach of 
confidence, the court is then required to consider Convention principles, in such a case the 
right to privacy, in its adjudication.97   
The question is whether the IWF might be a hybrid public authority.  Under s 6(5) ‘a person 
is not a public authority by virtue only of subsection (3)(b) if the nature of the act is 
private’.98  What this means is that if the matter in dispute is private in nature, then it is not 
a situation where the HRA applies to the body.  In contrast, a core public authority would be 
bound by the HRA for all of its activities.99  Thus in examining the IWF, not all aspects of it 
need be public in nature, nor would all aspects of its work receive HRA oversight. 
One of the leading issues of debate in UK case law is what qualifies as ‘functions of a public 
nature’ to trigger treatment as a hybrid public authority.  There has been no definitive 
settlement on this matter, thus it is a live issue, and a new case can at any time change the 
lens through which the activities of the IWF are viewed.100  In the past, the courts have held, 
given the circumstances of the cases, a parish council101 was not a public authority, but a 
housing association102, and private psychiatric hospital103 were found to qualify as such.  The 
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most recent high level pronouncement on the matter is the deeply divided House of Lords 
decision in YL v. Birmingham City Council (YL).104 
YL concerned whether a private residential care home was a hybrid public authority.  The 
claimant was entitled to accommodation by the Council, which contracted with a private 
provider, Southern Cross Healthcare Ltd., for the care for the claimant.  Southern Cross was 
a private residential care home, with public and privately funded residents.  Arising from a 
dispute between Southern Cross and the claimant, the care provider terminated the 
claimant’s care at the home, and the claimant sought a claim that Southern Cross was in 
breach of Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the HRA.   
The Court was divided 3/2 in favour of finding that Southern Cross was not a hybrid public 
authority under s. 6 of the HRA.  The minority (Lord Bingham of Baroness Hale) advocated 
interpreting ‘public function’ generously, focusing on whether the nature of the function 
was public or private, and emphasising the vulnerability of the claimant.105  The majority 
(Lords Scott, Mance and Neuberger), in contrast, emphasised the fact that this was a for-
profit company, operating through contracts, both private and public, with no direct public 
funding and no legislative oversight : 
It is neither a charity nor a philanthropist.  It enters in private law contracts with 
the residents in its care homes and with the local authorities with whom it does 
business.  It receives no public funding, enjoys no special statutory powers, and 
is at liberty to accept or reject residents as it chooses…and to charge whatever 
fees in its commercial judgment it thinks suitable.  It is operating in a commercial 
market with commercial competitors.106 
The division in the Court was driven by starkly different policy views on the things 
considered by the courts in assessing whether a body is a hybrid public authority.107  Thus 
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any cases at the borderline of hybrid public authority is very much fact driven, given the 
nature of the body and the circumstances of that particular case.  Based on YL, the types of 
things courts look at would be the social benefit of what the business does, funding, 
statutory underpinning, ties to government, and whether it carries out a governmental 
functional.108 
We can also find guidance on the public authority status of the IWF from judicial treatment 
of other media regulatory bodies, which provide useful analogies to the gatekeeping role of 
the IWF.  The Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), the Office of Communications (Ofcom) 
and the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) are all classified as public authorities 
under the HRA, but all three bodies have legislative underpinnings unlike the IWF.109 The 
most appropriate comparison is to the Press Complaints Commission (PCC), which like the 
IWF is a private self-regulatory body that operates at the encouragement of Government 
and without any legislative underpinning.110  Similar to newspapers, ISPs are clearly private 
bodies: while they ‘operate in the public domain and fulfil a public service’ they do not owe 
duties under s. 6 HRA.111  However, the PCC is arguably a public authority. The Government 
stated in debates concerning the HRA that the PCC undertook public functions.112  Indeed, 
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the PCC acknowledged it was a public authority in R (Ford) v The Press Complaints 
Commission:113 
The [PCC] correctly in my view accepts for the purposes of the present 
permission application, that it is arguable whether it is a Public Authority for the 
purposes of Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the HRA”) and is 
amenable to judicial review.114 
In the case of the IWF, it is argued that more is going on here than a simple ‘public 
connection’ as Lord Neuberger described the activities of Southern Cross in YL.115 The IWF is 
a product of direct Government threats carrying out a function that at its core is 
governmental in nature.  While there is no legislative underpinning to the functioning and 
legitimacy of the IWF, there can be no question that its legitimacy and role is Government 
driven.  In addition, it has been reported that the IWF acknowledged it is a public authority 
under the HRA and undertook to govern itself pursuant to the HRA,116 although this 
statement was made in minutes that are no longer available.  
The IWF insists that it is a self-regulatory body operating separately from state, but the 
actual set-up is less clearly self-regulatory. In a Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Crown Prosecution Service and the Association of Chief Police Officers concerning 
Section 46 of the Sexual offences Act 2003, the role and remit of the IWF is described as 
very much an extension of government, using language such as ‘support’ and ‘on behalf of 
UK law enforcement agencies’ to describe its functions: 
The IWF is funded by service providers, mobile network operators, software and 
hardware manufacturers and other associated partners. It is supported by the 
Police and CPS and works in partnership with the Government to provide a 
'hotline' for individuals or organisations to report potentially illegal content and 
then to assess and judge that material on behalf of UK law enforcement 
agencies. It also exists to assist service providers to avoid abuse of their systems 
by distributors of child abuse content and to support law enforcement officers, 
at home and abroad, to detect and prosecute offenders. Reports made to the 
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IWF in line with its procedures will be accepted as a report to a relevant 
authority.117  
Indeed, the language the IWF and the Government use to describe the role of the IWF is 
mixed.  The Rt Hon Alun Michael MP, former Minister of State for Industry, described the 
set-up of the IWF as one of ‘partnership and self-regulation’,118 indicating a co-regulatory 
approach halfway between the PCC and Ofcom.  The IWF describes itself as a self-regulatory 
body, but also uses words such as ‘partnership’ and ‘multi-stakeholder’.  Professor Byron in 
her child protection review described the IWF as lying ‘at the heart of the Government’s 
safeguarding strategy’119 for the protection of children.  The IWF describes its’ relationship 
with the Government as follows: 
We operate independently of Government, but are closely supported by the 
Home Office, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the 
Ministry of Justice as well as working with the Department for Children, Schools 
and Families (DCSF) and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) 
and a number of Parliamentarians, Peers and MEPs who take an interest in our 
work.120 
From this it is unclear what the relationship between the IWF and the Government is, 
although it can be said at minimum that there is a relationship between the two, although it 
is not formally provided for in a legislative document. Besides the mutual sharing of 
information and resources, the IWF also receives some funding from the UK government, 
although a miniscule amount compared to its operating budget. 
The funding of the IWF is highly unusual and makes it difficult to draw comparisons with 
other media regulatory bodies.  It is a registered charity, and as a charity it must publish its 
accounts.  There it was revealed that the IWF’s largest single donor is the European Union, 
although its main revenue draws from the subscription fees it charges to its members, 
which range from very small firms paying fees of £500 to £5,000 per annum, to main ISPs 
paying £20,000 per annum.121  In addition, it receives the following support, including 
funding from the Home Office: 
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Sponsors, which “support us with goods and services to help us pursue our 
objectives”, include Microsoft. Additional money comes from what the IWF calls 
“CAI income”. This is revenue from licensing the list of prohibited URLs to private 
net-security outfits. It totalled £5,183 in 2007, but had jumped to £40,734 a year 
later. In 2006, the IWF also received £14,502 from the Home Office.122 
Based on a narrow interpretation of public authority the IWF might not qualify as such.  
However the ‘steering’123 role of Government combined with its funding structure and 
public function, makes a strong case that the IWF is a public authority under the HRA.   
In addition, Article 1(3)(a) of the Framework Directive, might be found to apply to the 
activities of the IWF.  If so, the IWF will be explicitly bound to take into account ECHR 
principles. The contentious provision was drafted with the three strikes laws in mind 
concerning illegal file sharing, however, the provision drafted has more general application.  
The provision also specifically states it applies to member states, but in practice it may not 
be restricted to this.  Article 1(3)(a) provides that any restriction on users access to the 
Internet ‘shall respect the fundamental rights’ of the ECHR, explicitly stating that any 
Internet sanctions must satisfy the ECHR criteria that they be appropriate, proportionate 
and necessary in a democratic society. Additionally, Article 1(3)a might invite greater 
scrutiny of their complaints mechanisms as it requires that non-judicial procedures be fair, 
impartial and include the right to be heard of the affected persons. 124  
The above shows a strong case can be made that the IWF is a public authority and thus 
directly bound by Article 10.  The case of the IWF is then quite different than imagined. It 
becomes a case of a corporate governance framework developed to the point that it is 
brought within the rubric of state-centred human rights laws, a matter that has simply not 
been tested in the courts yet.  It is arguable that the language of CSR here, intentionally or 
unintentionally, has only served to deflect attention away from this state of affairs.  The 
evolution of this framework from a pure-CSR body to a public authority also has implications 
to businesses considering self-regulation as they might be fearful of exactly this result.  This 
is explored more in chapter six.   
                                                          
122
 Davies ibid. 
123
 In McIntyre and Scott n. 9, p. 121, the authors discuss the Government’s ‘inherent steering capacity’ with 
regard to the IWF. 
124
 The new Article 1(3)a of  
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on  
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive). 
137 
 
However, that is not the end of the story. We are at a crossroads.  If the IWF is a public 
authority, then we must assess whether its administration complies with Article 10(2).  Even 
if the IWF is not a public authority, there is a strong case to be made that the state has 
positive obligations to the public under Article 10 concerning the governance of the IWF.  
This leads us in the direction of a direct application of the ECHR concerning the IWF.  We 
cannot forget, however, the notion of the IWF as a form of pure-CSR.  Even if no direct 
human rights obligations are engaged in a legal sense, a body such as the IWF has human 
rights commitments nonetheless.  This leads the examination in another direction, where 
Ruggie’s Framework provides guidance on the characteristics to look for in the IWF’s 
internal governance structure. 
B. Is the IWF Prescribed by Law with a Legitimate Aim? 
 
What qualifies as a legitimate aim is exhaustively listed in Article 10(2) as ‘national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, 
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’125 
There isn’t any question that the IWF serves a legitimate aim - several legitimate aims - 
under Article 10, including the prevention of crime, the protection of reputation, and most 
particularly the protection of children reflected in the protection of health or morals or 
public safety.  The IWF serves a valuable and notable purpose in protecting the public from 
exposure to child abuse images and arguably contributes to limiting access to such images 
or the distribution channels of paedophiles.  With regards to the wider IWF remit, regulation 
of content which encourages terrorism and hate speech, all are legitimate aims under 
Article 10. 
For an interference to be prescribed by law, the Court takes a wide view. For example, in 
Müller v. Switzerland,126 the court held that obscenity laws, which vary depending on the 
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views of a community at the time, were sufficiently precise to be prescribed by law. While at 
a minimum, there must be a specific rule or legal regime that can be pointed to,127 it 
includes delegated powers and unwritten law (i.e. common law).  Unfettered discretion is 
not prescribed by law, but if it is sufficiently delimited it is sufficient.128  At the heart of 
prescribed by law is the principle of legal certainty, meaning there must be some basis in 
domestic law, whether statute or common law, for the conduct.129  
In Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No 1),130 the Court stated it involves an examination of 
the quality of the law to assess its arbitrariness. This involves two criteria.  First, the law 
must be adequately accessible.  Second, a norm is not prescribed by law ‘unless it is 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must 
be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in 
the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.’131  
The IWF targets content which domestic law deems is illegal. Child sexual abuse images are 
covered by the Protection of Children Act 1978, Sexual Offences Act 2003, Memorandum of 
Understanding: Section 46 Sexual Offences Act 2003, the Police and Justice Act 2006, and 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.  With regard to criminally obscene adult content, the 
relevant legislation is the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and 1964, and Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008 section 63.132 The concern is not with the content targeted by the 
IWF, but rather with regulation of the regulator.  The power the IWF exercises in 
determining the information we can and cannot access on the Internet is vast.  The exercise 
of this power must be prescribed by law.   This requires that there are safeguards in the law 
to protect against arbitrary interferences by a public authority like the IWF.  Such was the 
issue in Halford v. United Kingdom133 concerning the interception of telephone calls.   
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In Halford, since the Interception of Communications Act134 only applied to public 
communications network and the interference occurred over a private network, there was 
no provision in domestic law to protect the complainant.  In the context of Article 8 the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the lack of regulation in domestic law 
meant the interference was not prescribed by law, stating, 
In the context of secret measures of surveillance or interception of 
communications by public authorities, because of the lack of public scrutiny and 
the risk of misuse of power, the domestic law must provide some protection to 
the individual against arbitrary interference with Article 8 rights (art. 8).  Thus, 
the domestic law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an 
adequate indication as to the circumstances in and conditions on which public 
authorities are empowered to resort to any such secret measures…135 
As will become evident in the following section concerning the proportionately of the IWF’s 
governance structure, the IWF’s operation is largely secret with very little oversight of its 
operation.  This can be seen with the inclusion of obscene content in the IWF’s remit.  The 
test under the Obscene Publications Act is subjective asking whether the material will tend 
to deprave and corrupt those likely to be exposed to it.136   It is inherently tied up with the 
views of the community of that time, and is a problematic standard to apply at the best of 
times by a jury of one’s peers in the formal setting of a court.  It is far more subjective and 
arbitrary when assessed by an individual in a back room without the prospect of any judicial 
oversight, and ultimately risks the imposition by a private body of its employees’ moral 
views on the wider public.  While traditional media, particularly broadcasters, have long 
grappled with the standard of offensiveness, this has not made the issue any less vexing or 
difficult to manage, and the IWF is distinguishable from such bodies for the largely private 
nature of its operation.   Drawing from Halford, there is nothing in domestic law, nor 
internal to the IWF’s governance structure that protects the public from arbitrariness in how 
the IWF exercises its power.  It is unchecked.  Without any such protection, the law cannot 
be said to be adequately accessible or foreseeable, two other aspects to the concept of 
prescribed by law.  This will become particularly apparent when later in this chapter we 
explore the process by which website owners are/are not advised their site is on the 
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blacklist and the process of appeal.  The result is that the IWF, as a public authority, is 
arguably operating without any legal basis. 
Even if the IWF is not a public authority, there should be concerns with a body which 
exercises such a powerful role in administering our right to freedom of expression and yet 
fails to show evidence its operation is not arbitrary.  Such characteristics of transparency, 
accountability, and proportionality are considered key to any good regulatory system, public 
or private.137  As a voluntary framework, the concern is further magnified when analysing 
ISP Terms of Service and AUPs, which provide an almost unlimited remit to ISPs to terminate 
a user’s account. For example, PlusNet’s AUP allows the ISP to terminate any user’s account 
without a right of appeal for a breach of the AUP, which provides: 
(a) in any way which breaks any law or the conditions of any licence or rights of 
others; 
(b) to make offensive, indecent, menacing, nuisance or hoax calls or to cause 
annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety; 
(c) to send, knowingly receive, upload, download, or use any material which is 
offensive, abusive, defamatory, obscene or menacing; or  
(d) in any way which we reasonably think will, or is likely to, affect how we 
provide the service to you or any of our customers.138 
Such AUPs are not related to filtering of content per se, except in so far as an ISP chooses to 
discontinue access to, for example, a newsgroup.  In such a case, the terms are sweeping, 
with ISPs such as Virgin providing that it can discontinue access ‘for any reason.’ 139  Such 
AUPs provide the wider regulatory picture of censorship of content – with the IWF providing 
the list of content to block, the ISP blocking it, and additionally the ISP reserving sweeping 
powers to cut off user access for unlimited reasons and without appeal. 
While the current remit of the IWF serves the legitimate aim of preventing disorder and 
crime and protecting health or morals, its administration is not prescribed by law. Indeed, 
the strength of its aim has helped mask its lack of legal basis, because people fearful of 
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being branded sympathetic to child pornographers either do not speak up or are quickly 
quieted, deflecting attention away from the failure of the IWF to carry out its’ work in a 
manner prescribed by law. The next question is whether the interference is necessary in a 
democratic society, keeping in mind that this question does not arise if the operation of the 
IWF is found to lack legal basis. 
C. Necessary in a Democratic Society 
 
Whether an interference with the right to freedom of expression is necessary in a 
democratic society is ultimately a proportionality question where one asks whether there is 
an alternative, less intrusive way to protect the public interest.140 What will be argued is 
that the IWF fails on multiple levels to be a proportionate response to the problem of 
unlawful content online, which impacts the ability to participate in democratic life online. 
Under Article 10(2), an interference with the right to freedom of expression must be 
prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Handyside v. United Kingdom 
clarified the meaning of this term, explaining that ‘necessary’ ‘“is not synonymous with 
“indispensible”…neither has it the flexibility of such expression as “admissible”, “ordinary”, 
“useful”, “reasonable” or “desirable”.’141 Rather, it is a question of proportionality, meaning 
there was a pressing social need for the interference, and that the interference strikes a ‘fair 
and proportionate balance between the means chosen to satisfy it and the individual’s 
freedom of expression.’142   Thus a court considers some of the following in its assessment: 
 What is the importance of the right?143 
 Is there a rational connect between the objective and the measures taken – is it 
arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations.144 
 The means chosen must be no more than is necessary to satisfy the objective. 
 The more severe the interference the more it must be justified.145 
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In this regard, ECHR jurisprudence is ultimately tied up with the notion of margin of 
appreciation, a notion inapplicable here except in so far as a certain margin of appreciation 
should be accorded a private body in organising its regulatory affairs.146  Ultimately, in this 
respect, the ECtHR seeks to determine whether the reasons given are ‘relevant and 
sufficient’ to justify the interference.147  Thus courts and states struggle with each case to 
determine the boundaries of this notion, and ultimately the analysis gets folded into 
discussion of the nature of the interference, proportionality, local customs and European 
standards, and competing interests.148 
In Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No 2),149 the ECtHR summarised the general principles 
to be applied in assessing what is necessary in a democratic society as follows: 
(a)Freedom of expression is one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society and includes the right to offend, shock and disturb; 
(b)It is especially important as regards the press: it is ’incumbent on it to impart 
information and ideas on matters of public interest.’150 
(c)Necessary means there is a pressing social need. Contracting states are given 
a margin of appreciation in this regard, but ‘it goes hand in hand with a 
European supervision’151, meaning that the Court gives the final ruling on 
whether the restriction can be reconciled with Article 10. 
(d)The Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the national authority.  
What it should do is ‘look at the interference complained of in the light of the 
case as a whole and determine it was “proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify 
it are “relevant and sufficient”.’152 
The analysis of whether the measures taken by the IWF are necessary in a democratic 
society can be categorised per the importance of the right, the remit of the organisation, 
and the proportionality of the measures taken. 
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Freedom of expression ‘is one of the cardinal rights guaranteed under the Convention.’153  
Any exceptions to this right must be interpreted narrowly.154  The activities of the IWF in 
both creating a blacklist of content to filter, and in its role as a notice regime for the 
takedown of unlawful material engages one of the most fundamental human rights 
reflecting one of the key foundations of democratic society and the facilitative potential of 
the Internet: participation in democratic discourse.  The blacklist acts as a blanket restraint 
on speech, the most extreme act of censorship for which the most justification is needed, 
because for all practical purposes, it removes from public access the information at issue. 
The availability of the information via alternate means, whether because the users is 
knowledgeable in how to route around filters, or the information is available, for example, 
in a different format such as print, does not make it anything other than censorship.  
Indeed, prevention of access does not need to be fool-proof: ‘a censor need not stamp out 
information entirely to effectively rig the market of ideas.’155 
The IWF has attempted to alleviate such concerns by describing the blacklist as voluntary.  
At a conference soon after the Wikipedia incident, the IWF chair Peter Robbins commented, 
‘[the Wikipedia image] was added to a list we give to service providers who voluntarily 
undertake to block access to those types of images.’156  He further defended the incident 
stating, ‘[n]obody in the 12 years or so that we have been operating has had any real reason 
to complain about anything that we may have done.’157 The reality, however, as we have 
seen is that removal of such content is far from voluntary through the ISPA Code of Practice, 
government and social pressure, and when it acts as a host, through the E-Commerce 
Directive. Such regulation, combined with a private self-regulatory body acting as monitor 
and notifier of unlawful content, leaves ISPs with no option other than to remove all content 
it is advised is illegal.  The result is that a single private body makes all the decisions for the 
UK on the content which is blocked from access.   
This can be contrasted with other countries, such as Canada where its Telecommunications 
Act forbids ISPs to block access to content. Instead, such blocking is administered by a 
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government regulatory body, the Canada Radio-Television Telecommunications Commission 
(CRTC).158  While an industry body, www.cybertip.ca, has been modelled on the IWF, the 
body itself does not make decisions concerning the content that is added to the blacklist, 
instead forwarding it to law enforcement authorities.159 Some countries rely on lists 
provided by law enforcement agencies.160 As Lillian Edwards argues, 
This censorship needs no laws to be passed, no court to rule, with the publicity 
that entails.  It only needs the collaboration, forced or otherwise, of ISPs. ISPs 
are not public bodies; their acts are not subject to judicial review.  Nor are they 
traditional news organizations; their first concern (quite properly) is for their 
shareholders and their own legal and PR risks, not for values like freedom of 
expression. 161 
As we have seen with the Wikipedia incident it highlights the risks when the IWF overblocks. 
The IWF capitalised on the botched blocking to shift blame to ISPs stating in its 2008 Annual 
Report, 
In this particular case there was an unforeseen technical side-effect of blocking 
access to the Wikipedia page in question. Due to the way some ISPs block, users 
accessing Wikipedia from these ISPs appeared to be using the same IP address.  
This undermined the way Wikipedia controls vandalism therefore anonymous 
UK Wikipedia users were blocked from editing.162 
While the process for addressing the complaint will be discussed further below, it 
exemplifies for present purposes, the reach of the blacklist.163 It was followed up early in 
2009 with the blacklisting of images on the Wayback Machine, which inexplicably led some 
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ISPs such as Demon Internet to block the entire archive.164  In both incidents neither owners 
of Wikipedia or the Wayback Machine, nor users, were advised of the blocking.  
The argument might be advanced that this is not the kind of speech that goes to the core of 
the right to freedom of expression.  It is not political. It does not further democracy.  Far 
from it, the material is not only unlawful, but the specific material on the blacklist is the 
lowest form of speech, if it can be categorised as such, child sexual abuse images.  This 
argument might be compelling, except for the fact that we don’t actually know what is being 
censored.  What we do know is that the Internet has become a central component to 
participation in democratic culture, access to which is increasingly being seeing as a 
fundamental human right.165   Three things, in particular, are striking about the IWF’s impact 
on participation in democratic culture.  First, the blacklist, as well as the notices sent to ISPs, 
are kept secret.  The list is sent in an encrypted format to ISPs, ‘which are subject to 
similarly secret terms of agreement regarding their employees’ access to the list.’166  ISPs 
can add a URL to the list and no one would know,167 and the sweeping nature of ISP ToS 
allows for virtually unhindered filtering of content.  While it is true that there are very good 
reasons why the blacklist is kept secret as we don’t want to ‘provide a roadmap to 
paedophiles’,168 this does not obviate the need for a democratic, transparent and 
accountable governance structure.  
Second, website owners are not necessarily advised when their site has been added to the 
blacklist or added to a list sent to ISPs for takedown. The IWF simply states ‘[n]otifying the 
website owner of any blocked URL is the responsibility of the Hotline or relevant law 
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enforcement agency in the country believed to be hosting the content.’169  Third, users are 
not always told they are attempting to connect to a site that has been blocked but are 
rather served an error page.170  After the Wikipedia incident, the IWF revisited its policies 
and created a Blocking Good Practice guide,171 which recommends that its members are 
more transparent concerning the content that is filtered.  The reader will note that it is 
framed as a recommendation rather than a condition of membership in the IWF.  Thus, as it 
stands, there is no standardisation in the industry concerning transparency of content that is 
filtered.  
Third, the IWF is at significant risk of function creep.  The IWF’s remit has expanded from its 
initial focus on child pornography to now include criminally obscene content, and for a while 
racial hatred content, leading commentators such as Petley to state, ‘ill-defined bodies such 
as this are all too prone to mission creep whereby, without any proper public discussion, 
they quietly expand the range of their activities – usually under pressure from 
government.’172 In a January 2008 speech home secretary Jacqui Smith indicated support for 
further expansions of the IWF’s remit, where she stated that the Government was in talks 
with the communications industry to regulate terrorism in the same manner that child 
pornography is handled, commenting, ‘[w]here there is illegal material on the net, I want it 
removed.’173  In other countries ISPs have been encouraged to take on such an expansive 
and judicial role, such as the Netherlands, which approved a code encouraging ISPs to make 
legal determinations on what is ‘undesirable’ or ‘harmful’ and take it down.174   
At the same time, the Internet industry as a whole is under extreme pressure to address all 
sorts of undesirable content: euthanasia websites, suicide websites, pro-eating disorder 
websites (known as “pro-mia” and “pro-ana” sites), glorification of terrorism, and the 
elephant in the room, illegal file sharing.  Increasingly there are discussions, such as in 
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Sweden, of extending the use of filters for child pornography to illegal file sharing.175 Italy 
requires the blocking of access to online gambling, and Norway recently proposed to block 
access to a sweeping array of sites that allow such things as gambling, flag desecration, 
peer-to-peer illegal fire sharing, and communication of hate speech.176   Such regimes enlist 
intermediaries as proxies to do the dirty work of censoring content.  The IWF has shown 
itself to be resistant to expansions of its remit, but it puts considerable pressure on the 
governance structure to have the safeguards in place to address such challenges.  
There is an evident theme running through this examination and it is as follows. In the face 
of a significant interference with the right to freedom of expression, in particular where a 
certain amount of secrecy is necessary, extraordinary care must be taken to build 
safeguards into the body’s governance structure.  While the aims of the IWF are legitimate, 
the use of blacklists and notifications of unlawful content in a way that necessarily leads to 
what is human rights terms is an act of censorship, is a significant interference with the 
enjoyment of freedom of expression. In cases of filtering alleged child sexual abuse images, 
it acts as a blanket restraint on speech. For such an interference to be proportionate it must 
be narrowly tailored so that it interferes with the right no more than is necessary.  A review 
of IWF governance documents reveals minimal constraints on what the IWF do with their 
considerable power.   
The IWF has a ‘Code of Practice’, but it is not a policy document. Policies concerning its 
charity status, financial risk, police liaison guidelines and most importantly, concerning the 
supply of the blacklist to ISPs are not dealt with in the Code.177 Rather, it is focused on the 
notice and takedown procedure and the obligations in this regard of IWF Members vis-à-vis 
its membership in the IWF. It does not address the Members relationship to the public.178  
While a third party can notify the IWF of a breach of the Code by one of its Members,179 this 
is not helpful in practice to address any concerns about the rightful filtering of a URL, 
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because the IWF would not find a Member breached the Code in removing material that the 
IWF itself blacklisted. 
The IWF is relatively transparent concerning the process by which images are assessed. The 
people compiling the blacklist are trained by the police, although we do not have any 
further information on what that training entails. They are ‘periodically inspected and 
audited by eminent independent experts’ 180 but we do not have access to these reports.181  
They assess the images in line with the UK Sentencing Guidelines Council’s Definitive 
Guideline of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.  The images are categorised as follows: 
Levels Description182 
 
1 Images depicting erotic posing with no sexual activity 
2 Non-penetrative sexual activity between children or solo masturbation by a 
child 
3 Non-penetrative sexual activity between adults and children 
4 Penetrative sexual activity involving a child or children, or both children and 
adults 
5 Sadism or penetration of or by an animal 
 
The IWF URL List Policy and Procedures183 identifies the following consideration, which are 
taken into account when assessing an image: 
a. Previously unseen images. 
b. History and how widely the image is disseminated. 
c. Nature of the image. 
d. Nature of the website featuring the image. 
e. Number of images associated with the URL. 
f. Jurisdictional legal disparity.184 
In addition, the IWF considers the potential problems caused by addition of the URL to the 
blacklist to Internet users, licensees, increased availability of the image, and the impact on 
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the website owner’s reputation.185  If the removal of the URL would cause one or more of 
those problems, the IWF advises it does not put the URL on the blacklist while ‘actions are 
taken to seek the removal of source of that content’,186 which if not removed leads to a 
referral of the matter to the IWF Board.  
The IWF policy concerning Newsgroups has changed recently.  From 2001 until 2010, it 
compiled a list of newsgroups which ISPs are ‘recommended’ to not host because they 
‘regularly’ contain child sexual abuse content, meaning 1% of the images viewed were such 
content. The IWF assured that the system for monitoring these newsgroups and analysing 
the stats had been independently reviewed, but there is no information on the independent 
review.187  The new policy is vaguer as to the process concerning newsgroups. While the 
focus is on alerting ISPs to specific posts, which the ISPs can then remove, the IWF retains a 
monitorial role concerning newsgroups as a whole, and makes use of the E-Commerce 
Directive notice and takedown regime by issuing notices to ISPs. It simply no longer calls it a 
recommendation or notice, but rather the provision of ‘data’ to the ISPs and newsgroup 
providers.188   
The question is then whether the IWF approach is not only successful but necessary to deter 
child sex abuse and other unlawful behaviour. Other frameworks, such as Operation Pin,189 
illustrate creative and effective approaches to tackling child pornography which are human 
rights compliant. Operation Pin was launched by the Virtual Global Taskforce (VGT)190 in 
2003 with the specific goal of deterring paedophiles from looking at child sexual abuse 
images. VGT is a collaboration of law enforcement agencies across the world. The Operation 
involves creating a website which falsely purports to carry child pornography but is in fact a 
law enforcement site. If someone enters the site or attempts to download an image he or 
she is advised that it is a law enforcement site, that the person has committed an offence, 
and that the person’s details have been ‘captured’ and passed on to law enforcement.191   
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In any event, paedophiles are increasingly using social networking sites, image sharing sites, 
free website hosting platforms and even hacked sites to distribute images.192 Such sites, 
while within the purview of the IWF, are more difficult to uncover. For example, the IWF is 
less likely to receive notifications on its hotline concerning a closed group on Facebook.  
Even more concerning are peer-to-peer sites, which are increasingly being used by 
paedophiles, as well as the use of Virtual Worlds, where the concern is more about role play 
than images.193  These are outside the reach of the Cleanfeed blocking system.  This is not to 
say there isn’t a role of critical importance for the IWF, but rather that there is less 
justification for a non-human rights compliant regulatory structure. It is a significant 
interference of the right to freedom of expression and yet does not target the most 
common methods by which paedophiles distribute images. As Petley comments, 
The IWF dislikes being called a censor, and, strictly speaking, it isn’t one. But, on 
the other hand, there cannot be the slightest doubt that it is involved in a 
process whose end result is self-censorship by ISPs understandably terrified of 
being accused of distributing child pornography – and, it might be added, keen 
to burnish their public image as responsible, family-friendly companies and, thus 
garlanded, to proceed unhindered with the all-important business of making 
money. Its existence disguises and obscures the fact that the state is involved in 
the censorship of the Internet, albeit covertly and at one remove, and its 
workings make it largely impossible for the authors of online material deemed 
illegal to defend themselves in court.194 
The end result is that IWF employees calmly slip into a judicial role, only to be questioned if 
a user or website owner happens to discover the blocking.195  Without any structures in 
place to guard against misuse of power, the IWF, as it is currently operates, is a 
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disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of expression and therefore 
breaches Article 10 of the HRA. 
D. A Failure of the State? 
 
If the IWF is not found to be a public authority, then the human rights problems we have 
seen concerning the IWF’s operation are arguably a failure of the state to positively protect 
users’ right to freedom of expression.  The Council of the European Union recently adopted 
a directive that directly binds the state to administer blocking of child pornography online 
pursuant to human rights principles.196  Under Article 21, member states are obliged to 
block access to child pornography, adding: 
Such blocking of access shall be subject to adequate safeguards, in particular to 
ensure that the blocking is limited to what is necessary, that users are informed 
of the reason for the blocking and that content providers, as far as possible, are 
informed of the possibility of challenging it. 
As we have seen, the IWF operates without any of the safeguards identified in Article 21.  As 
a directive it also binds the state to comply with Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights197 requiring that limitations of rights are proportionate, necessary and for a 
legitimate aim.  Once this directive is implemented into the UK, if there are no changes to 
the IWF’s operation, the Government can be found to be failing to meet its obligations 
under Article 21. 
In addition, unlike our American counterparts, the European tradition has been more open 
to positive obligations on states to ensure enjoyment of convention rights such as the right 
to freedom of expression.  The ECtHR has regularly intervened in cases between private 
individuals to ensure they ‘can effectively exercise their right of communication among 
themselves.’ 198 Whether a state has such a duty in a particular case is largely driven by 
questions of proportionately, namely whether there are alternative means available for the 
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person to engage in the expression at issue.199  Courts attempt to balance such issues as the 
interests of the community against that of the individual, allocation of resources, the nature 
and significance of the expression and the restriction, and the rights of others. 200  Thus, in 
Fuentes Bobo v. Spain,201 the Court held that Spain failed to safeguard freedom of 
expression when an employee criticised management during a radio programme.  
In Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, concerning corporate punishment in a private school, 
the Court held that the case engaged the right to education, and stated, ‘the state cannot 
absolve itself from responsibility by delegating its obligations to private bodies or 
individuals.’202  Such cases where the Court has found the state responsible for safeguarding 
a Convention right between private individuals tend to be cases where traditional state 
responsibilities have been transferred to private parties.203  This privatisation of censorship 
is one of the central criticisms of the legitimacy of the IWF, operating directly under threat 
of government legislation, and with government and EU funding. But for the IWF, its 
activities would be the responsibility of the state, and in other countries, it is operated in 
this fashion. 
There is a strong analogy between denying access to a forum such as a shopping mall to 
engage in free expression, and denying access to speak to the public or for the public to 
receive information, through the use of blocking technologies. The leading case is Appleby v. 
United Kingdom,204 a decision of the ECtHR sitting as a Chamber, where the applicants were 
denied permission to set up a petition stand and collect signatures in a town centre, known 
as ‘the Galleries’, which was privately owned by Postel Properties Limited.  In the past other 
associations had been granted permission to set up stands and displays and carry out 
collections, such as the Salvation Army, local school choirs, a Stop Smoking Campaign, the 
Blood Transfusion Service, the Royal British Legion, various photographers and British Gas.  
In determining whether the state has a positive obligation in the circumstances, the ECtHR 
raised the following factors: general interest of community balanced against that of the 
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individual, priorities and resources, burden on authorities.205 The ECtHR rejected that the 
state had a positive obligation in this case because all ways to exercise freedom of 
expression were not banned. They could obtain permission from individual businesses, 
which they did on one occasion; the ban was only on the entranceway and passageways of 
the Galleries. Alternatively they could campaign in the old town, door-to-door or though the 
press, radio or television.206 It commented, 
That provision [article 10], notwithstanding the acknowledged importance of 
freedom of expression, does not bestow any freedom of forum for the exercise 
of that right.  While it is true that demographic, social, economic and 
technological developments are changing the ways in which people move 
around and come into contact with each other, the Court is not persuaded that 
this requires the automatic creation of rights of entry to private property, or 
even, necessarily, to all publicly owned property (government offices and 
ministries, for instance). Where, however, the bar on access to property has the 
effect of preventing any effective exercise of freedom of expression or it can be 
said that the essence of the right has been destroyed, the Court would not 
exclude that a positive obligation could arise for the State to protect the 
enjoyment of the Convention rights by regulating property rights. A corporate 
town where the entire municipality is controlled by a private body might be an 
example (see marsh v Alabama)’.207 
Unlike Appleby, the speech targeted by the IWF is not speech central to the functioning of 
democracy, however that does not mean that speech that furthers democratic culture is not 
swept up in error by the blacklist or issuance of a notice of unlawful content. Once such 
speech is filtered, the censorship is absolute, destroying entirely the essence of the right. 
There are no alternative options available to users or website owners analogous to the 
scenario in Appleby, and in fact, it is this unavailability of alternatives that makes filtering of 
content by private parties so significant and concerning.  If there is no constitutional right at 
issue, the scenario is starkly different. It is then in essence a property issue, and private 
property owners have the unfettered right to effectively eject people from his or her ‘land’, 
and do not have to comply with any test of reasonableness in this regard. 208  Based on ECHR 
jurisprudence, the significant interference with freedom of expression posed by filtering, 
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and the state-like function of the IWF, there is a strong case for positive obligations on the 
state to ensure its human rights compatibility.  The failure of the state to intervene in this 
regard would be a breach of Article 10(2). 
E. Assessment as a Pure-CSR Body 
 
Even if the IWF were found not to be a public authority or the State found to have no duties 
concerning its operation, we are left still with a body whose operations have a significant 
impact on the right to freedom of expression.  The body becomes a form of pure-CSR, and 
as we saw in chapter three, we still draw from Article 10 principles, albeit more loosely, in 
assessing whether the IWF is satisfying its human rights responsibilities.   As we have seen 
the IWF fails to be an Article 10 compliant body, but in relaxing the application of Article 10 
to the IWF as a form of pure-CSR, perhaps its deficiencies are cured by the presence of the 
sort of factors Ruggie highlighted as important in his Framework.  Such factors are also of 
evidentiary value in an assessment of the IWF as a public authority.  Referring back to 
Ruggie’s criteria, we must ask what is the nature of the human rights obligations set out in 
the IWF policies? Are there due diligence processes, namely, is there guidance on human 
rights policies, monitoring and tracking performance, and mitigation strategies? And the 
broader Article 10(2) question is whether the method of governance is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued.  
In order for secret lists of censored content to be human rights compliant, the governance 
structure of the body carrying out this work must be democratic, transparent and 
accountable. Since the IWF’s restructuring in 1999, it has made efforts to make its operation 
more transparent. It provides an Annual Report of its operations, and its hotline, 
information systems and security are independently audited, although it does not say how 
often (citing the most recent as August 2010).  The following information, for example, is 
available on their website: ‘[o]ur policies; minutes of our Board meetings; details of Trustees 
and senior staff; our list of funders; accounts; details of companies that receive the IWF URL 
list for implementing the blocking of indecent images of children; and the Code of Practice 
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governing our relations with industry members’.209  However, the reality is that the IWF’s 
transparency is facile. 
The Annual Reports available online only go back to 2006. They were reviewed to determine 
whether human rights are considered in the Annual Report and how.  There are no human 
rights policies to assess concerning due diligence, such as monitoring and tracking 
performance, and mitigation strategies. Indeed, not one report discusses human rights or 
freedom of expression. Before 2010, they read like public relations pamphlets, with several 
pages devoted to thanking their sponsors and the primary information communicated being 
the number of child abuse URLs blocked, where the content was hosted, and the nature of 
the content.210  There are indications of improvement, however.  The 2010 Annual Report 
incorporates discussions of the ways the IWF is attempting to be more transparent in its 
operations,211 but there is still no mention of human rights. 
In addition, the IWF’s strategic plans for 2008-2011 and 2011-2014212 are focused on such 
things as the effectiveness of the IWF, its public profile, role and influence.  Human rights 
are not mentioned as part of the IWF’s strategic plan. The Annual Reports are audited by 
Peters Elworthy & Moore, with potential to satisfy Ruggie’s criteria, but the audits only 
concern financial matters.213  Equally human rights were not discussed in any of the 
available Board Minutes, which only go back to 2007 on the website.214  The lack of 
consideration of human rights is replicated at a policy level, where human rights are not 
mentioned in any of the IWF policies governing the notice and takedown regime, or the 
blacklisting regime.  The only mention found of human rights was an assurance that the IWF 
has struck the right balance: 
The establishment of the IWF pre-empted the introduction of formal regulatory 
action and legislation of the internet industry in the 1990s and has since worked 
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to ensure the right balances are drawn between freedom of expression and 
protection from criminal internet content.215   
This perhaps reflects the wider view of the IWF that this is simply not a human rights 
matter.  As Peter Robbins, the then chair of the IWF, commented in 2009, ‘I'm against 
censorship. I don't see us as a censorship body. We deal with illegal content and get it taken 
down where we can.’216 However, this is in stark contrast to the earlier undertaking by the 
IWF to be governed under the HRA.217 
The IWF is subject to periodic audits.  It advises that its ‘[h]otline systems, assessment, 
security and processes are inspected by independent auditors such as forensic, academic 
and law enforcement professionals’.218  Its most recent audit is from March 2011 and 
publicly available.  Human rights was not one of the terms of reference for the audit 
team.219  The previous report is from 2008 and the IWF advised that it passed with ‘flying 
colours’, although the report was not published nor was it provided to the magazine Wired 
at its request. 220 The most relevant to an assessment of its human rights compliance are the 
mysterious four reviews of its ‘role, and remit, governance and procedures’.221  It advises 
that these reviews involve consultations with the government, police and ‘other key 
stakeholders.’222 The only one for which there is any information is the review in 1998 by 
KPMG and Denton Hall, which led to sweeping changes in the IWF’s governance in 2000 
mainly an effort for the IWF to be more independent from industry, and it did so by creating 
more transparency with, for example, the publishing of its board minutes and papers. 223 
This author requested a copy of these four audits from the IWF, and was advised that they 
were ‘unable’ to send them to me and that they ‘don’t publish everything.’224  As I was 
unable to review the audits myself, I then sought answers to the following questions in the 
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hopes of determining whether the IWF was audited for human rights compliance in line with 
Ruggie’s criteria: 
My questions are as follows: 
1. Might you advise what criteria form the basis of the audits? To put it another 
way, on what terms is the IWF audited? 
2. Have the criteria been consistent for each audit? If not, how has it changed? 
3. Am I correct that there have been four audits?  
4. In addition, what organisations are carrying out the audits? If you are not in a 
position to name the companies, might you advise what types of organisations 
they are?225 
The IWF advised ‘I’m afraid I don’t have the answers to your questions below’, and then 
directed me to the webpages with information on the IWF’s governance and accountability, 
Board Minutes, and Annual Reports.226 A Freedom of Information Act227 (FOIA) request is 
unavailable against the IWF as it is not a body set up by the Crown, statute, a government 
department, the National Assembly of Wales, or a Minister. The fact that it is a charity does 
not matter, nor that some of the funding is from public resources. Most charities and most 
private companies are not covered under the FOIA.  In addition, it is not listed as covered by 
the FOIA in Schedule I.  It is available to the Secretary of State under section 5 to designate a 
private body a public authority under the Act if it performs public functions or is contracted 
by the government to perform otherwise governmental functions. However, the Secretary 
of State has never done this.228 
The only available complaints procedure to address blocking of content is the IWF’s. The 
ISPA Code of Practice does not ‘adjudicate on the legality or otherwise of material accessible 
on the Internet.’229 If there is a ‘Complaint’ that the ISPA Member has breached the ISPA 
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Code of Practice in a way that puts into issue the legality of the Internet material, then the 
customer or third party lodging the complaint must contact the ‘originator of the material 
directly’.230 In addition, if a person is unsatisfied with how a dispute has been resolved there 
are available alternative dispute resolution schemes approved by Ofcom, such as 
Ombudsman Services Communications and CISAS.231 However, these schemes are only 
available for complaints by the ISPs’ domestic customer and the scope of the schemes do 
not cover complaints concerning Internet content, such as complaints about content that 
has been blocked.232 Thus the only available complaints mechanism is directly with the IWF. 
If a person ‘affected by’233 the inability to access content finds out, he or she can initiate the 
Content Assessment Appeals Process.234  A ‘person’ is defined widely to include ‘a potential 
victim or the victim’s representative, hosting company, publisher or internet consumer who 
believes they are being prevented from accessing legal content’.235  Under this process, the 
initial complaint is made, which might include ‘details regarding your complaint or reasons 
for appealing a content assessment by the IWF.’236  This complaint is treated as an appeal of 
the initial decision to issue a notice to remove the content or blacklist the content, even 
though you were never involved in or even notified of the initial decision. The appeals 
process works in a similar manner.  Once the complaint is made, this is treated as your 
representations on appeal, even though, again, you are not included in the actual process: 
An IWF Director is made aware of the appeal and a record is created. 
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The content is re-assessed (This will be undertaken by a suitably trained IWF 
Manager not involved in the original assessment decision). 
If the original assessment decision is reversed and the appeal is upheld the 
appellant is informed and appropriate remedial action is taken i.e. notice to 
takedown is repealed or URL is removed from the IWF URL List. 
If the original assessment decision is not reversed and the appellant wishes to 
continue their appeal then the content is referred to the relevant lead police 
agency for assessment. 
If the URL is likely to or has triggered a significant risk (*3)  then the URL will be 
temporarily removed from the IWF URL List. 
The police agency’s decision will be communicated to an IWF Director who will 
act in accordance with the agency’s assessment. The agency’s decision is final. 
The appellant is informed. 
If the original assessment decision by IWF is reversed and the appeal is upheld 
appropriate remedial action is taken i.e. notice to takedown is repealed or URL is 
removed from the IWF URL List. 
The Board will be informed whenever an assessment decision is reversed 
following a referral to the relevant police agency. (It is not possible for the Board 
to make a decision relating to assessment of images as to do so would require 
Board members to view content that they are not trained to assess).237 
The appeals process had an opportunity to be test-run by Wikipedia when the Scorpions 
page was blocked in 2008, revealing the above inadequacies. The IWF described this process 
as follows: 
Following representations from Wikipedia the IWF invoked its Appeals 
Procedure.  This entails a review of the original decision with law enforcement 
officers.  They confirmed the original assessment and this information was 
conveyed to Wikipedia. Due to the public interest in this matter our Board 
closely monitored the situation and, once the appeals process was complete, 
they convened to consider the contextual issues involved in this specific case.  
IWF’s overriding objective is to minimize the availability of indecent images of 
children on the internet, however, on this occasion our efforts had the opposite 
effect so the Board decided that the webpage should be removed from the URL 
list.238   
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While this description appears to give due consideration to the complaint, the reality of how 
this process is experienced by a complainant is quite different.  In particular, excepting the 
initial complaint, the complainant takes no part in what is effectively an adjudicative 
process. The effect of this is to make the complaints procedure inaccessible, unpredictable, 
and arguably illegitimate,239 as can be seen in the starkly different terms used by 
Wikipedia’s counsel to describe the experience:  
When we first protested the block, their response was, ‘We’ve now conducted 
an appeals process on your behalf and you’ve lost the appeal.’ When I asked 
who exactly represented the Wikimedia Foundation’s side in that appeals 
process, they were silent. It was only after the fact of their blacklist and its effect 
on UK citizens were publicised that the IWF appears to have felt compelled to 
relent.240 
 
Thus a secret blacklist of censored speech is combined with secret audits, under secret 
terms, subject to a secret appeals process, and insulated from a FOIA request, and we are to 
simply rely on assurances by the IWF that they balance freedom of expression properly 
against protection from criminal content.  In the face of a significant interference with the 
right to free expression, where the very access to the speech is blocked, there is startlingly 
little information available on the process by which the interference occurs. To describe 
such a process as a disproportionate interference with freedom of expression is an 
understatement, because human rights are not built into any elements of the IWF’s 
governance framework. An analysis pursuant to John Ruggie’s criteria that a company 
should have a process of due diligence for human rights concerns, including monitoring and 
tracking of performance, the presence of mitigation strategies, and characteristics of 
legitimacy, accessibility, predictability, equitability, rights-compatibility, and transparency in 
its remedial structure, reveals that none of this is present in the IWF’s governance 
framework. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The goals of the IWF to tackle criminal content, in particular, child sexual abuse images, is 
not only laudable, but a task of critical importance.  And we can only be thankful for the IWF 
employees willing to work with such images on a daily basis to protect the public.  However, 
their power is vast, going to the essence of the right of freedom of expression, and thus 
brings with it great responsibility.  As a public authority, this involves ensuring that its 
governance structure complies with basic human rights principles requiring it has a legal 
basis, a legitimate aim and is carried out proportionately. As we saw, the IWF utterly fails as 
a human rights compliant regulatory instrument.  If this is not a failure of the IWF as a public 
authority, it is a failure of the state.   
Even as a voluntary industry framework, the current governance structure of the IWF fails to 
sufficiently protect and respect freedom of expression online, and as a macro-gatekeeper 
the IWF currently operates as a hindrance to the Internet’s potential as a facilitative force in 
democratic culture.  The question is whether the IWF and wider ISP industry can build 
human rights safeguards into its governance framework in a manner that complies with 
human rights principles while still retaining its self-regulatory nature.  The difficulty with the 
latter is that it relies on faith that industry will not only recognise, but undertake such 
responsibilities in a substantive rather than facile manner, which it has not done so far, and 
there are doubts whether such corporate responsibility is enough to create the uniformity 
and structure needed.  
The case study in the following chapter complements the findings here.  It is approached 
with more awareness of the weaknesses of CSR frameworks in moving us forward with a 
democratic vision for the Internet.  We are also now more aware of the role CSR plays in 
filling the gap between human rights law directed at the relationship between the state and 
the public, and the experience of human rights online being between private IIGs and the 
public.  We have also seen that voluntary frameworks can develop over time into something 
more formalised which might eventually transform the body into a hybrid public authority 
directly bound by the HRA.  There are risks associated with this. The act of strengthening the 
administrative structure risks dissuading companies or industries from addressing their free 
speech impact fearful of incurring further liability.  The significance of this case study’s 
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findings to the viability of CSR to address digital human rights matters will be discussed in 
chapter six.  It is there that I will propose an alternative corporate governance model that 
seeks to mend the deficiencies identified in this case study and the one that follows, and 
discharge the duty of the state to protect freedom of expression.  With this knowledge we 
can proceed to examine the role of search engines in impacting freedom of expression, 
which is altogether more subtle and indirect than the blunt instrument of filtering by ISPs.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
INDIRECT MECHANISMS OF 
INFORMATION CONTROL: SEARCH 
ENGINES 
This chapter examines a macro-Internet IIG with a far more subtle and indirect impact on 
democratic culture than filtering by ISPs.  The indirect nature of search engines impact on 
speech, however, does not equate to weakened impact.  It is simply less visible.  Search 
engines, it will be shown, are critical gatekeepers of participation in discourse online. The 
results that are returned when a user inputs a search query, and the order of results and 
what is included and discarded on such results channel the nature and extent of democratic 
participation online.   
This investigation brings to light issues surrounding the viability of CSR as a form of 
governance for digital human rights altogether different to the last chapter. There are few 
legal and normative frameworks that regulate search engines, and CSR instruments have 
not developed to fill the gap.  The question is why not. In this case study a tension is 
revealed between the legal and CSR models of human rights that has stunted the 
development of CSR in this area. The source of conflict is in defining what speech and whose 
speech we are talking about when attempting to craft search engine responsibilities for 
freedom of expression.  As a result of this conflict, the subject matter of the human rights 
responsibilities of search engines has thus far been circular, never moving beyond a broader 
discussion of free speech principles to how such principles are operationalised.  Thus in 
examining the human rights compliance of search engine governance structures, this 
chapter also seeks to move the subject matter forward to enable operationalisation of free 
speech principles in a governance framework. To that end it will put forward the argument 
that the free speech right engaged by search engines is that of the right to accessibility of 
information.   
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While this case study examines the speech significance of search engines in general, through 
examples it will focus on one particular search provider, Google. Google holds over 90% of 
the search market in the United Kingdom, a statistic replicated across Europe.1  While 
Google’s market share is less in the US, sitting at 67.3%, it is still the clear market leader.2  
Google’s global market share for search is 82.80%.3  Thus an examination of search engines 
naturally leads one to focus on Google.  In addition, search providers such as Google have 
diversified extensively from their initial provision of search services to include, for example, 
maps services (Google Maps), health services (Google Health), video sharing (YouTube), 
photo sharing (Picasa), blog hosting (Blogger), operating systems (Android), and applications 
such as email (Gmail), Docs and Spreadsheets.  While their business is diverse, the focus in 
what follows is on their core business of the provision of search services, namely rankings, 
as it emerges as a particularly key aspect to participation in expression online.   
Every search engine functions differently, but modern search engines, excluding simple 
directories, generally work as follows. A computer robot called a ‘spider’ or ‘bot’ crawls the 
web for content in the form of key words or links, which are then indexed and made 
searchable by users.4 The bot will return to the site regularly to look for changes. While the 
algorithms are protected as trade secrets, certain basic functions are known about search 
providers algorithms such as Google. Google uses the famous PageRank approach, where a 
webpage’s importance is based on its popularity in the form of votes. These votes are the 
number of sites linking to it,5 and as will be discussed below, can be susceptible to 
manipulation.  In addition to PageRank, Google uses over 200 other ‘signals’, which it does 
not elaborate on. This algorithm, Google reports, is updated weekly.6  Since 2007, Google 
offers Universal Search, which returns expanded results to users to include images, videos, 
news and books.7 
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I. SEARCH ENGINES AND DEMOCRACY 
 
Estimates on the number of websites on the Internet vary widely depending on the factors 
taken into account.  In 2008, Google announced it had indexed 1 trillion unique URLs.8  A 
more conservative estimate is that there are approximately 348 million websites available 
on the Internet and 2 billion users.9 Regardless of the figure (both I would say are quite 
extraordinary), these statistics generally reflect the visible Web, being the Internet that has 
been indexed by search engines. Beyond the Internet world framed by search engines is 
what has been called the Deep Web, the unindexed and unexplored terrain of the 
Internet.10  Its size is unknown, though it was estimated by Michael Bergman in 2001 to be 
400-550 times bigger than the normal web,11 leading him to comment that searching on the 
Internet is like ‘dragging a net across the surface of the ocean.’12   Search engines in this 
environment become key gatekeepers drawing sites from the dark web to human attention 
by adding them to their rankings.  As James Grimmelmann aptly summarises, ‘[t]he reason 
we think of the Internet not as a chaotic wasteland, but as a vibrant, accessible place, is that 
some very smart people have done an exceedingly good job of organizing it.’13  Consider the 
amount of information Google processes. For May 2010 alone, there were 9.2 billion U.S. 
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Webs searches, 6 billion of which were conducted at Google.14 With such information, 
Google is able to provide crisis response services for humanitarian and natural disasters, 
including, for example, the person finder service for tsunami struck Japan discussed in 
chapter three. 15   Recently, the Bank of England used Internet search data to help identify 
economic trends.16 
Faced with billions of pages of information, search engines are our guides to effective 
navigation of the Web.  They sort through the clutter and, as Jennifer Chandler describes 
them, act as ‘selection intermediaries’,  by finding information and making an assessment of 
what is most useful for the reader.17  Google recognises its key role in this process stating, 
‘[t]he Internet…makes information available. Google makes information accessible.’18  
Search engines thus emerge as critical chokepoints on the Internet acting as the link 
between readers and information.  In so doing, they structure participation in democratic 
culture. They decide the information that gets on the list and the information that does not.  
They decide the visibility of the information by ranking some of this information higher than 
others.  Yet their role is more complex and meaningful than equating it with a simple index 
akin to a telephone book.  For example, users have been overtly encouraged to rely on 
Google to assess the value of websites through the PageRank toolbar, which ranks the 
importance of websites on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 being the highest.  The result is that 
search engines create categories for consumption, thereby shaping public opinion and the 
direction of democratic discourse: 
They structure categories in response to users’ queries, and thereby have the 
capacity of creating categorise for grasping the world.  By defining which 
information becomes available for each query, search engines may shape 
positions, concepts and ideas.19 
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This is magnified by how users use search engines. First, users tend to rely on search engines 
to navigate the Internet. Researchers in Germany found that 75% of German users relied on 
search engines as their primary vehicle for finding information the Internet.20 Second, users 
tend to expect that search results will be reliable and relevant.21 Third, most users do not 
visit beyond the first or second page of search results.  One study found that 80.6 per cent 
of users reviewed the first page of search results, while the figure dropped to 13.6 per cent 
of users for the second page of results.22 Even more startling, on that first page of search 
results, click-through data shows that 72% of users click on the first results, dropping to a 
mere 13% for second results and 8% for third results.23  One comment with regard to earlier 
research is particularly apposite, ‘to be seen is not only to be indexed, but to be highly 
ranked in the search results.’24  In light of the above data, it is arguable that this can now be 
pushed even further: that to exist on the Internet is to be ranked number one on search 
results. 
The importance of search engines to participation in democratic culture is further 
pronounced when taking into account the importance of access to the Internet in our daily 
lives as set out in chapter one.25  Search engines, it can be concluded, make any meaningful 
engagement online possible.  Since we use the Internet for various activities such as work, 
shopping, education, entertainment, communication, and increasingly to work through 
major life issues, search engines become intertwined with participation in democratic life 
both on and off the Internet.26  They become facilitators of this participation.   As Melody 
states, ‘access to information and communication would appear to be the most essential 
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public utility.’27 This becomes increasingly so as mobile phones take on pc-like capabilities, 
facilitating the infiltration of the Internet into the most minute aspect of our days, from 
finding directions, to exploring restaurant choices, shops, opening times, and all other uses 
of the Internet transposed to mobility.28  Through mobile phones the physical and virtual 
become inextricably linked.29  
There are two distinct issues of freedom of expression and search that arise concerning the 
role of search in facilitating democracy. First, there is the significance of search engines as a 
structure or forum for speech in its own right, and second, there are the speech issues that 
arise concerning how that forum is then managed.  With regard to the first, the structure of 
the search engine can have political and discursive significance itself and this is usually 
determined by code. For example, since September 2010, Google automatically suggests 
terms to complete your search query, and if you are signed into a Google account this 
automated function personalises it to your search history.30  Thus if one inputs ‘lse’, 
suggested completions are functional, suggesting completions of your query with the terms 
‘for you’, ‘library’, ‘email’ and ‘moodle’.   
These completions can have political and social significance.  A search for the term ‘Tories’ 
suggests completion of the search query with ‘are evil’.  When ‘Stephen Fry’ is searched, as 
at November 2010, one of the suggested completions for the search query was ‘gay’. Google 
has instituted a policy of vetting this automated completion function,31 and an updated 
search of Stephen Fry in February 2011 returned nothing of significance.  During the peak of 
the superinjunctions drama in the UK and the revelation that footballer Ryan Giggs was one 
of parties who sought this type of injunction, a search of his name suggested completion 
terms of ‘Imogen’, ‘affair’, ‘super injunction’ and ‘wife’.32  In addition, Google recently 
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decided that torrent-related terms such as ‘BitTorrent’ and  ‘torrent’ are unavailable as 
autocomplete terms.33  Is the search engine simply a private party’s statement of opinion to 
which it can censor and shape at will? As will be shown, this is what Google has successfully 
argued thus far.34 Or are there obligations as to arbitrariness and openness and even child 
protection that come into play? Regardless, the experience of using and running a search 
engine begins to reflect all of the complexities, emotions and limitations one is confronted 
with in any system of freedom of expression in the physical world.  
The importance of the search forum to freedom of expression creates tension between 
search providers, content providers and users, and ultimately puts pressure on the 
governance structure of search engines as they are forced to administer peoples’ free 
speech rights in this forum.  Often people or businesses ranked low on search engines or not 
ranked at all want to be highly ranked, while people or businesses with unfavourable 
information ranked highly on search indices want the information to be buried lower on 
search results or off the indices entirely.   What Google decides to do in the face of such 
conflicts largely determines the expressive opportunities for people online, yet the legal 
legitimacy of the various behaviours, including Google’s responses, is currently unclear in 
the law. We can see this dilemma played out in four scenarios. 
First, while businesses often purchase sponsored links which run alongside or at the top of 
the search results, businesses quite commonly now attempt to play the system by 
capitalising on how Google’s search algorithm works to push their business up the rankings, 
or competitors down the rankings.  Known as search engine optimisation (SEO), it 
manipulates the way PageRank works by creating artificial votes for your website: link farms 
are created, which are sites linking one site to the other to artificially boost the importance 
of a website in the eyes of the Googlebot thereby securing a higher spot on Google’s search 
results.  What should Google do in response? Delete such SEO websites from its index? 
Manipulate the rankings to counteract the link farms?  Google has addressed the issue 
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through its algorithm,35 and more recently by offering encrypted search (which is now the 
default when logged-in with Google).36  The difficulty is drawing the line between 
maintaining the integrity of the search results and punitive manipulations that are more 
properly acts of censorship. 
Second, Google’s popularity approach to search rankings has been manipulated for political 
purposes known as Google bombing.  The first such Google bomb was committed by Adam 
Mathes linking the term ‘talentless hack’ to his friend’s website.  The most famous Google 
bomb, however, was when the search term ‘miserable failure’ returned George Bush’s 
official White House page.  Not all Google bombs are humorous and trivial.  The search term 
‘Jew’ returned an anti-Semitic site www.jewwatch.com at the top of the search results. In 
such a scenario, what can or should Google do? Should Google move such a result down 
further in the rankings or do nothing? Should it rely on counter-bombs to sort the problem 
out? In this particular case, Google has taken an approach that has depended on domestic 
law.  In the UK, one finds a link at the top of search results titled ‘Offensive Search Results’ 
with an explanation by Google condemning the site, but not removing it from the search 
results.37  In Germany, however, www.jewwatch.com was removed entirely from Google 
Germany’s search results with a statement at the bottom of the search page indicating that 
a site was removed for legal reasons.38   
Third, as mentioned above, many individuals and businesses wish to push unfavourable 
information about themselves down or entirely off the rankings.  Sometimes it is simply 
scurrilous information about themselves, such as subjects of www.dontdatehimgirl.com.  At 
other times it is arguably defamatory information,39 or involves some information being 
highly ranked but not other information, thereby creating a misleading story.  For example, 
a name search might reveal a criminal charge against a person but not the subsequent 
dismissal of charges, or a complaint against a company might be highly ranked but not the 
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dismissal of the complaint, creating what Viktor Mayer-Schonberger calls an environment of 
perfect remembering – it is this which has underpinned his advocacy of a revival of 
forgetting.40  Some states such as Italy have enacted rights to be forgotten,41 and at a 
European level such a right is currently being investigated by the European Commission as 
part of its data protection reform.42 This reflects the narrative force of search results. They 
tell a story about its subject, and the question is the extent to which individuals and 
businesses can control this narrative, as well as Google’s discretionary rights to respond. 
Last, to what extent is Google legally allowed to manipulate search results to favour its 
services over competitors in search results, because such an act favours its own speech over 
the speech of others?  Is Google allowed to penalise sites by effectively removing them from 
algorithmic consideration? The European Commission is investigating a complaint that 
Google’s Universal Search is anti-competitive because it favours Google’s services over its 
competitors.43 
The above illustrate that not only do search engines engage free speech issues concerning 
accessibility of information online, but that they also place the providers of the search 
services squarely at the centre of vexing legal questions concerning their rights and 
obligations in managing this ‘critical pathway of communication’.44  How the free speech 
impact of search engines would be treated under jurisprudence of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) will be examined later in this chapter.  The issues come down to 
characterisation: are search results simply Google’s marketing tool – Google’s private forum 
for speech? Or are search engines critical communication tools for making any sensible use 
of the Internet? The struggle to address this question has stymied the potential 
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development of CSR to govern speech concerns and search engines, a point that we now 
explore further by reference to the regulatory and governance regime in the UK, and more 
broadly, in Europe.  
II. GOVERNANCE OF SEARCH 
 
At the moment, search engines are effectively ‘lost in law’.45  This is partly due to the 
hybridity of search, making it difficult to apply current law to it. It is also partly due to the 
light-touch regulatory approach that has been taken in western democracies to Internet 
governance.46   The natural comparison for search engines is mass media. Search engines as 
gatekeepers facilitate public discourse much the way that the media shapes our 
understanding of the world, but they are not creators of the content, and at least in terms 
of rankings, they are not publishers per se. Equally, however, the role of search engines is 
functional, akin to transport services in creating the algorithms that ‘route’ information.47  
Thus they are both powerful forces in shaping the information we consume and a logistically 
necessary infrastructure for Internet navigation.  The result, as Nico van Eijk states, is that 
search engines fall outside most laws: 
The limited legal attention devoted to search engines is, I believe, partly the 
result of the fact that the search engine is neither one thing nor the other: it 
concerns issues that are considered to fall within telecommunications law and 
partly – if not very much so – issues to do with content.  Partly because of this, 
there is a legal vacuum: the search engine does not have a place in law.48 
As a result of this hybridity, current media law largely does not apply to search engines as 
they were not drafted with search in mind.49 The AudioVisual Media Services Directive,50 for 
example, is aimed at regulating television broadcasting services.  The application of the 
Electronic Commerce Directive (E-Commerce Directive), in particular the limitation of 
liability provisions in Articles 12-14 for information society services (ISS) which act as mere 
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conduits, cache or host content, is uncertain.  Relevant here, and discussed in detail in the 
last chapter, is Article 14, which states that hosts of unlawful content are not liable as long 
as they did not know, nor was it apparent, that the content was unlawful, and once they 
obtained such knowledge, acted expeditiously to remove or disable access to the content.51  
In the context of search engines, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has held that Google is 
an ISS to whom the limitation of liability provisions might then apply.52  In order to come 
within the scope of the Article 14 exemption as a host ISS, the ECJ stated that the activity 
would have to be ‘of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature’53 lacking in knowledge 
or control of the content.  In that case concerning whether Google’s sale of trademarked 
Adwords was illegal,54 the ECJ held Google was not an ISS within the definition of the Article 
14 host provisions.   
Note, also the obiter comments of  Justice Eady in Metropolitan International Schools v. 
Designtechnica Corporation and Others55 that Google did not qualify as a mere conduit, 
cache or host of content.  However, other European states have specifically provided that 
search providers are covered by the Directive.56  Regardless, the E-Commerce Directive is of 
limited use in determining issues of ranking, except to the extent that if it can be found that 
Google in a particular instance had knowledge or exercised control, it might remove it from 
the ambit of the Directive’s limitation of liability.   The Council of Europe is joining the fray 
with soft law guidelines, in draft form at the moment, concerning search engines and social 
networking sites, focusing on transparency, conditions in terms of service, freedom of 
expression and privacy, and user data control.57   
As it stands at present therefore there are no specific laws that govern search engines.  We 
may of course extend traditional law to the case of search engines, with actions in tort, 
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contract, competition law or trusts.  A body of cases is steadily growing, particularly out of 
the United States, with most actions against Google being largely unsuccessful.58  Discussion 
of the free speech issues raised by a search provider such as Google, for example, have been 
cut short by the finding of District Court Judge in Search King v. Google that search engine 
rankings are protected as the search provider’s speech effectively removing search from 
free speech scrutiny.59  The implications of this case will be discussed in more detail later in 
the chapter. 
Equally, human rights law does not directly apply to search providers such as Google.  
Google is not a public authority under the Human Rights Act (HRA).60 It is a private, for-
profit company without any of the features that might drive it to the murky arena of hybrid 
public authority, such as public funding, public function or special statutory powers.61 
Equally, a search provider such as Google is not subject to judicial review for much the same 
reason: Google cannot be said to be a public body or carrying out a public function.  If 
human rights law can be found to apply it is indirectly62 and through analogy to the media 
and their critical role in democratic discourse: we examine this particular possibility more 
closely later in the chapter.  Given the otherwise light-touch approach to regulation of the 
Internet in the UK and the rest of Europe, search providers have been largely left alone to 
develop their own governance framework, which many have.  
This is a situation therefore where there are no direct human rights laws engaged. Under 
Figure 7 of chapter three, current governance of search engines is best categorised as a 
form of pure-CSR.  This directly engages Ruggie’s Framework as relevant to a determination 
of their human rights compliance.  Here human rights principles are a way to operationalise 
a commitment to human rights rather than legal obligation.  As we saw, however, such 
human rights principles grow out of traditional ECHR jurisprudence and therefore a 
                                                          
58
 See discussion of case law in the following section.  One can of course pursue specific claims in competition 
law, copyright, trademark, breach of contract, etc., but these are not specific regulatory frameworks. 
59
 Search King n. 34. 
60
 See last chapter for discussion of public authority.  
61
 See YL v. Birmingham City Council [2008] 1 AC 95. See discussion also in R. Clayton and H. Tomlinson, 2
nd
 
edn, vol. 1 The Law of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2009), chapter five, particularly starting at 5.17 
concerning hybrid public authorities. Note that search engines do not engage in activities that are public in 
their function, though they are of public interest, as argued in my earlier work n. 24. 
62
 See for example Campbell v. MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 where the plaintiff grounded the claim in breach of 
confidence and then once before the courts argued infringement of article 8 because the court is a public 
authority.  See more recently Author of a Blog v. Times Newspapers Limited [2009] EWHC 1358 (QB).  
175 
 
consideration of the ECHR is necessary to understand what a commitment to human rights 
entails and to identify the limits of the legal model.  We are left with two questions in 
analysing this.  First, even if the operation of search engines complies with Ruggie-type 
factors, is it enough to satisfy the human rights commitment needed?  Second, if it is not 
enough and knowing there are no direct HRA duties, is the state’s duty engaged (not 
necessarily as a matter of law) to protect freedom of speech through search engines?  
With this in mind we now look more closely at Google’s governance framework to see 
whether it has any of the elements of Ruggie’s criteria, namely the presence of due 
diligence processes, such as monitoring and tracking of performance, mitigation strategies 
and remedial structures.  Search providers are largely governed through their Terms of 
Service (ToS). Such provisions do not operate in a legal vacuum, of course, and are subject 
to the wider law.  For example, there are questions about whether any limitation of liability 
in a ToS are enforceable given the authority of Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Limited63 that 
there must be communication of these terms before the contract is concluded.  Most of the 
public uses search engines without ever having seen the ToS.  In addition, the provisions 
might be in breach of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UTCCR).64  
The UTCCR applies to contracts that have not been individually negotiated to protect 
weaker parties (with little or no bargaining power) from the enforceability of unfair terms.65  
Such legal issues raise interesting questions about the legal enforceability of these terms, 
but we are concerned here with the significance of these provisions through a human rights 
lens.  Further, without an understanding of the human rights aspects of these ToS, then it is 
difficult to identify a harm or imbalance against which these consumer protection provisions 
can be applied.    
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A. Google’s Corporate Governance Framework 
 
Under cl. 1.1 of Google’s ToS, the ToS applies to any of Google’s services, including its 
products, software, services and websites.  This wide language indicates that its search 
engine, being its primary service, is covered by the ToS.  With regard to management of 
search results, Google does not specifically address the issue in the ToS, but rather couches 
its legal rights and responsibilities in sweeping terms as regards generalised matter. Thus in 
cl. 4.3, Google retains sole discretion to stop providing its Services or features of its Services 
without prior notice to the customer.  Does this include the links on its search results as 
features, thereby granting Google sole discretion to remove links at will? In this regard the 
ToS are unclear, as while Google’s search engine would clearly be covered by the ToS, it is 
not clear that the results are. Regardless, Google grants itself unlimited discretion to remove 
‘Content’ from its Services: 
8.3 Google reserves the right (but shall have no obligation)  to pre-screen, 
review, flag, filter, modify, refuse or remove any or all Content from any Service. 
For some of the Services, Google may provide tools to filter out explicit sexual 
content.  These tools include the SafeSearch preference settings (see 
http://www.google.co.uk/help/customize.html#safe). In addition, there are 
commercially available services and software to limit access to material that you 
may find objectionable.66 
The content to which it refers is defined in s. 8.1 as ‘all information (such as data files, 
written text, computer software, music, audio files or other sounds, photographs, videos or 
other images) which you may have access to as part of, or through your use of, the 
Services.’67 The implication of these provisions is that Google can remove content from its 
search service at will.  Of course, there are many things that might prevent Google from 
doing so, illustrating the various regulatory modalities at work.  For example, the risk of 
smeared reputation if the public finds out about selective removal of content might lead to 
defections to competitors such as Bing and Yahoo!, thus a market based response arguably 
balances out these heavy-handed Terms of Service.  However, even in the face of 
investigation by the European Commission for anti-competitive behaviour and the tarnish to 
its reputation this might cause, Google continues to dominate the search market in Europe.   
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There is the added problem that we simply do not know what is being removed from search 
results.  Google’s search algorithm is protected as a trade secret and on a day-to-day basis it 
does not reveal the reasons for manual manipulation of rankings.  While protection of the 
algorithm is necessary for this business model and to ward off SEO (in turn protecting the 
naturalness of search rankings), it forces the user to have faith that what is happening 
behind the scenes is fair, proportionate and non-discriminatory.  In addition there is no 
remedial mechanism within the company or through industry through which to address 
issues of rankings.  Combined with onerous provisions in the ToS, on paper at least, Google 
has the right to do virtually anything with any information accessed through its search 
engine.  
The ToS only serve to exempt Google from liability.  Looking at further provisions in the ToS, 
under cl. 14.1, Google advises that its services are provided ‘as is’. This allows Google to 
avoid liability for any failures to deliver its services, such as search reliability. It further 
drives this home in the second key aspect, under cl. 14.2(a), where it states quite broadly 
that Google does not represent or warrant that ‘your use of the Services will meet your 
requirements’.68  It then details more specifically the types of things Google does not 
represent or warrant about: services won’t be uninterrupted, timely, secure or free from 
error, nor will information obtained necessarily be accurate or reliable (thus no legal 
responsibility for accurate search results), nor for defects in operation or functionality (cl. 
14.2(b)-(d)). 
Google further insulates itself in its Limitation of Liability in cl. 15 stating that it is not liable 
for ‘any indirect or consequential losses which may be incurred by you. This shall include 
any loss of profit (whether incurred directly or indirectly), any loss of goodwill or business 
reputation, or any loss of data suffered by you’.69 (cl. 15.2(A))  This is complicated by cl. 
15.2(b)(ii) which states that Google is not responsible for any loss or damage suffered by 
you as a result of ‘any changes which Google may make to the Services, or for any 
permanent or temporary cessation in the provision of the Services (or any features within 
the Services)’.70  A company falling off the ranking, for example, might be a side effect of 
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changes to search algorithm, and this provision would exclude Google for liability for this.  
This occurred in October 2010, where certain high profile sites such as www.cnn.com were 
not listed for several days.71  Absent from this is any mention of when Google specifically 
manipulates rankings, unless, and this is indeed arguable on the part of Google, it is included 
under the generalised limitation of liability for ‘any changes which Google may make to the 
Services’.  
Google addresses its approach to removal of content from search results not in the ToS, but 
on its blog http://googleblog.blogspot.com.72  While not binding on the company the way 
that terms of service would be, the statement can be evidentiary support in an action in tort 
or for breach of contract. The focus is mainly on how it handles government requests that 
breach international human rights principles, much like the GNI, but it also explains Google’s 
approach to its own services. With regard to search, its policy is to remove ‘content from 
search globally in narrow circumstances, like child pornography, certain links to copyrighted 
material, spam, malware and results that contain sensitive personal information like credit 
card numbers. Specifically, we do not engage in political censorship.’73  With regard to 
removal of content in Europe, it states, 
Some democratically-elected governments in Europe and elsewhere do have 
national laws that prohibit certain types of content. Our policy is to comply with 
the laws of these democratic governments -- for example, those that make pro-
Nazi material illegal in Germany and France -- and remove search results from 
only our local search engine (for example, www.google.de in Germany). We also 
comply with youth protection laws in countries like Germany by removing links 
to certain material that is deemed inappropriate for children or by enabling Safe 
Search by default, as we do in Korea. Whenever we do remove content, we 
display a message for our users that X number of results have been removed to 
comply with local law and we also report those removals to chillingeffects.org, a 
project run by the Berkman Center for Internet and Society, which tracks online 
restrictions on speech.74 
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What does it mean if you dispute information on Google’s search results?  If you have 
personal information that you do not want indexed, you can contact the website owner 
directly to remove the offending page, and have the owner contact Google to tell them not 
to crawl or index that page, or remove the cached copy. If you are unhappy with a drop in 
rankings, there are not many options available.  There is no complaints mechanism per se 
available through Google.  You can sue, but as the cases discussed below show, courts are 
struggling when trying to assess the application of traditional law to search engines, and 
such lawsuits take a long time at significant expense.  Or you can do nothing.  
As we have seen, Google fails to account for human rights in its internal governance thus 
does not engage with any of the criteria set out in Ruggie’s Framework, but is its governance 
supported by a commitment to any general or industry CSR frameworks?  Google has not 
signed on to international CSR frameworks such as the UN Global Compact.  There is a code 
of conduct through the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC),75 but Google is not a 
member, nor, as discussed in chapter three, does the code address free speech issues.  
Google is, however, a founding member of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), but the GNI 
has limited impact on regulation of search rankings.    
The GNI has been discussed in more detail in chapter three.  It is a corporate responsibility 
framework for ICTs concerning freedom of expression and privacy, so seems at first blush to 
be ideal to address the sorts of free speech dilemmas posed by search engine rankings as 
identified above.  However, the GNI is not geared to this, rather it is oriented toward helping 
companies in guiding their conduct in countries where local laws conflict with international 
human rights principles.76  In its Principles, it states ‘[p]articipating companies will respect 
and protect the freedom of expression of their users by seeking to avoid or minimize the 
impact of government restrictions on freedom of expression…’77 This focus on conduct in 
the face of government demands can be seen as well in the Implementation Guidelines.78  
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The GNI states that it applies not just to conduct in foreign countries, but applies equally at 
home, but it is hard to see any applicability of its provisions in the context examined here.   
The applicability of the GNI to search rankings is further diminished by the lack of detail in 
the GNI concerning the scope of freedom of expression as it relates to what member 
businesses do. Neither the GNI’s Implementation Guidelines, the Governance, 
Accountability and Learning Framework nor the Governance Charter identify what exactly 
are business activities that impact freedom of expression. While such a broad-strokes 
approach is to an extent appropriate to allow for it to develop as a living, breathing 
instrument and respond to the changing landscape of ICT business, it becomes problematic 
when examining a scenario at the borders of free speech engagement such as search engine 
rankings.   
For example, the GNI Implementation Guidelines state that companies should ‘employ 
human rights impact assessments to identify circumstances when freedom of expression 
and privacy may be jeopardized or advanced, and develop appropriate mitigation 
strategies’.79   It is quite easy for search engines to state that search results are simply not a 
human rights matter, that it is a proprietary algorithm protected as a trade secret and an 
expression of opinion of the search provider.  Google has stated just this in the instances 
where it has been sued by content providers who believe their drop in rankings has been 
illegitimate.80  
Thus even if the GNI had been geared toward conduct closer to home, it would not apply to 
search rankings, and the GNI therefore becomes illustrative of the risks of CSR frameworks 
as all-encompassing frameworks to address human rights issues.  The way the GNI is 
structured is broad in much the same way that the UN Global Compact is broad.  This is 
compounded by the voluntary nature of the regime and the fact that it is industry-led (even 
if multiple stakeholders participate), with the result that businesses simply do not have to 
address human rights issues they wish to avoid. If they are forced to, they can simply refuse 
to join, citing whatever public relations statement suits the purpose best, or quit, using 
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much the same rhetoric.81  For example, Facebook, in a letter to The Honourable Richard J. 
Durbin, the Chairman of the US Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law, stated that 
one of the reasons it did not join the GNI was that Facebook is a resource-strained start-
up.82  It assured, however, that it admires the GNI and that it has ‘embodied’ its principles in 
its governance documents.83  Twitter, in its letter to Durbin stated it simply had not had the 
time to evaluate GNI, and that ‘it is our sense that GNI’s draft policies, processes and fees 
are better suited to bigger companies who have actual operations in sensitive regions.’84 
Despite these drawbacks, the very fact that Google is a founding member of such a CSR 
initiative is promising.  It highlights that Google, and indeed other search engines85, have 
turned their attention to their impact on freedom of expression and have worked to create 
a CSR framework to address this impact.  The absence of search engine rankings from its 
scope is as significant as would have been an analysis of its provisions if it had applied.  The 
GNI is a work in progress, and so perhaps search rankings will be addressed one day in its 
application.  At present, however,  governance of search rankings is limited to Google’s 
contractual Terms of Service (ToS).  
From a human rights perspective, we have a company whose activities significantly impact 
on participation in democratic culture, to whom human rights laws do not directly apply, 
and for whom no corporate responsibility frameworks provide guidance.  It is governed by 
ToS that may or may not breach consumer protection or contract laws, and operates with 
relatively little transparency.  The body does not have any human rights considerations built 
into the ToS that can be said to monitor what it does. The only thing the ToS do is remove 
search rankings from human rights scrutiny.  Besides the GNI, which doesn’t apply, there is 
no governance structure akin to criteria proposed by Ruggie, to examine.  There are no 
processes of due diligence or mitigation strategies built into how it is governed through the 
ToS and no avenue for remediation. 
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What does this mean then for the capacity of CSR to be the regime for governance of search 
engines concerning freedom of expression.  The examination of the above sets out that 
current governance fails to be a human rights compliant regulatory structure.  Quite simply, 
there is no structure.  The question is why that is, because this answers the question of the 
potentiality of CSR for governance of this gatekeeper.  In the case of Google, the hurdle to 
developing CSR here might be in part the views of Google on what it is.  Google’s CSR 
webpage talks about CSR as a form of philanthropy stating, ‘[s]ince its founding, Google has 
been firmly committed to active philanthropy’86 citing in support its work concerning China, 
earthquake relief and grants it awarded. 87 It also has its non-profit project www.google.org, 
discussed earlier, which does such things as track flu trends. This view of CSR is relatively 
archaic, reflecting the approaches of business executives in the 18th and 19th centuries, 
discussed in chapter three, who treated it as a form of charity. To move forward there is a 
need here to separate CSR from philanthropy. Socially responsible management of the 
company is different than its charitable activities, and interchanging the two risks 
whitewashing otherwise socially irresponsible conduct. 
Further, the absence of attention to search results in the governance frameworks, both at 
an industry level and internally, highlights one of the weaknesses commonly identified with 
pure-CSR frameworks: their voluntariness.  While such voluntariness has advantages, as 
identified in chapter three, such as flexibility, innovativeness and commitment, it also allows 
important issues calling for regulatory attention to go unattended. Such is the case with 
search results. However, there is more than simple inattention going on here. When 
confronted with the dilemma of search results, businesses are being asked to grapple with 
complicated, conflicting questions of law and then undertake responsibilities therefrom.  
There is a tension here between legal and CSR models of human rights that needs to be 
unpicked. 
Two aspects of this problem make the development of CSR to address search rankings 
difficult. First, there are questions about whether freedom of expression is engaged by 
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search engine rankings.  Second, if it is engaged, whose right is it?  For example, is there a 
right on the part of users to receive information? Is there a right to be ranked? Or are search 
results protected speech of the providers?  Answering such questions becomes important to 
be able to operationalise broad principles into rules of conduct in any governance 
framework, whether wholly CSR, co-regulatory or legislative in nature. 
III. SPEECH DILEMMAS POSED TO SEARCH GOVERNANCE 
 
We have already established the critical role search engines play in the information society 
and their importance to democratic participation.  The purpose of this section is to examine 
in more depth the freedom of speech issues posed by search engines against the backdrop 
of traditional human rights law.  This serves two purposes.  First, we must identify the limits 
of the legal model of human rights as applied to the search engines.  Second, as we have 
seen traditional human rights principles can be extended via CSR to private bodies like 
Google through Ruggie’s Framework.  We must examine how ECHR jurisprudence can help 
shape and inform (and even confuse) a CSR framework.  Having a better understanding of 
the free speech rights at stake concerning search engines and the legal status of such rights 
helps move the discussion forward concerning the viability of CSR as a governance tool. 
From the outset, search engines’ relationship with freedom of expression is muddied, 
because while they play a critical role in facilitating effective navigation of the Internet, they 
are not publishers or creators of information. They simply make the information easier to 
find.  This is because if information is not ranked on a search engine, it is still available on 
the Internet, although more difficult to find as one would need to know the URL.  It would 
be incorrect to therefore characterise the information as being deleted from cyberspace if it 
is unavailable on or removed from search results; rather the link to that information is 
simply not indexed on that particular search result for that particular search term. 
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With this knowledge and against the legal backdrop discussed above, it is suggested that the 
free speech issues raised by search engines are related to access to information. 88   In the 
face of the billions of pages of information available online, control over the accessibility of 
this information directly gatekeeps the ability to participate in democratic culture.  It is not 
that a specific result might be of importance to democracy and another unimportant, rather 
the focus needs to shift to viewing search engines on their own as spaces of democratic 
significance regardless of the private nature of their operation.  A forum is a precondition to 
exercise any free speech right.  The responsibilities that flow from this, it will be argued, is 
for search providers such as Google to manage the rankings against principles of 
proportionality and fairness.  A corporate governance framework built around this has the 
potential to satisfy Article 10 principles. 
Does Article 10 extend to accessibility of information and therefore bind the state to its 
facilitation? Not everything we utter is protected under the principles of freedom of 
expression and the accompanying human rights framework. Perjury, contractual promises 
or representations inducing contracts, competition, bribery, or criminal threats, amongst 
others, are not forms of expression brought within the human rights framework.89 The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) defines the scope of freedom of expression 
as including the ‘freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.’90  The 
language in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is similar, though 
expands on the mediums that are protected to communicate the freedom.  In its article 19 it 
defines the scope of freedom of expression as including the ‘freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or 
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.’91  Article 10 of the 
ECHR is more limited, not including a right to seek out information. It asserts the ‘freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
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public authority and regardless of frontiers.’  It is observed that accessibility per se is not 
provided for in any of these human rights frameworks.  
The speech engaged by search engines must be drawn from the wider body of law and 
theoretical foundations that have historically brought traditional media under the umbrella 
of freedom of expression.  Search engines are gatekeepers to participation in democratic 
culture online.  They are information guidance instruments, accepting user queries and in 
return they help ‘listeners…discriminate amongst speakers.’92  In this way, they are like the 
media and its power to shape world views.  They are unlike the media in the sense that they 
are not publishers of content; but by channelling information flows they affect democratic 
discourse. While search engines do not directly engage the right to impart or receive 
information, as Chandler notes, freedom of expression has a range of penumbral rights, and 
when looking at the digital environment and the role of intermediaries, we should consider 
freedom of expression more broadly in terms of its communicative role. All theories of free 
speech, she persuasively argues, depend on there having been established between the 
speaker and listener a communicative relationship and so it follows that ‘all elements of that 
relationship’93 ought to be protected.  Selection intermediaries such as search engines 
intervene in this communicative relationship as follows: 
Given the large amount of information, listeners may require assistance in 
making their selections, and sometimes a selection intermediary will be 
interposed between speaker and listener.  That selection intermediary will also 
apply some criteria of discrimination in order to select the speech to which the 
listener’s attention will be drawn. Where the selection criteria are those that the 
listener would have employed, no distortion is thus introduced by the 
intermediary.  Where the selection intermediary uses criteria of discrimination 
that the listener would not have selected, the selection intermediary is 
undermining the establishment of a communicative relationship in a manner 
that restricts the freedom that both speaker and listener would otherwise have 
had.94 
There is an intrinsic value to what search engines do that furthers democratic culture.  
This goes to the heart of free speech justifications, not only in terms of furtherance of 
democracy but also of autonomy and self-fulfilment.  Yet, search engine’s functional, 
automated side has been cited as evidence that they don’t fit with any of the 
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traditional justifications for speech protection.95  Such arguments largely come out of 
the US, where freedom of expression, while given preferential weight in assessing 
competing rights compared to here in Europe, is treated as a negative right.  The 
arguments, as Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale noted, state that the speech engaged 
by search engines has no intrinsic value, that it does not encourage participation in the 
public sphere: ‘[w]hile having an undeniable expressive element, the prevailing 
character of such speech is performative rather than propositional.  Its dominant 
function is not to express meaning but rather to “do things in the world”; namely, 
channel users to websites.’ 96   
Their conclusion, like this author’s, is that search itself is of free speech significance 
regardless of the content of the links.  However, our approaches are couched in different 
historical views on the negative or positive duties of the state concerning freedom of 
expression. They frame the role of search engines as to channel information: ‘search engine 
rankings play a central instrumental role in facilitating effective speech by others.’97  
However, they restrict the trigger for First Amendment scrutiny in the American tradition of 
negative treatment of free speech to situations such as where search engines might be 
banned by governments or specific content is filtered – to the effect of the speech, not to 
the structure itself.  In contrast, the argument here draws from the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) history of sometimes positive duties on the state to facilitate the 
exercise of the right to free speech and conclude that as a macro-IIG, a search engine such 
as Google is of free speech significance on its own triggering Article 10.  Whether the state’s 
responsibility is satisfied by encouragement of CSR Frameworks more akin to Ruggie, or 
whether direct legal duties on states to regulate the industry are necessary is something 
explored further in chapter six.  What is clear is that the state has a role to play, not 
necessarily in a legal sense, to shape access to information in the digital society.   
One cannot make use of the right to freedom of expression without access to some forum 
through which to express it, whether one is receiving or imparting the information.   There is 
a long history in free speech jurisprudence concerning access to town squares, parks and 
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public halls for the circulation of information.98  Search engines have characteristics drawn 
from both the public and private spheres. They have characteristics of media companies and 
their integral role in shaping our world views; they also have characteristics of public forums 
such as town squares, where people gather to circulate information and ideas.  Yet they are 
owned, operated, and spear-headed entirely by private companies. Thus it becomes a 
private forum of public significance, for which very little guidance is available as of yet in 
free speech jurisprudence.  We can find some guidance in the line of cases concerning 
access to private shopping malls,99 in particular the emphasis of courts on whether 
alternative avenues for speech are available.  In the case of search engines, as we saw, there 
are few alternatives to using search engines to access information online, and a limited 
choice amongst search providers.  Yet there is something altogether different between a 
shopping mall and a macro-IIG such as Google and that is the extent of the ability to control 
the flow of information.  In addition, while we can find guidance in cases concerning access 
to the media, particularly broadcasting cases, and the conflicting rights of the media 
themselves, such cases fail to encapsulate the infrastructure side of what search engines do.  
Thus these analogies can only take us so far.   
Having identified accessibility of information as the free speech right engaged by search 
engines, we are still left with the problem of operationalising it against the backdrop of 
national and international human rights regimes. Search engines engage potentially three 
rights under traditional approaches to free speech: the rights of the users to receive 
information, the rights of the content providers to be listed on the rankings, and the rights 
of the search providers to publicly air their opinions on the importance of websites.  The 
following section examines what such rights entail using ECHR jurisprudence as a guide, 
showing that at the moment the legal model conflicts with the ways the ECHR can be used 
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to guide the development of a CSR model.  This shows a need to move beyond the 
jurisprudence in the way I have above to embed free speech responsibility into the 
governance of search engines.  
A. Right to Receive Information (User rights) 
 
The rights to receive and impart information are independent rights; the speaker has the 
right to express him or herself, and the listener has the right to receive the expression. Thus 
the enjoyment of the right to receive information is conditional on someone willing to 
impart that information.  The law has interpreted this to mean that the right to receive 
information is a negative right – one cannot force a person to speak and so the right to 
receive information simply means that where there is a willing speaker and listener, the 
government should not intervene to prevent the communication from taking place.100  
There is then no positive obligation on the state to facilitate receipt of information between 
private parties. In Leander v. Sweden, the ECtHR summarised the law as follows: 
The Court observes that the right of freedom to receive information basically 
prohibits a Government from restricting a person from receiving information 
that others wish or may be willing to impart to them.  Article 10 does not, in the 
circumstances such as those of the present case, confer on an individual a right 
of access to a register containing information about his personal position, nor 
does it embody an obligation on the Government to impart such information to 
the individual.101 
There are signs that the UK is moving toward a more expanded right of freedom of 
information, such as the greater weight being accorded to information of public 
interest in defamation cases through the expanded public interest defence.102 Taking a 
                                                          
100
 See discussion in Clayton and Tomlinson n. 61, paras. 15.248-249 and Barendt n. 89, pp. 105-111. As noted 
by Clayton and Tomlinson, and citing R. v. Bow County Court, ex p Pelling, [2001] 1 UKHRR 165, para. 36, 
‘[a]dditional rights of access cannot be derived from Article 10 which the Court of Human Rights has 
consistently held does not include a general right to receive information in the absence of willingness to 
impart the information’: para. 15.227. 
101
 (1987) 9 EHRR 433, para. 74.  Note that when an argument for access to information has been made 
successfully it has largely been through Article 8 not Article 10: see Gaskin v. United Kingdom (1987) 12 EHRR 
36. 
102
 See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. and Others [1999] UKHL 45, and Jameel and others v. Wall Street 
Journal Europe Sprl [2007] 1 AC 359.  See also the Draft Defamation Bill, at 
www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/draft-defamation-bill.htm (last visited 28 October 2011), and the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill – First Report (19 October 2011), at 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtdefam/203/20302.htm (last visited 30 October 2011). 
189 
 
narrow approach, however, it is difficult to argue the state has a positive duty to 
facilitate access to search engine results. 
If we try to re-frame users rights as to seek information, we are even less successful as there 
is no specific right to seek state held information under Article 10, although it is provided for 
in Articles 19 of the UDHR and the ICCPR.  Similarly, there is little success arguing a right to 
access information generally.  Like the right to receive information, there is generally no 
positive obligation on the state to facilitate access to information it holds.103  The right to 
access information generally refers to official information, such as medical records, and the 
UK has specifically legislated in this regard in the Freedom of Information Act.104   The 
hesitation of developing the right of access to information too expansively, is as Eric Barendt 
notes: ‘[r]ecognition of a right of access would impose a constitutional duty on government 
or other authority to provide information it did not want to disclose.’105  Recent UK cases 
concerning whether the government has an obligation to hold inquiries in public, for 
example, took different approaches.106    
Where such obligations are limited vis-à-vis the state, it can be concluded that it is even less 
likely that obligations will be found to apply to private companies with regard to the forums 
they provide. However, in such a situation, there is a willing speaker: the website owner or 
other provider of content on web pages that are then ranked on search results. The 
difficulty remains that the search results simply make the information more accessible.  
If the right to freedom of expression is invoked with regard to users, then it is not easily 
found in the general right to access information.  Instead, we are moved away from the 
legal model and into the realm of CSR, taking its cues from the ECHR.  We can turn here to 
the underlying theories of freedom of expression for support, and to the general 
responsibilities imposed on media companies for their role in shaping public discourse.  
With regard to the latter, the ECHR does not specifically refer to media freedom.  However, 
judicial consideration of Article 10 reflects an historic commitment to freedom of expression 
of the media reflected in the media’s essential role in democratic society as public 
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watchdog.  In Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No 1) it can be recalled, the EtCHR said, 
‘freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society...[t]hese principles are of particular importance as far as the press is concerned.’107  
It goes on to state: 
[W]hilst the mass media must not overstep the bounds imposed in the interests 
of the proper administration of justice, it is incumbent on them to impart 
information and ideas concerning matters that come before the courts just as in 
other areas of public interest. Not only do the media have the task of imparting 
such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them.108 
Freedom of expression in this instance involves a duty on the press to communicate 
information and ideas in the public interest and a corresponding right of the public to 
receive such information.  Most of these media law cases, however, concern information in 
the public interest that the newspaper or other media company has chosen to publish. For 
example, in Fressoz v. France, the article exposed the fact that the boss of Peugeot awarded 
himself a 45.9% pay rise at a time when he refused to award employee pay rises.109  
Thorgeirson v. Iceland110 involved a newspaper article calling for an independent 
investigation into allegations of police brutality. Sunday Times v. UK, quoted above, 
concerned a series of newspaper articles aimed at helping victims of the Thalidomide 
disaster to reach better settlements. 
In contrast, search engines are not directly involved in the publication of the information, 
and certainly not all, in fact very little, of what is brought up on search results is in the public 
interest.  The top two search terms in 2010 in the US were Facebook and Facebook login.111  
Google reported that the fastest rising search terms worldwide in 2010 were chatroulette, 
ipad and Justin Bieber.112  Despite this, search engines continue to be some of the most 
visited websites on the Internet, and for good reason. Even if most searches are for inane 
matter, this simply reflects the general public’s democratic participation in the real world.  
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Not everyone reads newspapers, nor do such readers faithfully read every line of the news 
and politics sections, but can be found more often reading lifestyle and entertainment 
sections that newspapers knowingly offer up to draw in such readers. This illustrates what is 
so unique about what search engines do. Visitors input search terms, and search providers 
offer results. This immediately sets up a discourse between the visitor and the provider.  
While the provider is not the writer or publisher, what search engines do unrelated to the 
content of the searches is a matter of public interest.  What search engines rank on its index 
selects information, orders it, and structures how the information is consumed.  
Thus, it is not that a specific article is of public interest, but that simply search engines are of 
public interest because they now play an essential role in democratic society in structuring 
how we understand the informational world. This role is intimately tied with the roots of the 
protection of freedom of expression and the importance attached to the role of media in 
democratic society.  Nico van Eijk argues along these lines stating that making information 
available should be treated similarly to the right to freedom of expression, commenting 
‘[t]he functioning of a search engine therefore entails activities that are of crucial 
importance to making the actual perusal of information possible.’113  The failure of current 
governance to account for this critical role indicates that pure-CSR is not enough.  State 
involvement is needed to identify what is expected of search providers.   
Since search results are of democratic significance and users arguably have a general right of 
access to search results, do content providers have a right to be heard on search results? 
B. Right to be Heard (Content Provider Rights) 
 
Crafting a right of content providers to be ranked on search results and a corresponding 
duty on search providers to rank them is problematic, because it imposes a right to 
communicate on a particular forum.  Yet a forum is a necessary precondition to exercise any 
free speech right.  As Barendt notes, ‘[p]olitical parties, other groups, and individuals cannot 
exercise their free speech rights without use of some property, whether a personal 
computer, printing press or broadcasting studio, a hall or park, or the streets.’114  There are 
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two potential avenues to argue such a right. First, it can be said that the rights of the 
content providers are rooted in historical rights of access to public streets and halls and 
other public forums for the exercise of freedom of expression.  Although in the case of 
search engines the forum is privately-owned, as will be shown, at times private places have 
been held to invite public rights, and it may be here the state’s duty to facilitate access to it.  
Second, it is arguable that the right is akin to claims of access to various mediums of 
communication such as rights of access to broadcast time, for rights of reply in newspapers 
or to advertise on television. 
Traditionally, the strongest arguments for rights of access to forums for speech have been 
to forums that have been quite clearly public areas – public halls, parks, streets – in contrast 
to enclosed buildings such as schools and halls where someone would have to specifically 
make the space available to be used.  The appropriate analogy then becomes to cases 
concerning access to private places of public appeal, such as shopping malls. As discussed in 
the last chapter, one sees a variation in the United States, where the Federal Court has 
found there is no constitutional right to free speech in privately owned shopping mall; 
although some states have interpreted their state constitutions as conferring such a right.  
The ECtHR in Appleby v. UK, discussed at length in the last chapter, held that freedom of 
expression did not necessarily grant rights of entry to private property such as shopping 
malls, particularly when there were alternative venues available to exercise the expression, 
such as in the old town centre or door-to-door calls.115  This was despite the fact the 
shopping mall had only recently been privatised, had been partially publicly financed and 
functioned like a town centre.  It stretches the case law too far to interpret this to mean the 
state might have a duty to facilitate freedom of speech on search engines, though an 
argument might be made in media law. 
 Search engines like Google, while places of discursive significance, are private, for-profit 
companies, which simply make information more accessible. Accessibility is critical on the 
Internet, but does not translate into a free speech right of content providers to be ranked. 
The content provider’s information is still available on the Internet, and alternative avenues 
are available to bring their website’s attention to consumers such as advertising campaigns, 
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online or off, word-of-mouth and mail. Further it would impose free speech obligations on 
an algorithm to ensure that all content is ranked.  This becomes a form of imposed 
innovation.  However, in framing the responsibilities of providers to manage their forums 
fairly and proportionately, this shifts the human rights discussion away from the concern of 
the algorithm to when there has been a manual manipulation of the rankings, or where the 
results of the algorithm produced such a result that manual manipulation might be 
necessitated.116  
The second possible avenue to argue is that being ranked is the equivalent of rights of reply 
in newspapers or rights of access to broadcasting to communicate one’s views.  However, 
obligations on the state to provide for a right of reply have only arisen over specific 
incidents,117 which is different than the categorical, automated nature of search results.  A 
general right to be ranked cannot be drawn from such cases.  It might arise for the searched, 
however, for those that are the subject of searches which they believe to be defamatory or 
the like.  Scholars such as Pasquale have explored this avenue, arguing that there should be 
a right of reply in certain circumstances on search engines.118 
An argument can be made that users’ rights to be ranked on search results is analogous to 
claims for access to broadcasting.  For example in the ECtHR case Vgt Verein gegen 
Tiefabriken v. Switzerland, Swiss law banned the broadcast of political advertisements and 
thus a Swiss television station refused to air a commercial against cruelty to pigs, which was 
prepared in response to an ad for meat.  The ECtHR held that the law banning political 
advertising contravened Article 10 as it didn’t apply to other media and denied the 
opportunity to reach a wide audience.119  ECtHR rulings concerning access to broadcasting 
media have not been consistent, with a later ruling upholding the ban on religious 
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advertising in Ireland.120  In the UK, the House of Lords controversially upheld a ban on an 
anti-abortion party election broadcast.121  All such cases involve state action and are rooted 
in the historical scarcity of available broadcasting channels, as well as arguments that 
broadcasting is especially pervasive in one’s home, monopolised by few, and the need for 
pluralism of views because of television’s powerful role in society.  In this regard search 
engines have similar power to shape information flows, although such power is far more 
subtle than with broadcasting.  However, search engines are altogether more functional and 
automated than the editorial and publishing role played by broadcasters that drives the 
regulatory environment here, and search engine operations are further removed from the 
state than was the situation in these cases.    
An attempt was made to apply broadcasting laws to search engines in the US in Langdon v. 
Google,122 where the Delaware District Court was tasked with determining whether the 
broadcasting ‘must carry’ rule applied to Google’s advertisements.  Langdon ran two 
Internet websites, www.NCJusticeFraud.com, which he alleged exposed fraud perpetrated 
by North Carolina government officials, and www.ChinaIsEvil.com, which he alleged 
discussed atrocities committed by the Chinese government.  Langdon sought paid 
advertising placement of his websites on Google, Microsoft, Yahoo! and AOL, and was 
refused.  Various reasons were given by the providers for refusing to run his ads.  Google 
advised it does not run ads that advocate against an individual, group or organisation, Yahoo 
advised it does not run ads for websites it does not host, and Microsoft simply did not reply.   
Langdon alleged,123 inter alia, breach of his rights to free speech, stating that the 
Defendants should have placed his ads in prominent places and ‘honestly’ ranked his 
websites, which he felt they did not do. Google argued that search results are protected 
speech124 and that doing what the Plaintiff wished was compelled speech and ‘would 
prevent Google from speaking in ways that [the] Plaintiff dislikes.’125 The Court agreed with 
Google holding the relief sought would breach the Defendants’ First Amendment rights akin 
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to newspapers rights to refuse to print editorials or to run advertisements based on their 
content.126   
Additionally, the Plaintiff tried to argue a right of access to search engines akin to a user 
right discussed in the section above.  Langdon argued that search engines are public forums 
in the way that shopping malls have occasionally been held to be, but the Court rejected this 
argument finding that although the Defendants have speech rights, they are not subject to 
the constitution: ‘Defendants are private, for profit companies, not subject to constitutional 
free speech guarantees…They are internet search engines that use the internet as a medium 
to conduct business.’127 Langdon’s argument that he had no alternative to advertising on 
the Defendants’ search engines was promising, but was also rejected by the Court citing 
alternatives such as ‘mail, television, cable, newspapers, magazines, and competing 
commercial online services.’128 In the end the Court dismissed all claims against the 
Defendants in this preliminary motion, upholding only the continuance of the breach of 
contract claim against Google. 
In the UK, while there cannot be said to be a specific right of content providers to be ranked 
on search results, the fact that search engines themselves have speech significance might 
invite positive obligations on the state to ensure that the search provider manage its affairs 
in a fair, open and proportionate manner consistent with Article 10.  While there is no 
general right of access to broadcast time, for example, the ECtHR has held that the decision 
making process must be even-handed, as in Haider v. Austria,129 where the Court gave the 
example of one political party but not another being excluded from broadcasting, or in 
Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Osterreichs and Gubi v. Austria130 where the state was 
held to have breached Article 10 for failing to be balanced in its provision of assistance to 
information providers.131  Even if the state has no positive duties as such this provides 
guidance on the soft law obligations of search engines.  Thus while the content provider has 
no right to be ranked per se, Google has an obligation to manage the rankings against 
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principles of proportionately and fairness.  Such an approach accords with the work of 
Ruggie and his advocacy of access to forums of remediation which are legitimate, accessible, 
predictable, equitable, rights-compatible and transparent. 
There is a risk here, of course, that, for example, Google’s manipulation of rankings to 
address racially-motivated Google bombs will not be viewed as even-handed.  In a free 
speech regime such as the US, this might necessitate intervention to protect the speech 
rights of those expressing the hateful opinions. However, such concerns are counteracted in 
Europe by the stronger hate speech laws, and by the exceptions under Article 10(2).132   
Ultimately, what is shown is a need for recognition of the need for governance of search 
engines pursuant to human rights principles and the creation of a governance framework to 
facilitate this. 
Thus far we have established search engines as places of democratic significance inviting 
general free speech scrutiny, and that users thus have rights to access information on search 
results.  While there are no direct duties under human rights law, the above shows the need 
to extend ECHR principles for deployment in CSR frameworks. We are left with a key conflict 
in the development of CSR frameworks along these lines, however, and that is the legal free 
speech rights of search providers such as Google.  Up until now we have been looking at 
how a legal model can inform a CSR model, but as will be shown, the legal rights of search 
providers conflicts with any CSR commitments sought to be imposed. 
C. Commercial Speech Rights (Right of the Search Providers) 
 
In contrast to the last case study, where determinations by the IWF of the content that is 
blacklisted arguably engages directly the HRA, the issue of search engine rankings raises the 
murkier issue of the legal rights of the search providers themselves.  Thus any CSR model 
that might be developed immediately comes into conflict with legal duties.  In the United 
States, case law thus far has favoured the speech rights of the search provider over the 
users.  While such cases are specific to its First Amendment context, they are the only cases 
for which this issue has been litigated thus far and provides guidance on the issues that 
might be argued in Europe if a similar case arises here. The cases involve situations where 
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Google has been accused of manually manipulating rankings to the detriment of a company 
seeking to be highly ranked on Google’s search results.  
The leading case in this regard is Search King Inc. v. Google Technology a preliminary 
injunction by the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.133  Search King is a 
search engine optimisation company.  In 2002 it introduced PR Ad Network (PRAN) to 
arrange for their clients advertisements to be placed on third party sites, effectively a link 
farm.  Link farms violate Google’s Webmaster Guidelines.134  Google advises that the 
consequences of violating its Guidelines is a penalty, the nature of which is not elucidated 
although it does say it might lead to not showing up on the index, or removal from the 
index: ‘we strongly encourage you to pay very close attention to the “Quality Guidelines”, 
which outline some of the illicit practices that may lead to a site being removed entirely 
from the Google index or otherwise penalized.’135  
Google’s toolbar shows a webpage as having a PageRank between 1 and 10, the most 
popular having a rank of 10.  In 2002, Search King’s website dropped from a PageRank of 8 
to 4, and PRAN dropped from 2 to being eliminated from the ranking entirely.  Search King 
sued for tortious interference with contractual relations arguing that Google intentionally 
decreased the PageRank of Search King and PRAN, the result being an indeterminate 
adverse impact on their business opportunities because their exposure on Google’s search 
engine was limited. While Judge Miles La Grange agreed that the drop in rankings was 
intentional on the part of Google, she concluded ‘there was no meaningful way to 
determine whether any lost business is directly related to the lower PageRank.’136   Most 
important for our purposes, the Judge was persuaded by Google’s arguments and held that 
search results are opinions and accordingly protected speech: 
[A] PageRank is an opinion – an opinion of the significance of a particular web 
site as it corresponds to a search query.  Other search engines express different 
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opinions, as each search engine’s method of determining relative significance is 
unique. There is no question that the opinion relates to a matter of public 
concern. Search King points out that 150 million searches occur every day on 
Google’s search engine alone...A statement of relative significance, as 
represented by the PageRank, is inherently subjective in nature.  Accordingly, 
the Court concludes that Google’s PageRanks are entitled to First Amendment 
protection.137 
Since then, a case concerning a specialised search engine on a website that ranked and 
rated lawyers was held to be constitutionally protected speech.138  A similar case arose over 
an alleged drop in rankings in Kinderstart.com LLC et al. v. Google Inc.,139 and while the 
judge dismissed the case in a strongly worded judgment critical of Kinderstart, the case is 
highly revealing of Google’s view of its search results.  Following in the footsteps of Search 
King, Google’s Brief to the Court characterised its search engine as the expression of opinion 
of a private business about the importance of websites.140  It frames its function as 
essentially a promotional device for companies, as ‘a private forum for Google’s speech’141 
where rankings simply reflect differences of opinion regarding a site’s quality, highlighting 
particularly well the tension between legal and CSR models of human rights:  
Over the years, authors who felt their books belonged on bestseller lists, airlines 
who thought their flights should be featured more prominently in airline flight 
listings, bond issuers dissatisfied with their ratings, and even website owners 
angry about Google’s ranking on their sites, have turned to litigation seeking to 
override such judgments.  Each time, the courts have rejected such claims, 
recognizing that private businesses have a right to express these opinions 
freely.142 
In Europe, we do not have any similar cases to draw from, though there are a series of 
defamation cases which indicate there is some commercial protection accorded to search 
providers.  A recent defamation case in France indicates that search engines might face 
liability in Europe for at least the automated suggestions for search terms used.  Mr. X (the 
Plaintiff declined to be named) successfully sued Google for defamation for its automated 
search suggestions. When users searched Mr. X’s name, Google suggested completion terms 
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of ‘rape’, ‘rapist’, ‘Satanist’ and ‘prison’. 143  At the time, the man was appealing a three-
month suspended sentence for corrupting a minor.   The Paris Court of Bankruptcy held this 
was libellous of Mr. X.  Google has said it intends to appeal the decision, and relies on the 
automated nature of its search algorithm as a defence. In its view, since Google Search 
reflects an aggregation of the most popular search requests, then ‘it is not Google which 
suggests these terms.’144  It is a matter of argument whether the speech in legal terms is 
generated by Google or by users search terms; regardless, the case indicates courts might 
be less inclined to treat the obligations of a search provider in solely negative terms. 
The findings concerning search providers free speech rights hinge on the structure of human 
rights law as opposed to CSR principles.  The relationship between the search provider and 
the user and website owners, between the gatekeeper and gated, is far more dialogical than 
imagined.  For example, the launch in September 2010 of automatic suggestions for 
completion of search queries creates a more dialogical relationship than occurred with 
earlier search engines.  The automation and general use of search engines makes what they 
do objective and functional, but the completion of search queries is more interactive, 
intimate and invasive.  Thus it mixes all the invasiveness of broadcasting, with the critical 
infrastructure of telephone companies and railways, and the general use of phone books.  In 
so doing, we are returned to the initial argument rooted in free speech principles: it is not so 
much the speech of search engines that emerges as particularly critical, but the public 
importance of the space to democratic culture.  Therefore the space is one of free speech 
significance inviting responsibilities on the search providers to manage the forum in a 
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manner compliant with human rights principles. While there is no direct duty under human 
rights law, this shows the need to extend ECHR principles for deployment in CSR 
frameworks. 
By emphasising the speech rights of search providers, rankings are effectively removed from 
free speech scrutiny.  For the purposes of corporate governance, for the moment, it has 
helped shut down that avenue for development. For those that view CSR as something 
purely extra-legal, such rulings would not be viewed as a death-knell. However, they do 
affect voluntariness. It is simply harder to bring business to the table and convince them 
they have responsibilities the courts have ruled they don’t have. Thus if they are to 
undertake responsibilities through corporate governance, government guidance is needed. 
The issue is further complicated by the type of gatekeeping position Google occupies: as 
well as possessing its own speech rights, Google is forced into a judicial role. It fields 
complaints by those offended by search results (prejudicial content as with 
www.jewwatch.com), those unsatisfied with their ranking or lack thereof (Search King, 
Kinderstart etc.), those seeking removal of defamatory or otherwise personally prejudicial 
material (rights of the searched to be forgotten), and those seeking advertising placement 
(rights of access to a commercial forum).  In such a situation, Google is sometimes a party to 
the complaint whilst simultaneously carrying out a judicial role. At other times Google acts 
purely in a judicial capacity negotiating the dispute between third parties.  The situation is 
compounded by the role the search algorithm plays in the dispute, as inevitably a complaint 
concerning search has an algorithmic component, even if it is simply to tease out whether a 
shift in rankings is due to manual manipulation as opposed to automation.    
We are faced then with a body engaged in a complicated and sometimes conflicting 
gatekeeping role, one that clearly engages free speech issues, but for which the law is 
unclear on how this translates into specific responsibilities.  As it stands no CSR framework 
has emerged to guide search providers on their human rights impact concerning their 
search rankings.  The legal confusion surrounding the nature of free speech rights and 
responsibilities in this area all but prevents such a framework from developing.  Any 
industry-led framework depends on voluntariness and no company, nor its shareholders, 
would undertake free speech responsibilities with such legal uncertainty.   It becomes clear, 
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therefore, that Government leadership is needed in setting the expectations of search 
providers’ responsibilities for search rankings.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Search engines play a critical role in democratic culture by making information accessible.  
They sort through the clutter and present information in a consumable, searchable shape 
and thereby become macro-IIGs to the flow of information online.  This bestows great 
power on search providers.  Without clear acknowledgement by search providers that they 
shape democratic culture by defining how and what information is sent, received, and 
presented on the Internet, a situation results where ‘[f]reedom is contained while retaining 
the illusion of total freedom.’145  At present, traditional law has struggled to make room for 
search, and corporate governance has managed to avoid the issue altogether. Governance is 
currently largely through the ToS, which as the examination of Google’s ToS reveal, do not 
have any of the processes of due diligence or access to remediation identified by Ruggie, nor 
evidence of governance pursuant to principles of proportionality and  fairness underlying 
Article 10.  In fact, as it stands, search providers have been free to simply dismiss search 
rankings as being an issue of free speech at all.   
This environment would seem ripe for CSR to flourish, but it hasn’t.  The significance of the 
findings in this case study will be examined in the following chapter though can be briefly 
outlined as follows.  The unclear relationship between search engines and freedom of 
expression and the complicated judicial role search engines are forced to undertake has 
made it impossible for search providers to confidently craft out their responsibilities for 
freedom of expression on their own.  Cases out of the US such as Search King have only 
served bolster this head-in-the-sand approach by effectively removing search engines from 
free speech scrutiny, even in countries outside of the US.  Yet the transnational nature of 
search engines makes the need for government leadership more complicated and the need 
for alternative governance structure such as CSR more compelling.   Thus CSR has a role to 
                                                          
145
 S. Vegh, ‘Profit over principles: the commercialization of the democratic potentials of the Internet’ in K. 
Sarikakis and D.K. Thussu (eds.), Ideologies of the Internet (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, 2006), p. 72.  
202 
 
play concerning search governance, but government leadership is necessary to tease out 
what this role should be.   
There is a unifying factor, however, which identifies a way to move CSR forward in this area.  
The examination of the relationship between search engines and freedom of expression 
reveals that the free speech right engaged by search engines is accessibility of information 
and the right is to the forum itself.  Search engines are the forums to exercise the right to 
information access online.  The responsibilities that flow from this are that search providers 
such as Google should commit to manage the rankings against principles of proportionality 
and fairness with access to a remedial mechanism to address failures to satisfy these terms.   
What do we draw from the case studies to move forward to examine the viability of CSR to 
address digital human rights.  We have two macro-IIGs critical to participation in democratic 
culture operating in vastly different regulatory environments concerning freedom of 
expression.  In the case of ISPs the industry did come together to create a governance 
framework for filtering, but simply failed to account for human rights in any aspect of its 
structure.  In the case of search engines, the indirect nature of their free speech impact 
allowed them to simply sidestep it as a human rights issue. There is, as search providers 
frame it, no free speech significance to search rankings except that the results are their own 
exercise of speech.  The next chapter will draw this thesis to a close and ask whether the 
findings in this thesis reveal that CSR is insufficient on its own to provide the standards and 
compliance mechanisms needed to protect and respect freedom of expression on the 
Internet.  An alternative corporate governance model will be proposed for the United 
Kingdom that can serve as a template for approaching governance of human rights on the 
Internet serving to mend the deficiencies present in current approaches.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL 
FOR THE DIGITAL AGE  
When the Kimberly Process was established to provide companies and governments with an 
international diamond certification scheme to prevent the supply of blood diamonds, CSR 
was celebrated as having coming of age.1 It was a triumph of leadership and corporate 
commitment to end the violence associated with diamond mines in Africa. Years later and 
the regime is in tatters, its legitimacy and accountability questioned even by its own 
drafters.2  The public are hard pressed to see that the Kimberly Process made a difference.  
Other frameworks seem to have fared better, whether because they are generalised and 
aspirational, such as the Global Sullivan Principles3 and the United Nations Global Compact,4 
or more targeted and instrumental and therefore more capable of being operationalised, 
such as the Forest Stewardship Council.5  What then of the corporate responsibility 
instruments used for the protection of freedom of expression on the Internet?  As we have 
seen in this thesis, CSR has failed to be enough to facilitate the Internet’s potential as a 
force in democratic culture but it is not irrelevant to this vision either. 
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This thesis has examined corporate governance of a particular type of gatekeeper, the 
Internet Information Gatekeeper (IIG).  A gatekeeper, drawing from the work of Karine 
Barzilai-Nahon6, is an entity that exercises information control by, for example, selecting the 
information to publish, channelling information through a channel, deleting information, or 
shaping information into a particular form.  A simple gatekeeper is elevated to an IIG when, 
as a result of this control of the flow of information, it gatekeeps deliberation and 
participation in democratic culture.  Where a particular IIG fits on the scale of responsibility 
in this environment, whether as a macro-gatekeeper, authority gatekeeper or micro-
gatekeeper, depends on the extent to which (1) the information has democratic 
significance, and (2) the reach or structure of the communicative space.   
It is this relationship between these gatekeepers and their impact on participation in 
democratic culture that raises the free speech questions that are central to this thesis.  It 
asks: is CSR enough on its own to provide the standards and compliance mechanisms 
needed to protect and respect freedom of expression online?  The Information society is 
upon us. Access to the Internet and participation in discourse on the Internet has become 
an integral part of our democratic life, and facilitation of this democratic potential critically 
relies on a governance structure supportive of free speech.7  Since IIGs control the 
technologies that make this discourse possible, we inevitably rely on these companies for 
the realisation of the Internet’s democratic potential.  A decision of an IIG that affects our 
engagement in the Information society affects our democratic life.  This puts pressure on 
companies to have in place governance structures supportive of free speech.  At the 
moment, as the case studies in chapters four and five showed, companies have been largely 
left alone to address issues of free speech through CSR frameworks such as in-house codes 
of conduct seen in Terms of Service, through the work of regulatory bodies such as the 
Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), and industry initiatives such as the Global Network 
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Initiative (GNI).   This reflects a shift in the locations of regulation, away from the state to 
private nodes of governances.8  
The law in the UK, and indeed in the Western World, has stayed out of it, rigidly retaining 
the focal point of free speech laws on the Government, while the experience of human 
rights (when it has reached beyond the law) has been understood to occur elsewhere. Thus 
the law has been left flailing its hands at a system for which it is becoming inconsequential.  
This has fractured the administrative structure of free speech9 between free speech as a 
legal concept and as an experienced concept.  It is in this fissure that CSR has grown and 
taken shape.  The result is a system of private governance running alongside the law without 
any of the human rights safeguards one normally expects of state-run systems, such as 
principles of accountability, predictability, accessibility, transparency and proportionality.  
As Jack Balkin states concerning the US, 
At the very moment that our economic and social lives are increasingly 
dominated by information technology and information flows, the First 
Amendment seems increasingly irrelevant to the key free speech battles of the 
future…the most important decisions affecting the future of freedom of speech 
will not occur in constitutional law; they will be decisions about technological 
design, legislative and administrative regulations, the formation of new business 
models, and collective activities of end-users.10 
What is needed to remedy this mismatch is to pay closer attention to the administrative 
structure of free speech protection in the digital world, which requires more than pure-CSR, 
or voluntary codes.  One can discuss generalised commitments of Twitter to human rights 
and its role in furthering democratic discourse, the commitment of Google to making 
information accessible, and of ISPs to connecting users in the first place.  The problem is not 
a commitment, real or facile, to free speech. No company says it is against human rights in 
general or free speech in particular. The breakdown happens when moving from these 
generalised commitments to the operationalisation of these commitments – to the rules 
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  See in particular section 4 of R. Lambers, ‘Code and Speech. Speech Control Through Network Architecture’ 
in E. Dommering and L. Asscher (eds.), Coding Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2006), where Lambers 
describes this as tilting.  Julia Black’s work describes this as ‘decentring’: J. Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: 
Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World’, CLP, 54 (2001) 103. 
9
 Jack Balkin talks about the notion of the infrastructure of free speech in his most recent article: J.M. Balkin, 
‘The Future of Free Expression in the Digital Age’, Pepp. L. Rev., 36: N (2008) 101.  See also T. Emerson’s 
discussion of the administrative structure of free speech in Emerson n. 7, chapter one. 
10
 Balkin ibid., p. 101. He sees free expression being subsumed under an even larger set of concerns he frames 
as ‘knowledge and information policy’: ibid., p. 102. 
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that give effect to them.  Yet it would be equally a disservice to treat businesses as akin to 
states in their capacities and duties, though as we have seen with the IWF, the regulatory 
bodies these businesses help create can be treated this way.  The businesses, however, are 
commercial enterprises and should not incur governmental responsibilities.   
Drawing on regulatory and human rights traditions, this chapter will propose a new 
corporate governance model, one that embraces the legal and extra-legal dimensions 
involved in the process of protecting the right to freedom of expression. The conclusion of 
this author is that pure-CSR is not enough on its own to facilitate the Internet’s democratic 
potential.   Equally, top-down legal controls are a blunt tool for the tricky arena of business 
and human rights, as was identified in chapter three.  The corporate governance model 
proposed takes the form of a Commission for Digital Rights.  A special body is needed 
because in the end the responsibility for protection of free speech and furtherance of a 
human rights culture is a duty of the state, a duty that it has wholly neglected by 
outsourcing our rights through encouragement of corporate governance without additional 
guidance in the form of policies or rules.  If we are serious about a human rights culture in 
the UK and we are serious about the democratising potential of the Internet, it is something 
that must be so chosen and facilitated by building human rights compliance into the 
governance structures of the Internet. At a legal level this means creating a governance 
framework that supports and furthers human rights. 
The focus in this chapter, indeed this thesis, is as to a solution for the UK.  Thus when the 
Government is discussed in this chapter it is with reference to the UK Government.  
However, the issues raised are of global concern, and particularly in the Western World, the 
responsibilities of companies to further the Internet’s potential as a communicative tool is 
of pressing concern.  Combined with the transnational nature of many of the companies 
that qualify as IIGs as well as the transnational nature of Internet communications, there is 
an inevitable outward focus to any model proposed to solve the issues raised here.  
However, the UK is responsible for its own human rights culture, and since the conclusion is 
that the solution is a Governmental responsibility, the model is tailored to the UK 
jurisdiction.  The solution proposed, however, is offered as a template to be used to address 
other human rights engaged by the activities of IIGs, such as issues of privacy and freedom 
207 
 
of association, and to be used, modified as necessitated by domestic laws and culture, in 
other countries in the Western World.  
This last chapter is split into two parts. In this first part, I will examine the common failures 
with CSR revealed by the case studies and the significance of these failures.  Drawing from 
these findings, the second part of the chapter will outline the details of the Digital Rights 
Commission, addressing how such a commission can mend the weaknesses evident in the 
current corporate governance approach and articulate a new governance model for this 
framework. 
I. A FRACTURED SYSTEM 
 
In the second chapter I outlined three types of IIGs, macro-gatekeepers, authority 
gatekeepers and micro-gatekeepers, and identified their differences as related to 
democracy.  It was in this context that the case studies focused on macro-gatekeepers, 
those gatekeepers we inevitably must engage to participate online and which incur the 
strongest human rights obligations.  In the first case study the role of Internet Service 
Providers (ISP) in governing the filtering of content was examined, and the industry 
regulator, the IWF, was argued to be a public authority under the Human Rights Act (HRA) 
and operating in breach of Article 10.  In the second case study, the role of search engines in 
controlling what appears on search results was examined, and what was found was a lack of 
human rights concerns in the little that governs what they do.  The problems identified by 
these case studies were found to go to the very core of the purposes of freedom of 
expression, and the way CSR was used as a governance framework to address these 
problems was found to be insufficient to be human rights compliant.  This section will 
synthesise the findings from these case studies into points of analysis concerning the 
sufficiency of CSR as a governance tool for IIGs. Two key differences were found between 
the case studies, while four common problems with CSR were identified.  The cumulative 
effect of these findings is that Government leadership is needed to set the expectations of 
companies regarding their human rights responsibilities. 
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A. Where the Case studies Diverged 
 
The first of the divergences between the case studies was the role CSR plays in regulating 
conduct.  In the case of search engines, whose impact on free speech is more subtle because 
it guides and channels information flows indirectly, piece-meal corporate and industry codes 
have been the primary governance approach thus far.  Bodies such as the GNI have been 
created, but despite praise from governments11 and John Ruggie,12 few companies have 
taken-up the initiative, and in any event the regime fails to address the critical issue of 
governance of search engine rankings.  The failure to address rankings in the GNI illustrates 
the difficulty in identifying what are free speech issues concerning online gatekeepers.  The 
inherent murkiness of free speech means that unless sufficiently powerful forces compel 
attention to the issue, companies can simply select what is and is not an issue of free 
speech.  This can be driven by attempts to circumvent responsibility or be due to simple 
oversight or ignorance.  In the UK, we are largely left to rely on in-house codes of conduct to 
govern our speech rights concerning search engines. This reflects a very traditional 
decentring of power and reflects a primary reliance on corporate voluntariness as the CSR 
filler. This is reflected in Figure 8.  In this circumstance, the result of CSR filling the 
governance gap is a rickety, insufficient and incoherent framework that has only served to 
delay the development of much needed policy and law.   
                                                          
11
 See Congressional Hearings of Dick Durbin, ‘Global Internet Freedom, Corporate Responsibility and the Rule 
of Law’ (2008) at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da13b0614 
(last visited 23 September 2011), and ‘Global Internet Freedom and the Rule of Law, Part II’ (2010), at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da15885da (last visited 23 
September 2011). 
12
 J. Ruggie, ‘Business and human rights: Towards operationalizing the “protect, respect and remedy” 
framework’ (2009), at www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf (last visited 
3 August 2011), p. 18. 
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Figure 8 Decentring of Human Rights Governance 
In contrast, the case of ISPs and filtering technologies, and the creation of the IWF in the UK 
reflect the formalisation of a corporate governance structure.  As a result of the steering 
hand of government, industry take-up of the IWF, and the passage of time, filtering in the 
UK has become standardised and the IWF has thereby become entrenched and legitimised.  
The effect of this is quite different than the case of search engines.  It has re-centred the 
administrative structure of free speech.  This is reflected in Figure 9.   
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Figure 9 Re-Centring of Human Rights Governance 
This re-alignment has had two effects.  First, as was discussed in chapter four, the IWF is 
arguably a public authority and thus directly bound by the Human Rights Act (HRA).13  Thus 
the attention needed concerning governance of filtering isn’t additional laws, but a 
                                                          
13
 1998 Ch 42. 
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clarification of the applicability of existing laws. As will be recalled, the IWF tends to be view 
itself in different terms, at odds with its proper legal status, describing membership in the 
organisation as ‘a visible, tangible and valuable means of demonstrating corporate social 
responsibility’.14  Here CSR is a linguistic tool, the effect of which, intentionally or 
unintentionally, helps obscure the public authority status of the IWF and delay much 
needed attention to bring the body in line with the law. 
The second effect of this re-alignment is to illustrate the risks associated with more 
formalised governance codes. The more formalised a CSR framework, the more human 
rights principles are operationalised, the more likely it will be a public authority and thus 
bound by the HRA.  The very act of strengthening the administrative structure of free 
speech risks dissuading companies or industries from addressing free speech concerns for 
fear of incurring direct liability. The GNI is wrestling with this problem.  In the process of 
drafting the GNI the structure was rendered weaker and more flexible to draw companies to 
the table, but this also drove away human rights organisations that saw the GNI as being too 
flimsy to be called a human rights framework.15  And here is the rub: the notion of a 
framework of responsibilities, even a weakened one, has prevented businesses from signing 
on.16  While they cite their involvement with other CSR frameworks such as the Electronic 
Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC)17, or simply reassure that the company is committed to 
freedom of speech,18 the fact is no company in the three years since its launch has signed 
                                                          
14
 See www.iwf.org.uk/members/membership-benefits (last visited 23 September 2011). 
15
 See M. D’Jaen, ‘Global Initiative to protect net privacy and freedoms launched’, e-commerce law & policy 
(December 2008), at www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/PRIV_09-01_Article_Jaen.pdf (last visited 23 
September 2011), p. 11.  Also see commentary of Colin Maclay, ‘Protecting Privacy and Expression Online: Can 
the Global Network Initiative embrace the character of the Net?’ in R. Deibert  et al., Access Controlled: the 
shaping of power, rights, and rule in cyberspace (MIT Press, 2010), p. 98.  The Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(letter), at www.eff.org/files/filenode/gni/signon_letter.txt (last visited 5 August 2011).  And see Amnesty’s 
criticisms, discussed in B. Johnson, ‘Amnesty criticises Global Network Initiative for online freedom of speech’ 
(30 October 2008), at www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/oct/30/amnesty-global-network-initiative (last 
visited 5 August 2011). 
16
 See Global Internet Freedom Part II n. 11. 
17
 Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition, at www.eicc.info/ (last visited 27 July 2011).  Apple cited its 
membership in the EICC in its letter to Senator Durbin (27 August 2009), further citing the focus of the GNI on 
networks rather than its main business of the provision of devices, as the reasons for not joining the GNI.  
Apple states that internally it has a ‘comprehensive and principled approach to address human rights around 
the world’: p. 1. A review of Apple’s Supplier Code of Conduct attached to the letter reveals no provisions 
concerning freedom of expression as discussed in this thesis. 
18
 See Letter, Timothy Sparipini, Director Public Policy, Facebook to the Honourable Richard Durbin (27 August, 
2009), or Letter, Alexander Macgillvray, General Counsel, Twitter to Senator Richard Durbin.  Both available 
from Durbin’s site: http://durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=c3078a7d-bfd9-4186-ba86-
2571e0e05ec8 (last visited 31 August 2011). 
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on.  The result is a framework neither side is satisfied with.  At a Senate Hearing in the US on 
Global Internet Freedom, a GNI board member Rebecca McKinnon opined, 
What is holding these companies back? It does seem in part a fear of 
acknowledging that human rights is part of their business, that 
telecommunications and internet companies no matter how you slice it have 
implications for free expression, privacy and human rights. And I think a lot of 
companies are afraid of even having that conversation for fear that people will 
then hang charges on them of various kinds, and that they’d rather just avoid 
having the conversation at all. And I think what we saw with Google, Yahoo!, and 
Microsoft was an evolution of self-awareness and a coming out of recognising it 
is ok to have this conversation, it is ok to have responsibility, and if you hold 
yourself accountable it is good for business. 19 
The second divergence between the case studies is that CSR is forced to accommodate two 
different focuses: human rights impact at an international level, where CSR in its purest 
form is of most use, and human rights impact at a national level, where there is greater 
capacity for government and/or judicial control.  For example, the decision of a country 
and/or its companies and their industry body on what information to filter is ultimately a 
question of national concern based on the laws that govern the boundaries of free speech in 
that country.  The issue can in effect be localised, because determinations have local effect.  
While a website hosted abroad might infringe the UK’s Protection of Children Act20 by 
publishing images of child sexual abuse, the UK cannot in this instance censor the speaker 
without international cooperation. To do so requires coordination of international law and 
state agreement. Yet the UK can directly address access to the material within the borders 
of the UK, by either prosecuting those residing in the UK who access such material, if they 
can be discovered, and/or employ filtering mechanisms.21  
                                                          
19
 See Global Internet Freedom Part II n. 11, evidence of Rebecca McKinnon.  See also V.G. Kopytoff, ‘Sites like 
Twitter Absent from Free Speech Pact’ (6 March 2011), at 
www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/technology/07rights.html (last visited 5 August 2011). 
20
 1999 c. 14. 
21
 The boundary is not always so clear-cut.  This is exemplified in the famous Yahoo! case where Yahoo! hosted 
an auction site on which third parties sold Nazi memorabilia.  The sale of such material is illegal in France, yet 
the host of the content Yahoo! as well as the source of the content, originated in America. After hearing 
evidence from experts, the Court imposed on Yahoo! the obligation to block access to the material by French 
users: LICRA et UEJF v. Yahoo! Inc., Ordonnance Refere, TGI Paris, 20 November 2000, at 
www.juriscom.net/jpt/visu.php?ID=300  (last visited 21 September 2011).  This then led to an action in the US 
by Yahoo! seeking a declaration that the judgment was unenforceable because it conflicted with the First 
Amendment: Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme (2001) 169 F Supp 2d 1181 (N.D. 
Cal.). 
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Search engines, on the other hand, are far more international from the outset.  A company 
such as Google uses geolocation techniques to tailor search results to a user’s country or 
city, and it uses such techniques to filter results to comply with local law.  Consider the 
examples in the case study such as the filtering of Google search results in China or the 
different responses to the anti-Semitic site www.jewwatch.com.  Regardless of the ability to 
localise search results, the major search engine providers such as Google, Bing and Yahoo! 
are transnational with a firmly international focus.  The waters become further muddied by 
the more subtle way that search engines shape information flows.  A decision to filter a 
webpage is a more obvious act of censorship because it removes that web page from public 
circulation. However, a search engine’s rankings, the ordering of answers to search queries, 
are less obviously a free speech concern.  Yet it is equally as insidious in clamping down on 
avenues of democratic discourse, particularly in light of users reliance on search engines to 
navigate the Web and their tendency to only click on links from the top search results.22   
The combination of the transnational nature of search engines and the subtle way they 
impact free speech challenges the boundaries of state law.  It makes it more difficult for the 
UK Government to address the free speech impact of search engines domestically.  This 
drives search into the international arena where free speech is hotly contested. Western 
states are unable to agree on the scope of free speech protection, particularly concerning 
issues of hate speech, pornography and obscenity.  This proves problematic when it comes 
to setting any standards for search engine providers. For example, the miserable failure of 
the negotiations for a hate speech provision in the Convention on Cybercrime23 only served 
to highlight the differences between the American approach to hate speech and other 
Western democracies. The American constitutional system prevents the US from signing 
international accords which conflict with the US Constitution. Given the US approach to hate 
speech under the First Amendment (fight speech with speech), their negotiators were 
hamstrung from agreeing to a provision in the Convention to address hate speech, and so all 
other parties to the Convention were forced to address the issue of hate speech in the First 
Additional Protocol.24  In such an environment, there is a much greater role to play by 
                                                          
22
 B. Edelman and B. Lockwood, ‘Measuring Bias in “Organic” Web Search’, at 
http://www.benedelman.org/searchbias/ (last visited 21 September 2011). 
23
 23.XI.2001. 
24
 First Protocol to Convention on Cybercrime, 23.XI.2001.  
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companies in coming together to commit to codes of conduct to govern issues of free 
speech, because nation-states can at times be hard-pressed to cope.   
Apart from these two differences in the case studies, most of the findings concerning the 
viability of CSR as a governance tool were similar.   Four common failures with CSR as it is 
currently used to regulate IIGs emerged from the case studies. The commonality of the 
failures show the breakdown comes from two directions.  It comes from the state in failing 
to fulfil its positive obligations to protect freedom of expression by promoting a human 
rights culture in the UK, and it is a failure of businesses to respect freedom of expression 
along the lines of Ruggie’s principles by adequately addressing the impact of their business 
on human rights.  The way that these two can come together to address the human rights 
impact of IIGs on democratic culture is the creation of a Digital Rights Commission. 
B. Identifying the Problem 
 
First, imposing human rights duties, whether direct duties via legislative enactment or the 
obligation to respect outlined by Ruggie, risks disrupting the market and chilling innovation.  
In some cases it might even be a breach of fiduciary duty to the stakeholders, particularly 
when the human-rights driven decisions impact a company’s income stream.  This concern is 
common in the field of CSR and particularly so in the case of IIGs. Many a technology start-
up began in someone’s garage. A lot of the leading IT businesses we know today, such as 
Google, Microsoft, Apple, and Facebook, were all small-scale start-ups which might have 
been affected by overly-legalised human rights obligations.   In the end these are profit-
making institutions, and while we want the institution to be governed in a human rights 
compliant way, this is not the end-goal of the institution.  It is not necessarily the case that 
human rights obligations will chill innovation, simply that imposing state-like human rights 
obligations might burden a company without the capital to accommodate them.  
Such a concern, however, misses the point.  Imposing human rights obligations on business, 
whether formalised through laws or indirectly through incentives, audits or public 
praising/shaming will disrupt the market. In fact, that is the point.  The purpose is to disrupt 
the market to re-align business conduct along human rights compatible terms.  The goal is 
simply to narrowly tailor the obligations to minimise disruptions beyond the intended 
purpose of encouraging human rights compliance. Further, disruption is not necessarily a 
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bad thing if the goal and effect is to give companies more certainty about the nature of their 
responsibilities, which are otherwise litigated piece-meal through the courts. Or worse, the 
uncertainty might lead to overly censorial decisions by companies fearful of being sued. For 
example, Microsoft stopped offering a series of discussion groups in 2003-2004 because of 
fears of hosting illegal content and the associated uncertainty and expense of moderating.25   
We must remember that IIGs, particularly macro-IIGs, are different than ‘ordinary’ 
companies.  As discussed in chapter two, such companies control the flow of information in 
a way that facilitates or hinders participation in democratic culture, and macro-IIGs are 
gatekeepers we inevitably engage to go online, whether literally or figuratively. In carrying 
out a role integral to the facilitation of the Internet’s democratic potential, macro-
gatekeepers and some authority gatekeepers, are more akin to the ‘democratic public 
interest’ institutions adverted to by Ruggie and discussed in chapter three.26 There are 
certain institutions, Ruggie concluded, that are a special class of company and might invite 
additional corporate responsibilities beyond the duty to respect outlined in his framework, 
though he does not explore this further in his work.  Thus while fears of market disruption 
are real, they are abated by the narrow focus on companies going to the heart of 
democratic discourse online.  Imposition of special regulations on companies, such as media 
companies and public utilities, have a long history, particularly industries that are integral to 
the functioning of democracy.27  
The second problem with CSR identified by the case studies is that CSR is ill suited to 
oversight of the IIGs gatekeeping role.  IIGs are often not the originator of human rights 
abuses and rather are forced into a judicial role weighing competing human rights interests 
and making determinations of the merit of complaints and the information that should be 
filtered.  This dilemma is universal to the online gatekeeper, whether one is a search engine 
such as Google, an industry body such as the IWF, Apple in gatekeeping the apps that are 
available with its products, YouTube in removing offensive videos, a message board 
                                                          
25
 D. Tambini et al., Codifying Cyberspace (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 294. 
26
 J. Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises’ (2008), at www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf (last visited 27 
July 2011), p. 16. 
27
 Justifications of media regulation often centre on the media’s role in public discourse: see M. Feintuck & M. 
Varney, Media Regulation, Public Interest and the Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2006). 
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operator removing scurrilous comments, or simply a blogger removing contributions made 
to its comments section.  All are tasked with assessing the lawfulness of content that while 
within their control they did not create. While the US approach is to insulate such 
gatekeepers from liability under section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act28 and 
the European approach is to qualitatively insulate them from liability through the Electronic 
Commerce Directive’s notice-and-takedown regime,29 both systems are aimed at 
encouraging businesses to privately regulate their affairs. Thus we have a system of private 
governance running alongside the law, with its own rules, often variable and unknown, 
concerning what is acceptable and not acceptable speech.  
When the rules are set down in Terms of Services, the rights of the business are always 
framed broadly in order to avoid potential liability.  Often enough the businesses are the 
ones stuck in the middle, forced into the role of proxy censor30 by the guiding hand of 
government. This is particularly the case with ISPs, which are increasingly being pressurised 
by government (apart from the IWF) to filter a more expansive range of material.31 Such a 
judicial role is challenging to the promise of CSR.  It also distinguishes IIGs from other types 
of businesses for which CSR has been more successful in holding businesses to account.  It is 
easier to frame environmental responsibilities when the companies are the perpetrators, 
but less clear how to define judicial responsibilities in the face of conflicting local speech 
laws. The natural aversion to taking on such responsibilities combined with the complexity 
of fleshing out what the rule structure would be has impeded the development of CSR in 
this area. What becomes clear is that government guidance on what these responsibilities 
should be is crucial to move corporate governance forward. 
Third, one of the key weaknesses in current corporate governance of IIGs is the lack of 
sufficient remedial mechanisms.  The need for such mechanisms was shown in the case 
studies and has been identified by Ruggie as a touchstone of his framework. As Ruggie 
summarises, the aim of such a mechanism is ‘to counteract or make good any human rights 
                                                          
28
 47 U.S.C. 
29
 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects 
of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market. 
30
 See S.F. Kreimer, ‘Censorship By Proxy: First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the 
Weakest Link’, U. Pa. L. Rev., 155 (2006-2007) 11. 
31
 See chapter one fn 21. 
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harms that have occurred.’32  What is clear from the case studies is that core democratic 
rights of free speech are being engaged by the activities of IIGs, and yet there is little 
available to users to address potential or actual infringements of such rights through 
corporate governance mechanisms. It is asserted that ‘public signalling’33 from government 
is needed to advise companies on what is expected of them.  In the case of search engines, 
there is nothing available. There is no internal adjudicative process available through, for 
example, Google to address complaints.  In the case of ISPs and the regulatory body the 
IWF, there is a remedial mechanism, but it is simply wholly insufficient to be called human 
rights compliant.  The IWF in its capacity as a public authority certainly operates in breach of 
Article 10.  In both case studies, there were none of the criteria identified by Ruggie of 
legitimacy, accessibly, predictability, equitability, rights-compatibility, transparency or 
dialogue34 as important for a human rights compliant grievance mechanism.  
The IWF does not notify website owners their sites are being blocked, and leaves it to ISPs 
as to how the blocking will be carried out and whether they notify consumers trying to 
access such sites that the site is blocked. Thus from the outset a body like the IWF is plagued 
with issues of transparency and legitimacy. If a person finds out their site has been blocked 
or access to such a site blocked, there are a set of procedures the IWF must follow to handle 
complaints.  However, the procedures are hardly an adjudicative process or even mediation 
process, as the complainant has no access to make representations to the decision makers 
or to hear the case being made against them. Thus the process is not accessible, predictable 
or transparent. Without access to make representations, or knowledge of the reasons for 
decisions, then the decision-making body has ample room to make inequitable and rights-
infringing decisions and we are none the wiser. As a public authority under the HRA s. 6, 
much work is needed to re-shape the body to be compliant with Article 10.  Unlike search 
engines, however, which are governed mainly by voluntary codes, the task with the IWF is 
to bring it in line with its legal obligations.   
                                                          
32
 J. Ruggie, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (March 2011), at www.business-
humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pdf (last visited 4 August 
2011), p. 21. 
33
 See Ruggie evidence Joint Committee on Human Rights, Any of our business? Human rights and the UK 
private sector (First Reports of Session 2009-10), vol. II, p. 12. 
34
 For an explanation of what these criteria mean see Ruggie (2011) n. 32. 
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Fourth, there is a fundamental problem with voluntariness, which is at the heart of many 
corporate governance regimes, and is prevalent in the area of Internet governance. This is a 
tricky arena as CSR is not per se restricted to voluntary codes, as we saw in chapter three. 
There is a difference, however, between corporate governance as a broader notion, which 
includes within it well-developed self-regulatory frameworks, legislation, government 
cooperation and industry codes, and pure-CSR in the form of voluntary industry or in-house 
codes or commitments. This is particularly problematic in the UK where CSR is treated as 
extra-legal.  In so doing, this makes human rights in the context of business wholly extra-
legal.  This becomes confusing to the field of human rights, which is both a legal and extra-
legal concept, and it is both of these dimensions that the Digital Rights Commission seeks to 
harness as the governance solution.  The Joint Committee on Human Rights Report 
identified the issue of voluntariness as one of the key criticisms of Government in this area, 
commenting the Government unduly favours voluntary initiatives, and lacks policy 
coherence and leadership.35     
Pure-CSR codes simply lack the standard setting appeal and oversight necessary to the 
structure of a free speech system.  It is too reliant on the whims or commitments of 
management, thus susceptible to change over time and unreliable as a public-signal of the 
expectations of company conduct.  A change in management, for example, can lead to a 
change in the business’s human rights policies, or more insidiously, lead to no change in 
policy, but a change in the seriousness with which human rights matters are treated.  The 
work of the Private Sector and Human Rights Project found that the commitment of 
particular leaders in a company was the ‘dominant driver for engaging with human rights.’36 
The finding was particularly the case for companies that operated outside the public sector 
and industry regulation,37 which would be the case for most macro-IIGs such as ISPs and 
search engines. The problem inherent in this situation is exacerbated by the fact that IT 
companies, in terms of their democratic impact, are changeable, and the Internet 
environment is unstable.  This leaves the public hopelessly confused and offers none of the 
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 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Any of our business? Human rights and the UK private sector (First 
Reports of Session 2009-10), vol. I, p. 53. 
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 Twentyfifty, The Private Sector and Human Rights in the UK, (October 2009), p. 42. 
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 Ibid., p. 52. 
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characteristics of due process needed to be a governance framework.  Most important, it 
makes it more difficult to establish and sustain human rights standards.   
In the case of IIGs, voluntary codes are too heavily burdened with the task of delineating the 
nature of their judicial role.  In the case of human rights, voluntary frameworks generally 
only draw-in those already committed to human rights, and initiatives like the GNI are 
plagued by a lack of take-up by key gatekeepers of democratic discourse, such as Facebook 
and Twitter.38 Businesses become stuck in the middle, reluctant to take on the burden of 
adjudicating on human rights, both in terms of resources and effort, whilst the Government 
outsources the obligation through the backdoor of public pressure.  This is not an arena 
where Government pressure alone will suffice.  As Ruggie states, ‘[a]t the end of the day, 
therefore, the promotion of voluntary approaches by governments often differs very little 
from laissez-faire.’39  We need to stop thinking about CSR as something purely voluntary and 
extra-legal, and start thinking of this simply as one of the various tools that we need to use 
in order to address the issues of business and human rights, some legal and some extra-
legal.40  For this, we need Government leadership. 
If the commitment is to the democratising potential of the Internet and a human rights 
culture in the UK, positive steps must be taken to secure this system, which voluntariness 
cannot on its own enable.  In the context of IIGs, leadership is needed to retain a focus on 
digital free speech issues, as otherwise it is easily relegated to the backseat behind issues of 
discrimination and labour, which more urgently and readily capture the attention of policy 
makers. The result is that Government has positive obligations to frame something that has 
both legal and extra-legal dimensions.  Why not then discard CSR entirely in favour of top-
down legal controls? It is the legal and extra-legal dimensions of the subject matter of digital 
free speech for which voluntariness has a key role to play and that makes CSR a crucial 
component of any governance solution that is finally arrived at.  
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 See recent criticism of Kopytoff n. 19, and see evidence in Global Internet Freedom Part I and II, n. 11. 
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 Joint Committee on Human Rights vol. II n. 33, p. 8. 
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 Ruggie describes it as follows: ‘[t]he human rights policies of states in relation to business need to be pushed 
beyond their narrow institutional confines.  Governments need actively to promote a corporate culture 
respect of human rights at home and abroad’: Joint Committee on Human Rights n. 35, p. 61. He suggests such 
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to Export Credit Guarantees. 
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Voluntariness brings businesses to the negotiating table, involving them in the process of 
defining their roles and responsibilities and thereby has more potential to capture the spirit 
of commitment on the part of companies.  This is particularly important in the field of 
human rights, where its moral force is often of greater weight and value than its legal 
dimension.  Further, it has greater potential to realise free speech values without as readily 
chilling innovation, and has more potential to prompt a culture change, which is needed to 
truly embed human rights into everyday Internet governance by business.  Additionally, CSR 
has greater potential to address responsibilities of transnational companies at an 
international level when there are variations in national law, allowing them to carve out a 
path of responsibility and create standards.  As Daniel J. Weiztner, the associate 
administrator of policy for the US Department of Commerce, commented at the Global 
Internet Freedom Senate Hearings in 2010, 
Some part of the way that we can come together in an environment where the 
Internet can actually function globally…We should have a basic expectation of 
due process. National rules may vary but when they become arbitrary I think we 
all have a concern. That is most concern for the individual rights at stake. By the 
same token transparency and predictability of these rules wherever they fall on 
the spectrum and however that spectrum evolves over time are essential if we 
are going to have a viable commercial environment.41 
What clearly won’t work in this arena is legislation that regulates indirectly by encouraging 
take-up of CSR policies through the backdoor.  Such legislation includes, for example, the UK 
Companies Act, which under s. 417(5) requires companies to provide information on their 
CSR policies in their annual directors’ report.42  Such creative legislating helps uptake of CSR 
codes, but it does not provide the policy framework needed for the murky arena of free 
speech protection.  How would such legislation help advise ISPs on the information to be 
filtered, or social networking sites or blog providers on the information to be taken down?  
The combination of this type of legislation without guidance on how to go about it might 
have the opposite effect and paralyse companies, preventing them from moving forward for 
fear of falling foul of widely-drawn codes in ways that they cannot predict.  Such legislation 
                                                          
41
 Global Internet Freedom Part II n. 11, testimony of Daniel J. Weitzner, finishing at 70:34. 
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 Companies Act 2006 c. 46, s. 417.  Note that the requirement is narrowed to the extent that information 
provided must only be ‘to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or 
position of the company’s business’ (s. 417(5)).  The Director, however, is required to have regard to the 
company’s impact on the community and environment under s. 172. See also discussion Joint Committee on 
Human Rights vol. I n. 35, pp. 74-75. 
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fails to provide the coherence and standards needed for facilitation of the Internet’s 
democratic potential. Likewise, promotion of generic risk assessment tools, such as is 
promoted by the UK National Contact Point (NCP)43, does not solve the issues raised by IIGs.  
There is something more fundamental about IIGs, in particular macro-IIGs, which cannot be 
addressed by a risk assessment tool.  
What is needed is a partnership, but with the Government firmly at the lead.  This will 
better institute the legal and extra-legal dimension of human rights.  What is not advocated 
is multi-stakeholderism, as what is sought is operational in nature, which multi-
stakeholderism struggles to achieve.44  Rather, what is proposed is an avenue to 
operationalise free speech commitments. As Aurora Voilescu describes this kind of 
governance, it is ‘interactive voluntarism’ where a governance regime originates with 
government or is underpinned by regulatory interventions.45 It will be argued here that 
government leadership with voluntariness running alongside it addresses many of the 
problems identified above concerning corporate governance and IIGs. The remainder of this 
chapter outlines what this vision entails. 
II. FRAMING THE SOLUTION 
 
The partnership envisioned here places the government in a meta-regulatory capacity, or in 
a position to engage in the legal regulation of self-regulation, an arrangement where a 
government body has oversight of industry and in-house corporate governance in the arena 
of human rights.46    For certain industries of the information society, the optimal approach 
will be reflexive in that well-defined processes are used to underpin open and undefined 
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 See information on the UK NCP at www.bis.gov.uk/nationalcontactpoint (last visited 13 September 2011). 
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 Multi-stakeholderism here refers to how it has been used in forums such as the Internet Governance Forum, 
and discussed by academics such as Wolfgang Kleinwachter.  The IGF thus far has been unable to move beyond 
platforms of discussion of principles to rules or plans of actions. 
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 See discussion in chapter three. A. Voilescu, ‘Changing paradigms of corporate criminal responsibility: 
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Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 373. 
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‘Meta-regulation: legal accountability for corporate social responsibility’ in ibid. and C. Scott, ‘Reflexive 
Governance, Meta-Regulation, and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Heineken Effect’ in N. Boeger et al. 
(eds.), Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Cheltenham, Eward Elgar, 2008). 
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outcomes.47  While this might appear too woolly for furtherance of free speech online, it is 
not without enforcement effect.  For example, communicating these policies to the public 
becomes itself a benchmark against which companies are judged, framing the public 
conversation and public expectation.48  Thus while simple encouragement by government is 
insufficient, we must remember than the law can be a blunt instrument, and to not turn to it 
as the panacea.  In other situations, more well-defined legal frameworks will be required, 
such as in the case of filtering where the decision of the company or industry body has an 
immediate censorship effect on the circulation of information. The unifying factor in this is 
that a single body oversees issues of business and human rights for the Information society.  
The state duty to protect would be realised through creation of such a body setting out the 
structure of obligations, and through this better frame the realisation of a company’s duty 
to respect. 
One of the key problems faced by companies is a failure to recognise what is and what is not 
a human rights issue.  This is particularly so for free speech. Google is one of the key 
participants in the GNI, yet as we have seen even it fails to recognise the free speech 
significance of its core business, arguing rather the opposite in cases such as Search King Inc. 
v. Google Technology, Inc.,49 that the rankings are the search providers free speech right.  A 
body such as is being suggested here is needed to identify the areas for which IIGs are 
responsible for human rights, and to look forward at the rapidly changing Information 
society to identify upcoming areas of human rights significance and advise companies and 
thereby build human rights into technological design and policy. We are at the precipice of a 
human rights explosion in the arena of mobile telephony and such a body could work with 
industry at the ground-level defining the contours of their human rights responsibilities.  
Thus such a body would not only serve a remedial role for human rights abuses, but would 
also help to guide companies in avoiding abuses in the first place.50  In this role, the 
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 Scott ibid., pp. 174-175.  Not everything discussed by Scott concerning reflexive governance and CSR is 
advocated as applicable here.  Also see here the work of A. Murray on symbiotic regulation: A. Murray, 
‘Symbiotic Regulation’, J. Marshall J.of Computer & Info. L., 26(2) (2009) 207. 
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 This would be a type of alternative meta-regulation discussed by C. Scott in his article. 
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 (2003) Case No. CIV-02-1457-M (W.D.Okla.). 
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 Ruggie suggests this type of thing internal to companies saying it allows one to address problems earlier 
before things escalate: Ruggie (2011) n. 32, p. 25. 
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Commission pushes CSR principles outside the law and also discharges the state’s duty to 
protect free speech at the same time. 
The challenge will be to convince the UK Government that such a body is needed.  After all, 
a more generalised body to address issues of human rights and business and the 
environment has been suggested and so far has not been taken up by the Government.51  
Yet it is its focus on the information society and the specificity of the needs regarding this 
society that makes such a body compelling. A commission tasked with business and human 
rights is a wide mandate, yet a body focused on companies in the information society, 
namely information and communications technology (ICT) companies, is focused on their 
human rights responsibilities as it relates to communication.   
In addition, there is precedent set in this area with existence of the Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO).  The ICO is a product of the Data Protection Act 1984 to 
oversee safeguarding of personal data, and since then its responsibilities have expanded to 
include oversight of access to information held by public authorities under the Freedom of 
Information Act and the Environmental Information Regulations.52  The ICO will be discussed 
in more detail below.  In addition, the Government has recently turned its attention to 
regulation of surveillance technologies.  In February 2011, the UK Home Secretary 
introduced the Protection of Freedoms Bill, which proposes creating a Surveillance Camera 
Commissioner to oversee a Code of Practice for CCTV systems.53  At the time of writing, the 
Bill is at the report stage before the House of Commons.   The Digital Rights Commission 
proposed here would be focused on gatekeepers of digital discourse because they are the 
chokepoints to democratic participation. 
The literature tends to be split on the optimal framework to address business and human 
rights. One group sees the proper role and responsibilities of businesses in the arena of 
human rights to mirror the obligations of the state, or at minimum, to be a product of 
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 Joint Committee on Human Rights vol. I n. 35, pp. 4, 89-90.  Note in 2010 the government axed 192 such 
bodies: The BBC, ‘Quango list shows 192 to be axed’ (14 October 2010), at www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
11538534 (last visited 3 November 2011). 
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 See www.ico.gov.uk/what_we_cover.aspx (last visited 23 September 2011).  For history, see 
www.ico.gov.uk/about_us/our_organisation/history.aspx (last visited 23 September 2011). 
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 Protection of Freedoms Bill 2010-2011, at http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-
11/protectionoffreedoms.html (last visited 21 September 2011).  See Home Office Press Release, ‘Sweeping 
reforms to restore British liberties’, at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/press-releases/sweeping-reform 
(21 September 2011).  
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government policies.  Such groups often see pure-CSR policies as not doing enough to 
remedy or prevent human rights abuses and argue for more structured, stringent 
governance frameworks and remedial mechanisms that are for the most part legally 
binding.54 Evidence by several witnesses before the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
favoured CSR frameworks ‘underpinned’ by a legally binding framework of human rights.55  
The other group argues the value of voluntary company codes, and the use of alternative 
measures to ensure respect for human rights.  Such measures include the encouragement of 
human rights impact assessments, independent audits and mediation services, and 
emphasise the ability of voluntary codes to better capture the spirit of commitment than 
legal benchmarks.56 This split is unnecessary.  There is room to accommodate both, and as 
the case studies showed, both approaches are needed to address the governance of 
Internet gatekeepers.   
At the outset, certain basic requirements of such a body can be identified. First, we cannot 
treat all forms of CSR and all forms of situations the same. IIGs are varied, not only in terms 
of the types of businesses and their impact on democracy, but in terms of their size and 
resources.  Thus any body created must be able to accommodate such variations.  In fact, 
the variety involved brings home the need for a singular body to set policy and the 
standards against which the activities of these companies are judged.   
Second, rules set down in codes of conduct or policies are needed. The case studies 
revealed that the failure of international CSR initiatives was in moving from generalised 
principles to rules of operation.57 It is easy enough for the UN Global Compact to advise 
companies to respect Article 19 of the UDHR, but another thing entirely to advise 
companies on how to do this. Here lies the problem and is particularly complex for IIGs as a 
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 See for example, A. Ganesan, ‘Viewpoint: Why Voluntary Initiatives Aren’t Enough’, Leading Perspectives, 
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result of their judicial role.  Bodies such as the Forest Stewardship Council58 have been 
successful in encouraging more responsible forestry, but the goal with such a body is 
increased take-up of such responsibility, therefore voluntariness and the spirit of 
commitment feed the legitimacy and success of such a body.  In the case of IIGs, 
standardisation is necessary for free speech to be facilitated online, thus voluntariness on its 
own is insufficient.  Further forestry companies do not have to tackle the weighing of 
competing rights and interests as do IIGs, the latter requiring clear government advice on 
how this is to be done.  
 It would seem that media regulatory bodies such as the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) 
would provide insight into where to go, but we are not there yet with the Internet. The 
press has long been recognised as central to democracy, and the PCC is an outgrowth of this 
long-held commitment.  Government and business have a lot more work to do defining and 
recognising the human rights impact of IIGs before codes such as the PCC’s Editors’ Code of 
Practice can be successful for the Internet environment.59  In any event, there are legitimate 
questions about the sufficiency of the PCC for press regulation, particularly in light of recent 
events such as the PCC’s initial failure to take seriously the hacking claims against the News 
of the World.60  Further, there is an education and research arm to the proposed body, 
which will be discussed below, not reflected in the narrow regulatory role of the PCC. The 
body proposed here must work with companies and civil society to create rules and policies 
against which companies can be judged.  The conclusion, as will be set out, is that a new 
body is needed. 
We must be mindful of the risks of capture, which is particularly pressing when tasking a 
body to govern human rights as applied to the private sector.61 For example, Canada’s 
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National Human Rights Institution (NHRI), the Canada Human Rights Commission, has been 
embroiled in a series of controversies where the body has been accused of overstepping its 
proper reach and being captured by one-sided interests.62  This has damaged the legitimacy 
of the body in the eyes of the public.  The risk of a Digital Rights Commission being created 
with power over business and little accountability or legitimacy is of concern, in particular 
because this too can disrupt the market and chill innovation.  There is a real risk with tasking 
a body to define the obligations of profit-making institutions for human rights if it is not 
legislatively set. The powers, duties and scope of such a body would have to be clearly and 
narrowly defined by government, and particular care would have to be taken concerning the 
makeup of the Commission Board who oversee policy and adjudicate complaints. 
The final point to be made before setting out the characteristics of the model proposed is an 
acknowledgment.  The source of funding for such a body is not the focus of this chapter, but 
I would be remiss were I not to flag for the reader that the creation of such a body requires 
a lot of resources whether raised privately or publicly.  While there are options available, 
such as membership fees or industry levies, the economics of such a body is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  What this thesis does is set out an area where there exists a 
governance gap and for which governance is needed to be human rights compliant, and 
then sets out a model framework to satisfy human rights principles for which funding 
options can then be explored. 
A. A New Model for Corporate Governance 
 
What is needed is a framework that builds human rights safeguards into the governance 
structure.  Any communication occurs in an environment of rules.63  The challenge, as 
articulated by Damian Tambini et al., is ‘to ensure that rules are democratically set at the 
necessary minimum, procedurally fair, accountable and in the public interest.’64  Above all, 
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due process is needed in the administration of free speech. Unifying the system of free 
speech governance of ICTs under one body in the UK will solve most of the problems of due 
process, because it will provide a focal point, and decisions of the body would be expected 
to be made in a manner that are not arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable or unfair. 
Linked with this notion is the need for the body, and the businesses, to be accountable to 
the public.65 The rules that are then instituted need to be predictable, accessible, 
transparent, and proportionate, and businesses and the public must be educated about 
their rights and how to access the system.  This fits well with Ruggie’s criteria for non-
judicial grievance mechanisms that they be legitimate, accessible, predictable, transparent, 
rights-compatible, and involve learning and engagement with stakeholders.66  
Drawing on these criteria, the corporate governance model proposed for the Commission 
has three layers: education, research and policy; company support in the form of policies, 
assessment tools, and auditing and advisory services; and rule-setting and adjudication. See 
Figure 10 below for a model of this governance framework.  These three layers together 
would be the UK’s strategy for addressing business and human rights issues in the 
information society.  The key value in this framework is that it has legal and extra-legal 
dimensions, with the bottom layer forming primarily legal dimensions, the top layer focused 
on extra-legal dimensions, and the middle layered working to bring the two together.  The 
figure below is also consciously reminiscent of Benkler’s three layered model of the Internet 
to tease out for the reader that layered regulation is needed for a layered communication 
network.  Under Benkler’s model of the Internet one has the physical infrastructure layer 
layer, logical infrastructure layer, and the content layer.67  In human rights terms, the 
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Society, 27(1) (2000) 38 where he describes accountability as referring to giving account of one’s actions. 
66
 Note Ruggie’s criteria are focused on those of a remedial mechanism, while it is argued here that such 
criteria have broader application to the governance framework.  The list also has similarities to the principles 
of good regulation. Pre-Coalition, BERR identified five principles of good regulation: that it was transparent, 
accountable, proportionate, consistent, and targeted: http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/bre/index.html (no 
longer available). D. Tambini et al., identified guidelines for self-regulation in cyberspace as: external 
involvement creating the framework, stakeholder involvement, independence from industry, consumer 
representation, known rules and complaints procedure, keeping the scheme up to date, and reporting 
requirements: n. 25, pp. 282-285.  C. Maclay, in talking about the GNI, noted the following as underlying values 
for success: efficacy, adaptability, scalability, transparency, legitimacy, neutrality and sustainability: n. 15, pp. 
102-103. 
67
 Y. Benkler’s model of the Internet is: (1) the physical infrastructure layer, which comprises the physical 
components of the Internet that makes it work such as wires, cables, and hardware, (2) the logical 
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various layers can be seen in Figure 7 in chapter three differentiating between the state 
duty to protect, indirect legal obligations and pure-CSR.  For the sake of clarity, the top and 
bottom layers will be elucidated first to better contextualise the key work of the middle 
layer. 
Remedial Mechanism
Corporate Support
 Policies
 Assessment Tools
 Audits
Education,
Policy and
Research
Extra-Legal
Legal
 
Figure 10 Corporate Governance Model 
At the top layer is the education, research and policy arm. The public need to be educated in 
two respects.  There needs to be better awareness about the responsibilities businesses 
have for human rights.  Information in the form of publications, updates and advisories 
would help translate the confusing arena of human rights and business to points of 
communication for the public. The Intellectual Property Office is an excellent example in this 
regard, with its website www.ipo.gov.uk providing educative information on intellectual 
property law and the services the Office provides in its role as the official government body 
for intellectual property.  The ICO is similarly valuable in advocating on issues concerning 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and transmitted such as TCP/IP protocol, software applications and browsers, and (3) the content layer, which 
comprises the content itself: Y. Benkler, ‘From Consumers to Users: the Deeper Structures of Regulation 
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access’, Fed. Comm. L.J., 52 (2000) 561.  These various aspects at work 
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data protection through its membership in the Article 29 Working Party68 and through its 
issuance of reports and good practice guides for the public and businesses.69 
There also needs to be awareness of the remedial mechanisms available to consumers who 
feel they have had their rights infringed.  Part of this education will come once we have a 
better understanding of what these responsibilities are and once we have created a 
remedial mechanism, but once this work is done it is of no use unless the public and 
businesses are aware of its substance. Such a responsibility will be on-going for the 
Commission, particularly in continually educating the public concerning human rights issues 
that develop and change with technological change.   The businesses need to be educated 
as well. The Private Sector and Human Rights project found that most businesses associate 
human rights only with their overseas operation, and where focused on at a national level, it 
was treated not as human rights, but as a workplace issue regarding, for example, labour 
standards.70   
Part of this educative arm is the Commission educating itself on human rights issues.  There 
is a research component to this area that sorely needs attention.  This need is particularly 
acute for the Information society where there are so many varied industries intersecting 
online, and thus tailored solutions and policies are needed.  Sweeping up the area of human 
rights, business and technology into broader areas of corporate governance or human rights 
is a risk. It might simply regurgitate the facile treatment of the subject thus far wasting 
resources and time and bringing us no further toward responsible business treatment of 
human rights in the technology sector.  What is missing from this arena is engagement with 
the issues in any depth. We can take cues from the Danish Institute for Human Rights71 in 
this respect, which has a research department that works in cooperation with academic 
institutions, as well as the business and human rights project that draws from the work of 
researchers to develop methodologies to address business issues.72  However, bear in mind 
the Danish Institute’s scope is much broader than advocated here. The Commission 
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proposed is focused on businesses responsibilities for freedom of expression in the digital 
environment and is driven by a desire to facilitate the Internet’s democratic potential. 
At the base layer of the model is the remedial and rule-making arm of the Commission.  This 
layer applies to all IIGs. A key governance gap identified in my research as well as the work 
of Ruggie is the lack of a sufficient remedial mechanism for Internet users impacted by the 
activities of businesses, whether as the website owner (speakers) or information seekers 
(listeners/speakers). As shown in chapters four and five, those whose businesses suffer as a 
result of inexplicable drops in rankings, or whose website has been blocked for unknown or 
arguably unjustifiable reasons, have had their right to participate in democratic discourse 
impacted and require access to a forum to resolve the dispute.  This mechanism is the 
bedrock of the Commission’s governance framework underpinning any CSR frameworks 
companies might devise.  It may be that in accessing this forum, a complainant is found to 
have not suffered any free speech infringement, but it is the access to a forum for 
remediation that is the key to building the much needed administrative structure of free 
speech online.  
The drafters of the GNI refrained from creating a remedial mechanism of the type 
envisioned here for fear that there would be a deluge of complaints that would tax the 
resources of the body.73  This concern is more theoretical than real. The answer is not to 
remove access to a much needed remedial mechanism but rather to build disincentives into 
the framework to dissuade the casual complainer.  First, instituting a formal complaint will 
require time and effort on the part of the complainant.  Second, there should be an initial 
investigative stage by the Commission to assess the substantiality of a claim to weed out 
trivial or abusive claims.  Such substantiality has found its way into defamation law74 and 
can be drawn from to create an initial hurdle for a claim to proceed.  A complainant would 
be able to appeal such a finding, which again would indicate seriousness on the part of a 
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complainant that would weed out some of the more casual complainers.  Last, a financial 
disincentive can be built into the framework, such as a financial penalty if the complaint is 
found to be frivolous or vexatious at the appeals stage.75  It must also be borne in mind that 
some of the issues adverted to concerning remedial mechanisms simply reflect the wider 
problems faced by the legal system, which are then exacerbated when the framework is 
non-judicial in nature.76   
In designing the dispute resolution framework, guidance can be sought from the UK’s 
Nominet Dispute Resolution model77, and the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
Arbitration and Mediation Centre.78  Suggested procedural steps in a complaint are as 
follows.79  First, a complaint is assessed for substantiality, a low level threshold to weed out 
trivial or abusive claims.  Second, assuming a complaint passes this threshold, the 
complainant and business will have the option to engage in mediation to resolve the 
dispute. This author is hesitant to impose mandatory mediation as in certain circumstances 
mediation will quite obviously not be able to resolve the dispute, and then the process 
becomes a burden on time and money and a simple hurdle to get to the adjudicative 
process.80 Third, the complaint would be adjudicated with opportunities for the complainant 
and business to make representations and hear the case being made in opposition to theirs. 
One of the failures of the IWF’s structure was the lack of transparency concerning the 
adjudicative process. It purportedly existed but those embroiled in the dispute had no real 
access to it.  
Fourth, the Commission in adjudicating a case must have the power to award damages to 
the complainant for a breach of what will be called at this stage ‘the rules’, or at minimum 
the Commission must have the power to impose a fine on the offending business. The 
human rights compliance of self-regulatory bodies such as the PCC is in doubt ever since 
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Peck v. United Kingdom,81 where the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the 
lack of domestic remedy through the PCC and the predecessors to the Office of 
Communications (Ofcom), the Broadcasting Standards Council and the Independent 
Television Commission, breached the right to a remedy under Article 12.  Without the legal 
power to award damages to the complainant, something the Court noted to be different 
than the power to fine; such bodies did not provide an effective remedy under law.82  The 
UK Government has somewhat ignored this ruling in its subsequent set-up of Ofcom, 
limiting its power to the imposition of fines.  What we can conclude from the above is that 
the power to fine will make such a body compliant with the views of the UK Government, 
but the power to award damages will be needed to be European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) compliant, thus the optimal framework will allow for the awarding of 
damages.   
Without at minimum the power to fine, the body proposed here would be hamstrung from 
protecting and promoting digital human rights. This need was recognised recently 
concerning privacy violations. In the face of a series of egregious breaches of the data 
protection principles,83 such as Google gathering personal information from Wi-Fi networks 
via its street-view cars,84 the Government recognised the need for the Information 
Commissioner to have the power to fine organisations.85  The extent of damages awarded 
would depend ultimately on the type of gatekeeper and seriousness of harm.  Ruggie talks 
about this in terms of size and structure of firms, stating, ‘[t]he means through which a 
business enterprise meets its responsibility to respect human rights will be proportional to, 
among other things, its size.’86  Here it is a question of the type of gatekeeper, whether a 
company is a macro, authority or micro-IIG based on its democratic impact.  The 
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Commission should also have the power to make orders, though care would have to be 
taken in defining the extent of this power.  Just as Nominet has the power to revoke 
ownership of a domain name deemed fraudulently or otherwise illegally obtained, the 
Digital Rights Commission should have the power to, for example, order the removal of 
URLs from the IWF’s Blacklist.   
Fifth, access to this remedial framework can be either the first step in the remedial process 
or the appeal mechanism.  If an institution has a remedial mechanism in-house or through 
an industry association this would be the first stop for an individual, but such a decision 
would be reviewable by the Digital Rights Commission for human rights compliance.  If, 
however, no remedial mechanism exists, as is the case with search engines, then individuals 
can access the remedial mechanism of the Digital Rights Commission as a first step.  The 
steps in the remedial process are summarised in Figure 11. 
Complaint
Substantiality
Claim Dismissed/
Dropped
Appeal
Optional Mediation
Adjudication
 
Figure 11 Remedial Process 
The question is then the system of rules against which institutions are judged.  A generalised 
code concerning the duty of companies to respect human rights against principles from the 
UDHR, as seen in the UN Global Compact, is a necessary if generalised first step.  This initial 
commitment is important to spell out for companies their duty to respect human rights, and 
locates the source of duties for companies  These rules accompany the remedial mechanism 
in the base-layer of the corporate governance model, because they are applicable to all IIGs, 
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and draws from such international instruments ‘transnational stamp of legitimacy.’ 87  A 
body such as the IWF, for example, could not only turn to the Commission in its advisory 
role, but could act as partners with the Commission carrying out the dispute resolution 
aspect of the IWF’s operation.  This is when the work of the second layer of governance is 
engaged, as policies specific to the various ICTs can be crafted here. 
This second layer, the ‘corporate support’ layer, is the most promising yet complicated layer 
of the corporate governance model, because it joins the legal and extra-legal arms together.  
This layer includes formalised policies and codes, whether drafted by the Commission or 
external to the Commission itself but approved by the Commission. It also includes auditing 
and advisory services, issuances of opinions, and help in the form of assessment tools.  For 
example, an advisory by such a body that it considers the IWF to be a public authority for 
the purposes of the HRA would be very helpful, if anything to spur the body to revisit its 
own governance structure.  With regard to the GNI, for example, its framework of principles 
can form the basis against which a GNI member might be reviewed by the Commission.88  In 
addition, this layer becomes the arena for taking the ideas from the research and education 
layer above and operationalising it. This might be in the form of policies for a particular 
industry, or toolkits for businesses to engage in human rights risk assessments.   
Two duties emerge as key for this second layer. First, for a specific sub-industry, such as 
search engines or ISPs, or topics, such as privacy, a coherent package must be available, with 
policies against which a company will be judged laid clear in the form of Codes of Practice or 
identification of external codes against which companies will be judged (internal or 
industry), and toolkits and guidance mechanisms to help companies operationalise these 
duties to prevent abuses of rights.  This is the legal and extra-legal arms working together in 
its purest form.  Second, the Commission must have the capacity to independently audit 
such companies for their human rights compliance, as a step to prevent human rights 
abuses or at minimum prevent the escalation of abuses.  Related to this, the Commission 
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must act as a helpline to companies, providing advice where they are uncertain of how to 
handle a given situation.   
The value in this approach is that it encourages and brings within its ambit CSR codes, which 
run alongside it. Such codes can help inform the policies of the Commission and likewise the 
Commission’s work can help frame the legitimacy and content of such codes. In the case of 
search engines, they can further develop the GNI to address remedial issues, or they can 
choose not to address such issues, and be subject at first instance to complaints to the 
Commission remedial body.  As a helpline, such a service is familiar to such bodies as law 
societies, which have advisory services for lawyers concerned about an ethical dilemma they 
are facing with a client.  Likewise a company such as Google can seek out the advice of such 
a Commission on how to handle a judicial-type decision it is forced to make in the UK. This 
would not only help Google, but would help a body such as the Commission in gathering 
information that would feed its policy development role.  Such a framework also encourages 
international standardisation, because it can inform and draw from such codes, but the 
research arm of the Commission can also observe and assess international movement in this 
area. In developing the governance framework of this body, the pressing question that 
emerges is where to house such a body. 
B. The Need for a New Commission 
 
As Eve Darian-Smith and Colin Scott state, ‘growing nonstate regulatory power requires 
either an acceptance of diminished rights or the elaboration of a new rights narrative which 
more effectively embraces private power.’89  As we have seen in this thesis reliance on 
voluntary codes or regulatory bodies has often differed little from an acceptance of 
diminished rights.  This risks the Internet’s democratic potential.  We need a self-standing 
Digital Rights Commission to set the framework of a new rights narrative for ICTs; as will be 
shown this is too important and too cross-cutting to be slotted into the machinery of 
existing bodies.   
We must, however, look closer to these bodies to identify why they are of limited appeal to 
satisfy the vision articulated here.  The technical particularities of this industry compel the 
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need for something specialised, which presents difficulties from the outset as to the 
appropriateness of looking to existing regulatory bodies, such as the ICO, Ofcom, the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) or the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) NCP in the UK Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS).  Their mandates are too broad-based to handle the complexity of what is going 
on here without at minimum the creation of a sub-commission or executive agency to 
handle it.  The EHRC is a specialist in human rights without knowledge specific to the ICT 
industry, while Ofcom is a specialist in media and new media, with no human rights 
specialism, and BIS specialises in business and growth, not human rights or ICTs.  The ICO 
would seem the natural choice given the characteristics sought in this Commission, 
however, the ICO has struggled to handle its expanding remit as is and is focused more 
properly on data protection and data access issues than freedom of expression.  What is 
needed is a re-alignment of thinking on the part of Government concerning the importance 
of the Internet to democratic discourse through the creation of a Commission aimed at 
specialising in all three: business, human rights, and ICTs.  It is this lacuna in governance that 
has been the main theme running through this thesis, which the state has a duty to fill.   
First, the power to fine or award damages identified as necessary in the base layer of the 
governance model dismisses BIS and the OECD NCP from consideration.  The idea of a fine 
requires that something is identified as prohibited.  This would require either (a) laws 
setting down the act is prohibited, or (b) voluntary agreement of the members that they be 
subject to fines.  Thus a body such as Ofcom finds authority to fine under section 237 of the 
Communications Act90, while on the other hand with a self-regulatory body such as the PCC, 
the members have not agreed to be fined for a breach of the Code of Practice.91 The model 
proposed here is not entirely voluntary and thus we cannot rely on agreement by 
businesses to be fined, thus we are reliant on laws setting down the power to fine. In this 
case, legislative enactment of this duty on the body would be necessary.  
Regardless, BIS is ill-suited to take on the role envisioned here. BIS only serves an 
information and guidance role, thus its power to develop policies binding on businesses and 
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offer remediation services is more limited.  If BIS were found to be the proper home for this 
Commission, it should be as an Executive Agency to BIS akin to the setup of the Intellectual 
Property Office.92 In BIS’ capacity as the NCP for the OECD Guidelines, there is more 
promise, but the NCP role in the UK is still relatively toothless. The UK NCP was reformed in 
2006 after complaints about its operation and structure, but its lack of remedial powers 
against companies and for victims continues to be a pressing problem.93  The reader will 
recall the example given in chapter three concerning the investigation into Vedanta Plc 
regarding its mining operations in Orissa, India.  Vedanta simply refused to participate in the 
mediation, and the UK NCP did not have any powers to compel participation beyond 
expressing disappointment.94  Too much work would be needed to flesh out the NCP role to 
take on what is needed for the Commission envisioned here. 
The ICO is equally problematic, at least in its current form in the UK.  The role of the ICO in 
other countries such as Canada, are more comfortable with the role of investigator and 
advocate as set out in the top layer of the model, and thus better suited to taking on the 
role envisioned by the body proposed here.95  With regards to the UK, however, the ICO is a 
creature of statute and the focus thus far, as indicated above, is narrowly on issues of data 
protection and data access.  It would have difficulty accommodating the more amorphous 
issues pertaining to freedom of expression on the Internet.  The history of the ICO dates to 
1984 with the enactment of the Data Protection Act and its eight principles of good practice.  
A Data Protection Register was created to oversee the Act and manage registration of data 
controllers.96  Over the years its role has expanded. It fields questions and complaints, 
educates the public and businesses, participates in policy discussions, and now can impose 
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substantial fines.97  It took on its current form as ICO in 2000 when it was tasked with also 
overseeing the Freedom of Information Act, and its remit was further expanded in 2005 
with oversight of Environmental Information Regulations.    
As it stands the ICO is a cautionary tale of what can go wrong with the type of model 
proposed here.  Bodies such as Privacy International are deeply critical of the ICO for being 
toothless and failing to engage properly in the advocacy work it purports to undertake with 
the effect of diverting attention away from important matters of privacy.98  This is illustrated 
in the Google Streetview case discussed briefly above, where Google’s Streetview cars 
collected sensitive personal information including emails, passwords and URLs.99  The ICO’s 
initial position was that it was not a breach of the Data Protection Act, which led the 
Metropolitan Police to decide to stop investigating the matter.  The ICO’s view was hasty 
and wrong, and it was forced to reverse its position later.  The ICO further cemented the 
weakness of its bite even when exercised, when it imposed a flimsy fine of £1000 on 
Andrew Crossley, the sole operator of ACS: Law, for the leaking of the personal information 
of thousands of file sharers.100  The ICO has a lot of work sorting out its current role 
concerning data protection and privacy before expanding to accommodate what is needed 
here. 
The EHRC has more promise, but ultimately only serves to show the importance of a self-
standing Digital Rights Commission. It is the UK’s National Human Rights Institution (NHRI).  
Ruggie has identified NHRIs as promising bodies for the implementation of his Protect, 
Respect, Remedy framework, describing NHRIs as potential ‘lynchpins’ in the system of 
grievance mechanisms for companies and human rights, because they can provide 
‘culturally appropriate, accessible, and expeditious’ remedies, and when they can’t they can 
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provide information.101  While the idea of NHRIs goes back to period just after the Second 
World War and the adoption of the UDHR in 1948,102 they gained a focal point with the 
drafting of the UN Paris Principles,103 a set of guidelines for local human rights institutions, 
which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1993.104  The same year at the Second 
International Conference, the International Coordinating Committee of NHRIS (ICC) was 
created to coordinate the activities of NHRI and created a sub-committee to accredit NHRIs 
that complied with the Paris Principles. Currently 67 NHRIs are accredited with A status, 
including the UK’s EHRC.105   
The EHRC is the product of legislative enactment through the Equality Act 2006.  It took over 
the Commission for Racial Equality, the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Disability 
Commission.106 Due to its history it is more deeply rooted in equality issues than human 
rights, a problem that persists today, and is problematic to tasking the body with the 
commission work proposed here.  The EHRC has the scope to do the work articulated in this 
chapter by its generalised mandate to address human rights in the UK as the anointed NHRI.  
The EHRC, however, has been quite timid in the few years since its creation in expanding 
beyond its focus on equality, and yet has managed to be plagued by issues of in-fighting, 
with six commissioners resigning in 2009.107  Academics such as the LSE’s professorial 
research fellow Francesca Klug have argued that at a most basic level, the EHRC is simply 
‘not providing us with a credible vision of what human rights are’.108  While there is 
recognition of the need for institutional stability by the creation of such a Commission, 
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many question whether the EHRC is doing much to further a human rights culture in 
Britain.109   
With regard to the issue of business and human rights, the EHRC is even more timid.   In the 
Joint Commission hearings, the EHRC was cautious about assuming additional 
responsibilities stating that it was new and ‘still finding its feet’ concerning business and 
human rights.110  Further, the EHRC’s work in the private sector has been focused, once 
again, primarily on issues of equality, specifically elimination of discrimination and equality 
in the workplace,111 not on its broader mandate of human rights.  It has identified business 
and human rights as a commitment in its 2009-2012 action plan,112 but has framed it 
unhelpfully as ‘we will build business and public awareness of the key human rights issues in 
the private sector’.113  As it stands the EHRC is a disappointment. It would require a much 
larger undertaking on the part of the EHRC to do what it would need to in order to satisfy 
the requirements of the body proposed here.114 The issues examined in this thesis would 
take the back seat to what are seen at present by the EHRC as more pressing human rights 
and equality issues, and the delay involved in strengthening such an institution is insufficient 
in the face of the speed with which digital human rights issues are arising and changing.   
The framework proposed is much more targeted than the current broad strokes approach of 
the EHRC, so without significant changes to the EHRC, it seems ill-fitting. What is missing 
concerning business and human rights in the digital age is not wider commitments to human 
rights, but operationalisation of these commitments.  Thus a more targeted regulatory body 
such as Ofcom might seem better suited to this task.  However this is also the weakness of 
Ofcom, and ultimately its downfall as its’ targeted, regulatory focus comes without a wider 
human rights remit nor room for the much needed research, education and policy arm.  This 
helps identify what is so meaningful about the corporate governance model proposed. We 
don’t need a new regulator. What the Digital Rights Commission offers is an avenue for the 
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state to fulfil its duty to protect human rights, and through this frame businesses duty to 
respect human rights.  
Ofcom is the UK’s communications regulator, regulating ‘TV and radio sectors, fixed line 
telecoms and mobiles, and the airwaves over which wireless devices operate.’115  It is a 
creature of statute; its remit, duties and responsibilities are set out in the Communications 
Act 2003.116 Under the Act, its principal duties are to further the interests of citizens 
concerning communications matter, and further the interests of consumers through 
promotion of competition in the marketplace.117  Its’ remit has been legislatively expanded 
since then, most recently to address the framework for handling illegal file sharers by 
ISPs.118 Thus there is a line of progressive expansion that a human rights commission can 
latch onto if the Government sees fit.   
Ofcom has been quite a controversial regulator in its few short years of service.119  Putting 
aside such matters, the ethos of Ofcom is simply at odds with a human rights-driven 
framework.  It is a regulator thus engaging the base layer of the corporate governance 
model proposed here, and engaging minimally the middle layer.  Its consultation work with 
industry for example for the Draft Code of Practice for file sharing engages this middle layer, 
but this is also good practice for any regulator, and Ofcom goes no further to engage the 
other criteria of the middle layer identified above. Ofcom cannot be said to engage the top 
layer education, policy and research arm at all. Its regulatory principles are tailored to 
minimal intervention and support of free market principles.  For example, it cites as one of 
its Regulatory Principles, ‘Ofcom will intervene when there is a specific statutory duty to 
work towards a public policy goal which markets alone cannot achieve’.120  Its principles of 
intervention align with the generally accepted principles of regulatory regimes, principles 
advocated here, specifically principles of proportionality, consistency, accountability and 
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transparency.121 In this respect, Ofcom has more clarity than the human rights based bodies 
discussed above concerning how to regulate.  Since the remedial regime forms the core 
base of the corporate governance model, knowledge and leadership on this aspect is crucial.   
However, Ofcom is not a human rights specialist, and the risk is that human rights concerns 
would be minimised in the face of technical and logistical issues that draw more readily on 
their expertise.  There is a risk that human rights would be turned into a mere regulatory 
issue, one to be codified and applied, which would either over-regulate business on terms 
more akin to the state or under-regulate business and leave the lacuna in the law unfilled. 
The soft law of corporate governance is crucial to engender human rights commitments by 
business and instigate a cultural shift, which a regulator, strictly speaking, cannot do. 
The examination of these four bodies shows the need for an independent Digital Rights 
Commission. Ofcom is far too regulatory in its orientation to take on a corporate 
governance role, and BIS and the ICO cannot provide the strength of structure proposed for 
this Commission.  The EHRC or a sub-commission thereof is struggling to find its footing at a 
time when its leadership in building a human rights culture in Britain is desperately needed.  
Something self-standing is the only way through the intractability of this dilemma.  An 
examination of these existing bodies brings home the importance of facilitating a human 
rights culture both online and off, and the need for a new Commission built around the 
governance model identified above as the way forward to achieve this goal. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
It seems almost trite to proclaim that the Internet’s democratic potential is dependent on a 
system of free expression.  Social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook have 
played important roles in the recent protests across Africa and the Middle East, spreading 
information and mobilising participants.122 Governments, seeing the power Internet 
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communications were enabling, sought to block access to mobile and Internet services.123  
This shows both the democratising potential of Internet empowered communications and 
the susceptibility to control that the networks face.  While we may dismiss these issues as 
singular to historically human rights oppressive regimes, the struggle for online freedoms is 
a pressing fight in the Western World as well. It is just taking place more insidiously and 
quietly in the private sphere dressed in the language of freedom – free market, free speech, 
and freedom of choice.     
The Internet is the conduit for communication in the digital age, making it the heart of any 
system of free expression.  The problem is that digitisation has fractured the system, 
separating the legal system of free expression from the experience.  This gap has been filled 
by CSR mostly in the form of encouragement by government of voluntary codes, or in the 
case of the IWF, the formalisation of a corporate governance framework to the point that 
the HRA directly applies. Both approaches have been wholly insufficient for the protection 
of freedom of expression online.  In the case of search engines, CSR has allowed search 
providers to simply side-step the issue of the free speech impact of their core business.  In 
the case of the IWF, CSR has simply been a linguistic tool obscuring its public authority 
status.  This status also risks dissuading companies from addressing their human rights 
responsibilities fearful of incurring direct liability.   
What is needed to mend the fracture is to build-up the administrative structure of speech 
protection. The structure needed is particular to the Information society and the concerns 
posed by digitisation and the only way through this minefield is through a partnership 
between business and government.  Let us be clear however: the argument of this thesis is 
that UK Government is very much tasked with leading this project and it has wholly 
neglected its positive human rights obligations to further a free speech culture by its laissez-
faire approach.  The Government does not “relinquish” its obligations under international 
human rights just because they contract or legislate the obligation to business.124  We need 
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Government to be involved in creating a governance framework at a national level, because 
in the end the experience of a system of freedom of expression is localised. 
What is needed is a Digital Rights Commission for business and human rights to address 
such issues.  Such a Commission captures the legal and extra-legal concerns with Internet 
governance.  The international human rights framework often has little more than naming 
and shaming to achieve its results, sometimes to good or bad result, and it would be 
inappropriate to relegate the business and human rights dilemma to a purely industry 
regulatory concern.  We cannot forget the key role of the consumer in advocating for 
business change.125  A UK strategy on business and human rights in the Information society 
is needed, and thus what is proposed is a template corporate governance model that 
captures the legal and extra-legal dimensions of this problem. This three-layered model, 
which would form the basis of the Commission, creates a framework of research, education 
and policy underpinned by a regulatory remedial mechanism.  Such a framework is the 
optimal approach to facilitating work between the legal and extra-legal dimensions of the 
human rights problem and for moving corporate governance forward in the Digital Age. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
When I started this project the subject of human rights and the Internet was still in its 
infancy and it was at times through vision more than example that its potential as a 
democratising force was articulated.  Questions about corporate social responsibility of 
Internet companies were even further removed from public concern, particularly in the 
United Kingdom.  Now the subject matter is coming of age.  Recent scandals surrounding 
Wikileaks, Twitter, and the role of technology in facilitating and hindering the protests in the 
Middle East, have served to draw attention to the critical role private companies play in 
making our exercise of human rights online possible.   
How do we then address these companies’ responsibilities when human rights laws do not 
directly apply to them?  This thesis has focused on what the United Kingdom can do to 
address this matter, and what is proposed in the final chapter serves as a template for other 
countries to address these issues.  This template is both a tweak in the way the relationship 
between human rights, corporate governance and the law is viewed, and a model 
governance regime for going forward.   
There is more work to be done.  The case studies in this thesis focused on macro-IIGs to 
identify for the reader the gatekeepers with the most impact on democratic discourse and 
to identify the startlingly scant governance environment in which they operate.  However, 
further research is needed of other macro-IIGs, such as mobile phone providers and their 
governance of smart-phone apps,1 and gatekeepers further down the scale, in particular 
authority gatekeepers such as social networking sites, wikis (Wikipedia for example), and 
Twitter.  With regard to authority gatekeepers, there are questions about whether 
voluntariness in corporate governance regimes might have a greater role to play the further 
we slide down the gatekeeping scale, where standardisation across industry might be less 
necessary and the engendering of a commitment to responsibility is.   
In addition, research is required concerning others human rights impacted by the activities 
of these gatekeepers, in particular privacy, and the sufficiency of corporate governance 
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codes to address them.  Privacy is the other side of the freedom of expression coin and is 
arguably a pre-condition to any meaningful exercise of the right to freedom of expression.  
The Internet has provided unprecedented opportunities for companies to profile consumer 
behaviour for the purpose of tracking buyer habits, tailoring advertisements to the 
individual, or selling the information to third party advertisers.  Several recent controversies 
have drawn legal and policy attention to the issue of data protection and retention, such as 
the sale of users real time browsing data to the broker Phorm for the purpose of targeted 
advertising,2 and the use by Facebook of the programme Beacon to track user purchases on 
third party sites and announcing their purchases to their Facebook friends.3  At a European 
level a right to be forgotten is currently being investigated by the European Commission as 
part of its data protection reform.4  More attention is needed concerning the human rights 
compliance of the many private regulatory structures that govern these activities and how 
the corporate governance model proposed here can be used and extended to address these 
issues.  
Finally, further research is required concerning ICT companies that are not necessarily 
Internet-related.  While this thesis sets up the democratising potential of the Internet, it is 
also clear from this thesis that technology is an integral component of the Information 
society, and the issues concerning human rights and corporate governance related to 
Internet companies also arise concerning other information technology companies.  In 
particular, the corporate governance of surveillance technologies such as Radio-Frequency 
Identification (RFID) and CCTV and mobile tracking is earmarked as an area of future 
research that builds on the project undertaken here.5   
At the moment there is no specific regulation of enhanced CCTV in the UK, though as at June 
2011 the Protection of Freedoms Bill is making its way through Parliament, which proposes 
creating a Surveillance Camera Commissioner to oversee a Code of Practice for CCTV 
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systems.6  With regard to RFID and mobile tracking there is even less developed to address 
responsibilities of corporate owners and users, although that is changing.  For example, with 
regard to RFID, which are chips that contain data readable by a smart card reader, the 
European Commission has turned its attention to its privacy implications and in April 2011 
formally adopted the Privacy Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications.7  The 
implications of this to the UK are not yet known.  In the case of mobile phones, the use of 
technology to track a person is regulated by an industry code of practice without any of the 
characteristics identified throughout this thesis as necessary for human rights compliance.8  
The area of surveillance has similarities to the work carried out here though in a different 
direction. It is an area of human rights significance, which companies have been able to 
sidestep thus far, and for which scant regulation currently applies.  How the Digital Rights 
Commission and corporate governance model can be applied to this subject matter, and the 
particularities presented by the surveillance dilemma, is a natural extension of my work and 
anticipated future project. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Reproduction of Barzilai-Nahon’s Gatekeeping Processes1 
 
Gatekeeping Bases  Definitions and References  
Selection  Making a choice or choosing from alternatives  
(Donohue et al., 1972; Gieber, 1956; Lawrence & Giles, 1999; Lewin, 1951; Shoemaker et al., 
2001; Singer & Gonzalez-Valez, 2003; Snider, 1967; Van Alstyne & Brynjolfsson, 2005; Wang & 
Benbasat, 2005; Westley & MacLean, 1957; White, 1950)  
Addition  Joining or uniting information  
(Introna & Nissenbaum, 2000; Q. Jones, Ravid, & Rafaeli, 2004)  
Withholding  Refraining from granting, giving or allowing information  
(Bass, 1969; Donohue et al., 1972; Introna & Nissenbaum, 2000)  
Display  Presenting information in a particular visual form designed to catch the eye  
(Deuze, 2001; Donohue et al., 1972; Hong, Thong, & Tam, 2004)  
Channeling  Conveying or directing information into or through a channel  
(Barabasi & Reka, 1999; Bass, 1969; Cohen, 2002; Dimitrova et al., 2003; Donohue et al., 1972; 
Elkin-Koren, 2001; Hargittai, 2000a, 2000b; Introna & Nissenbaum, 2000; Rogers, 2005)  
Shaping  Forming, especially giving a particular form of information  
(Bass, 1969; Deuze, 2001; Donohue et al., 1972; Elkin-Koren, 2001; Introna & Nissenbaum, 
2000; Singer, 2006; Tuchman, 1974)  
Manipulation  Changing information by artful or unfair means to serve the gatekeeper’s purpose  
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(Bagdikian, 2004; Donohue et al., 1972; Elkin-Koren, 2001; Introna & Nissenbaum, 2000; 
Zittrain, 2006)  
Repetition  Saying, showing, writing, restating; making; doing, or performing again  
(Donohue et al., 1972; Shoemaker, 1991)  
Timing  Selecting the precise moment for beginning, doing or completing an information process  
(Donohue et al., 1972; Morris, 2000)  
Localization 
(including 
translation)  
Process of modifying and adapting information, products and services to distinct target 
audiences in specific locations in a way that takes into account their cultural characteristics  
(Barzilai-Nahon & Barzilai, 2005; Compaine, 2000; Hansen, 2002; O'Hagan & Ashworth, 2002; 
Schultze & Boland, 2000; Sunstein, 2001; Van Alstyne & Brynjolfsson, 2005; Zittrain & 
Edelman, 2002)  
Integration  Forming, coordinating, or blending into a new functioning or unified whole  
(Bass, 1969; Compaine & Gomery, 2000; Elkin-Koren, 2001; Van Alstyne & Brynjolfsson, 2005)  
Disregard  Paying no attention to information, treating it as unworthy of regard or notice  
(Adams, 1980; Introna & Nissenbaum, 2000; Q. Jones et al., 2004; Lawrence & Giles, 1999;  
 
Deletion  Eliminating information especially by blotting out, cutting out, or erasing  
(Barzilai-Nahon & Neumann, 2005; Morris, 2000; Zittrain & Edelman, 2002)  
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APPENDIX B 
Reproduction of Barzilai-Nahon’s Gatekeeping Mechanisms2 
Gatekeeping Mechanism Bases  References  
Channeling mechanisms  
(e.g., search engines, directories, categorizations, 
hyperlinks)  
Channeling mechanisms are gateway stations designed to 
attract attention of gated and convey or direct them into 
or through their channels.  
(Arasu, Choo, Garcial-Molina, Paepcke, & Raghavan, 2001; 
Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, 2003; Broder et al., 2000; 
Dimitrova et al., 2003; Elkin-Koren, 2001; Hargittai, 2000a, 
2000b; Introna & Nissenbaum, 2000; Lawrence & Giles, 
1999; Mowshowitz & Kawaguchi, 2002; Rogers, 2005; 
Zittrain & Edelman, 2002) 
 
Censorship mechanisms (e.g., filtering, blocking, 
zoning, and deletion of information, users)  
Censorship mechanisms are a set of means aiming towards 
suppressing or deleting anything considered objectionable or 
undesired. That is, assuring that ‘undesired’ information does 
not enter or exit or circulates the gatekeeper network. For 
example, blocking users from entering into a corporation 
email system.  
(Blakeney & Macmillan, 1999; Deibert, 2002; Hunter, 2000; 
Lessig, 2006; Marx, 1998; A. Shapiro, 1999; Wang & Benbasat, 
2005; Zuboff, 1988)  
Internationalization mechanisms (localization and 
translation)  
These mechanisms cover methodologies of localizing 
information, services and products, according to 
characteristics of communities based for example on customs, 
cultures, nationalities, languages and religions.  
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(Hansen, 2002; O'Hagan & Ashworth, 2002)  
Security mechanisms (e.g., authentication controls, 
integrity controls, access controls)  
Security mechanisms try to manage confidentiality, availability 
and integrity of information flow in the gatekeeper’s network.  
(Hawkins, Yen, & Chou, 2000; Oppliger, 2002; Panko, 2003; 
Pfleeger, Pfleeger, & Ware, 2002; Singh, 2000)  
Cost-effect mechanisms (e.g., cost of joining, cost of 
usage, and cost of exiting the network)  
Mechanisms that control the cost of gated to join, use and exit 
a gatekeeper’s network. The cost of joining a network refers 
among other things to the cost of infrastructure, connecting to 
infrastructure and maintaining it as controlled by the 
gatekeeper. The cost of usage includes the cost required to 
acquire skills to operate in the gatekeeper’s network and its 
sections. Finally the cost to exit mainly focuses on the cost 
imposed by the gatekeeper, when a gated attempts exiting 
the gatekeeper’s network.  
(Yochai Benkler, 2006; Brynjolfsson & Kahin, 2000; Compaine, 
2000; Cooper, 2002; Hoffman & Novak, 2000a; Hudson, 2000; 
Q. Jones et al., 2004; Lessig, 2006; C. Shapiro & Varian, 1999; 
M. D. Smith, Bailey, & Brynjolfsson, 2000; Van Alstyne & 
Brynjolfsson, 2005)  
Value-adding mechanisms (personalization, 
contextualization, customization, and integration of 
information tools)  
Controlling information through providing added value 
products and services that increase the attractiveness of the 
gatekeeper network and its sections to gated. Value-adding 
mechanisms can serve as a lock-in mechanism to attract 
potential gated to the network or prevent gated from exiting 
it.  
(Amit & Zott, 2001; Hargittai, 2000a, 2000b; Kenny & 
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Marshall, 2000; Levin & Zahavi, 2002; Porter, 2001; C. Shapiro 
& Varian, 1999; M. D. Smith et al., 2000; Sung-Eui & Kwangtae, 
2002)  
Infrastructure mechanisms (e.g., network access, 
technology channels, and network configuration)  
Mechanisms which utilize infrastructure components and 
characteristics to control information and behavior of gated.  
(Brousseau, 2002; Compaine, 2000; Cooper, 2002; Hoffman & 
Novak, 2000b; Hudson, 2000; Nuechterlein & Weiser, 2005; 
Panko, 2003; Stallings, 2001)  
User interaction mechanisms (e.g., add-on 
navigation tools)  
Application which act as intermediaries between the gated 
and the network. These mechanisms reside at the interface 
layer. In many cases but not always gated are aware of their 
existence and play a proactive role and consent to exercise 
them. For example, setting a default hompage while installing 
a browser.  
(Cornfield & Rainie, 2003; A. Shapiro, 1999; Sorensen, Macklin, 
& Beaumont, 2001; Wasko, Faraj, & Teigland, 2004)  
Editorial mechanisms (similar to traditional 
gatekeeping – e.g., technical controls, content 
controls, and design tools of information content)  
Very similar to the Communication literature which explores 
in-depth mechanisms used by editors. These mechanisms 
refer mainly to editing mechanisms of content.  
(Detlor, Sproule, & Gupta, 2003; Deuze, 2001; Hong et al., 
2004; Q. Jones et al., 2004; Kim & Benbasat, 2003; Robbins & 
Stylianou, 2003; M. A. Smith, 1999)  
Regulation meta- mechanism (this mechanism is a 
meta-mechanism that can apply in the area of each 
one of the other mechanisms above - e.g. state 
regulation of security, self-regulation of 
categorization of information) 
This mechanism is a meta mechanism which is applied 
through each one of the other mechanisms. It refers to rules, 
arrangements, treaties, agreements or procedures that aim to 
control and direct behavior through information control.  
(Agre, 2002; Yocai Benkler, 2000; Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, 
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2003; Blakeney & Macmillan, 1999; Brousseau, 2002; 
d'Udekem-Gevers & Poullet, 2002; Elkin-Koren, 2001; Lessig, 
2006; MacLean, 2004; Perritt, 1997; A. Shapiro, 1999; Zittrain 
& Edelman, 2002) 
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GLOSSARY 
ASA Advertising Standards Authority 
BBFC British Board of Film Classification 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
BIS Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 
EICC Electronic Industry Code of Conduct 
EHRC Equality and Human Rights Commission 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
GNI Global Network Initiative 
HRA Human Rights Act 
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
ICO Information Commissioner’s Office 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
IIG Internet Information Gatekeeper 
ISPA Internet Service Providers Association 
IWF Internet Watch Foundation 
NCP National Contact Point 
NHRI National Human Rights Institution 
OfCom Office of Communications 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PCC Press Complaints Commission 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
WTO World Trade Organization  
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